A study in evil: Najm al-Dīn II-Ghāzī and Renaud of Châtillon as 'the other' in the histories of the crusading period by Mallett, Alex
A Study in Evil: Najm al-Din 11-Ghazi and Renaud of 






I confirm that this thesis is all my own work. It has not been submitted or published before 
in any way, except for an edited version of Chapter One, which will be published in the
journal al-Masaq in 2010.
1
Acknowledgements
The completion of this thesis would have been impossible without the help, advice and 
support of a vast number of people. Foremost among these has been Carole Hillenbrand, 
who has been the model supervisor, and whose guidance, suggestions, patience, and help 
with Arabic, have been invaluable. I would also like to thank Andrew Newman, Judith 
Green, Kirsten Fenton, David D’Avray, Jonathan Phillips, Tom Asbridge, Stephen Burge, L. 
Stephanie Tait, Saeko Yazaki, Christine Lindner, Joklia al-Harthi, and Songul Melcit, all of 
whom have provided me with help and support over problems and questions of 
methodology, source material or Arabic. I would also like to thank the council of the British 
Society for Middle Eastern Studies, who awarded me a 2006 postgraduate research grant 
and the 2007 Abdullah al-Mubarak scholarship.
This thesis would not have been possible without my wife, Sarah, whose patience and 
understanding have often been tested, but who has always been full of love and support. I 
would also like to express my gratitude to my parents, Philip and Anne, whose interest in 
history and culture has had a profound effect on me, and whose support through my 
undergraduate university course laid the foundation for my interest in the Crusades. Lastly, 
and by no means least, I would like to express my sincere thanks to Martin and Geraldine 
Shenton, without whose help this thesis would never have been completed. My gratitude for 




A Study in Evil: Naim al-Din Il-Ghazi and Renaud o f Chatillon as ‘The O ther’
in the Histories o f the Crusading Period
Abstract
Throughout the medieval period, the chroniclers who wrote the sources which modem 
historians use as the bases of their enquiries wrote them with particular concepts in their 
minds. These concepts permeate every aspect of their work, from grand, sweeping themes to 
the vocabulary employed, and each aspect makes a contribution, large or small, to the 
history of ideas. This thesis will use a case-study approach to explore one aspect of medieval 
chronicles of the crusades: the concept of the evil ‘other’. This will be achieved by 
examining the image of two of the most controversial figures in the history of the crusades, 
Najm al-Dln Il-GhazI and Renaud of Chatillon. This thesis will examine the themes in the 
writings of the period, to understand the reasons for the presentations of the individuals in 
each chronicle, and whether the themes cross political and religious boundaries, and if so, 
why. In the first chapter, the image of Il-GhazI in the Christian chronicles will be examined, 
to help in the understanding of the reasons for and development of Christian ideas of the 
Muslim as evil. This will be followed by his image in the Islamic chronicles, in the second 
chapter, to elucidate whether the same characteristics are highlighted or not, and why this 
might be. In the third chapter, the image of Renaud of Chatillon in the Islamic sources will 
be studied, in order to illuminate the reasons why the Islamic writers saw the Christian as an 
evil other. Finally, Renaud’s image in the Christian sources will be expounded in chapter 
four, to shed light on whether he is presented in the same way as the Muslim sources, or not, 
and the reasons for this. The conclusions reached through these chapters will provide a 
contribution to the history of ideas of the ‘other’, particularly the underlying reasons behind 
these ideas. This thesis will also evaluate current views on how the chroniclers perceived the 
individuals, as well as helping to establish whether current historical theories involving II- 
Ghazi and Renaud are tenable.
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The footnotes are numbered consecutively throughout the thesis. Each new reference is given 
in full, with the exception of those which have been cited in the abbreviations.
A Note on Dating
The dates are given in both Christian (A.D.) and Muslim (A.H.) calendar. When dealing with 
Christian sources, the Christian date is cited first, and when referring to Muslim sources, the 
Islamic date is given first. In the introduction and conclusion, the former has been employed.
A Note on Placenames
The placenames in this thesis are given in transliteration of their Arabic names, except 
where there is a recognisable, well-known English equivalent, such as Jerusalem for al-Quds, 
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Introduction
Aim  o f  the Thesis:
Najm al-DIn Il-Ghazi and Renaud of Chatillon are two of the most controversial 
characters in the history of the Crusades. Their actions against their enemies -  and 
sometimes their co-religionists -  caused outrage among some chroniclers, while eliciting 
praise from others. The aim of this thesis is to examine the image of these two individuals -  
one from each side of the religious divide -  in the chronicles, from the other side of this 
divide, in order to understand the creation and development of images of the ‘other’ in 
writings from this period. The result of this study will be to enhance understanding of both 
the history and literature of the crusading period, an aim which will be realised in two main 
ways.
Firstly, this study will examine the idea of the ‘other’ by attempting to show in 
microcosm how ideas of the ‘other’ formed in the chronicles, what the bases for these ideas 
are, how they changed across time and religious perspective, and whether, broadly speaking, 
the presentations are consistent across the chronicles. To achieve this, the individuals will 
firstly be examined in the writings of the chronicler from amongst their religious opponents 
which contain the most information about them. This will then be compared with other 
chronicles of that same opposing religious group to evaluate whether there are common 
themes running throughout. Finally, the presentation of these two leaders will be examined 
in the chronicles of their own religious community to discover whether the views in these 
works tally with the descriptions already examined, and if not, why and how these 
discrepancies emerged.
These two leaders have been chosen because their actions have produced some of the 
fiercest vitriol from sources from outside their own communities, and so it will be possible,
11
through investigating sources from both sides of the religious divide, to determine whether 
or not they are seen in the same way, or if there are noticeable differences. The conclusion 
reached will, it is hoped, provide a more balanced view of the individual in question, an 
understanding of why the medieval chroniclers portrayed their opponents as they did, and 
contribute to investigations of concepts of the ‘other’ in the Crusades, and more widely. A 
better understanding of the individuals will lead to a fuller appreciation of the events in 
which they participated. For example, a shift in understanding the personality of Renaud of 
Châtillon will put a different interpretation on the events for which he has been criticised, 
such as the attack into the Red Sea in 1183/578, or the pillaging of Cyprus in 1156/551.
Secondly, this thesis will be one of the first studies in modem times to view the 
Crusades from both the Christian and Islamic traditions at the same time, to an equal extent. 
A tradition of using sources from both sides existed during the late nineteenth and twentieth 
century, and valuable work was carried out in this manner by the great Claude Cahen.1 Yet 
since his passing there has been little attempt to take up his mantle and attempted to study 
the Crusades using material from both sides equally. The result is that crusade historians 
have access only to translated versions of Arabic texts, which are few in number compared 
to the overall extant corpus of material available on the crusade side and, in the case of the 
Recueil' which is still the main source used by crusade historians, its text are badly 
translated.2 This means that while research on the Latin side of the Crusades has forged 
ahead with great success by historians who can read Latin, that of the Islamic perspective 
has not made significant progress in the last hundred years when compared to research on 
the Latin side. There have, recently, been some attempts to rectify this discrepancy, notably
1 See, for example, C. Cahen, La Syrie du nord à l ’époque des croisades et la principauté franque d ’Antioche, 
Paris, 1940.
~ Receuil des Historiens des Croisades: Documents Orientaux, 5 Vols, Paris, 1872 -  1906, vols. I, pp. 1 8 9 -7 1 4  
& II, pp. 3 -  180. See also C. Hillenbrand, ‘Sources in Arabic’, in Byzantines and Crusaders in Non-Greek 
Sources, ed. M. Whitby, Proceedings o f  the British Academy 132, Oxford, 2007, p. 316.
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Maalouf s narrative history of the Crusades3 and Hillenbrand’s recent thematic study.4 Yet 
in the last twenty-five years since M aalouf s book was first published these have been the 
only two volumes devoted to the Islamic side of the Crusades, while there have been 
hundreds published from the Latin side, with the result that the history of the Crusades is 
glaringly one-sided. This study will attempt to correct these problems, as it will utilise both 
western European and Arabic texts, in order to gain a more balanced view of the events and 
personalities in question, while hopefully encouraging other scholars of the Crusades to 
study in the same way.
A Note on the Use o f  the Terms ‘the Other’ and ‘E v il’:
The idea of ‘the other’ forms the backbone of this thesis, and a brief explication of its 
employment is necessary. As demonstrated below, the idea of ‘the other’ has been 
investigated to some extent by historians of the Crusades, and Latin and Islamic Medieval 
History more generally5. On the basis of their views, for the purposes of this study, the term 
‘the other’ will be used in its broadest possible sense, in order to gain as full an appreciation 
as is achievable of the attitudes surrounding these individuals. Therefore, the Muslim 11- 
GhazI will be studied not only from the perspective of the Latins, but also, where possible, 
from that of the Byzantines and the Native Christians, while the Latin Renaud of Chatillon 
will be studied through the prosopography of these two groups as well as those of the 
Muslims. The term ‘evil’ is one which is examined when it is employed by the medieval 
writer as a realist idea. It is used in this thesis to signify the opinion of the medieval writer 
that the subject upon which he was writing was particularly, vehemently opposed to 
God/Allah, who is by definition good, meaning that any opposition would automatically be
3 A. Maalouf, The Crusades Through Arab Eyes, London, 1984.
C. Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Istamic Perspectives, Edinburgh, 1999
’ See below, pp. 15 -  29.
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evil. Thus, it is a term which signifies the subject as one who is strongly and actively 
opposed to the author’s own worldview.
Aims o f  this Chapter:
This introductory chapter is intended to act as a background to the historical and 
historiographical basis for the theory of ‘the other’, the Crusades in general, and Il-GhazI 
and Renaud of Chatillon in particular. This background will present a sound basis for the 
enquiry of this thesis, enabling the issues explored to be fully appreciated by the reader.
In order to achieve this aim, this chapter will focus on four main points. The first of 
these is the theory of the other. An understanding of this concept will give the background 
to the theory on which the thesis is based, including how it has developed and why it is 
important. The theory will be the basis for the ideas being discussed in the thesis, yet it will 
also be tested by the thesis itself to examine whether or not the theory is accurate in the 
circumstances examined.
Secondly, this chapter will review the Crusades and the Islamic writings which are 
studied in a historical context, in order to elucidate both the circumstances which influenced 
the writers of the sources, and to gain a full appreciation of the events in which the two 
individuals participated.
Thirdly, it will examine scholarly approaches to the crusade and counter-crusade, 
including how -  and if -  they relate to the theory of the ‘other’. This will provide a sound 
starting point as a basis for the thesis, and the theories which have been previously put 
forward. These theories include the motivations of the individuals, the reason for their 
particular presentation in the sources, and whether the theory of the ‘other’ has or can be 
used in the context of the Crusades.
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Finally, this chapter will present an overview and background to the source material. 
The material which deals with the Crusades is an extremely large corpus, coming from a 
great number of different political, ethnic, religious, and cultural arenas -  and is in a variety 
of different languages -  and all these need to be considered when examining them. While a 
full review of every source is impossible in this thesis, due to space if nothing else, a basic 
understanding of them will serve to highlight current ideas as to their preoccupations and 
biases, helping the reader to understand how each source will be approached, and why their 
presentations of the individuals may be as they are.
Theory o f  the ‘other’ in crusader studies and beyond:
In one of the few works to examine issues of identity in the crusader states, Murray 
has stated that the writings of William of Tyre, Walter the Chancellor and Fulcher of 
Chartres, the three main sources for the Crusades up to 1187/583, ‘describe the Europeans of 
Outremer in a way which primarily stresses their distinctiveness from the other peoples of 
the Middle East’6, and that their use of terms such as Franci and Latini are in direct contrast 
to terms such as Turci, Saraceni and Suriani.1 Yet this article only examines how the Latin 
chroniclers built up an idea of commonality, a gens nostra, and, like the medieval chroniclers 
themselves, rather ignores the Muslims and Eastern Christians when examining the ‘other’ 
during the crusades. Thus, for previous examinations of the presentation of the ‘other’ in the 
crusading period, it is necessary to look to more general studies of this topic.
In his excellent account of the history of Christian views of Muslims during the 
medieval period, Southern has written that, up to the end of the twelfth century, there were 
two main stages in the development of these views. The first stage lasted between the
6 A. Murray, ‘Ethnic Identity in the Crusader States’, in Concepts o f National Identity in the Middle Ages, ed. S. 
Forde et al, Leeds, 1995, p. 61.
7 ibid., p. 64.
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seventh/first century and the year 1100/493, while the second was 1100/493 until 1140/534. 
In the first period, Islam made Europe feel uneasy, as it both questioned their own beliefs 
and was unpredictable.8 This was because little was known of Islam, as it was just one of a 
number of threats, and, although the Muslims were a definite threat at the time, they were 
not particularly attacked by Latin writers. The Christians of Latin Europe used the Bible as 
their main source of knowledge about Muslims, using the account in Genesis of Abraham, 
Hagar, and Ishmael to place the Arab-Muslims into a historical context. It was only in Spain 
that they were regarded as part of the eschatological forces mentioned in Revelations.9 It 
was with the change in the year 1100/493 that literature began to mention Islam more, 
although initially this was more from general gossip brought back by returning crusaders 
and from Constantinople. Southern writes that it was in these circumstances that ‘men 
inevitably shape the world they do not know in the likeness of the world they do know. 
Nowhere is this more clear than in early Latin literature about Islam’. Thus, if Christianity 
had a trinity, so must Islam; if Christians think Christ was God, so Muslims must think 
Muhammad was.10 Yet, Southern continues, this imagination led to observation, and first 
steps to understandings were taken by men such as William of Malmesbury and Petrus 
Alfonsi."
Jones is broadly in agreement, noting that the Christian writers of the medieval period 
rarely used ‘barbarian’ to describe Muslims. When this term is employed for Muslims, it is 
usually to highlight their non-Christian status, because they were not barbarians in the 
classical sense of being pagan or lacking in moral values. Christian writers could see that 
Muslim societies were, generally, sophisticated and religious, which implied a set of moral 
values, and the religion was believed to be a heresy, albeit a very dangerous one, instead of a
g
R.W. Southern, Western Views o f Islam in the Middle Ages, London, 1978, p. 4.
9 ibid., pp. 14 -  5.
10 ibid., p. 32.
" ibid., pp. 3 3 - 5 .
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pagan religion.12 He thus suggests that the medieval Europeans regarded Islam as being 
peripheral to European attitudes towards barbarians, and so there was a respect towards 
Islam. This implies that, perhaps subconsciously, medieval Christendom regarded Islam as 
an ‘other’, but a closer ‘other’ than barbarians such as the pagans of Scandinavia and 
Eastern Europe.
Edward Said, on the other hand, takes a very different view, believing that ‘the 
European encounter with the orient, and specifically with Islam...turned Islam into the very 
epitome of an outsider against which the whole of European civilisation from the middle 
ages was founded’.13 In his view, while the earlier barbarian invaders had incorporated 
themselves into the old Roman Empire, the Islamic invasions stiffened the resolve of Europe 
against the invaders and shifted the centre of European culture from the Latinate 
Mediterranean to Germanic Northern Europe. Said thus believes that from the very moment 
of the first Islamic attack on Europe, European attitudes to Islam were hostile and were to 
remain so for centuries.14 Daniel has written along much the same lines, though he implies 
that the Islamic invasions, acknowledged by Said, were in the imagination of the 
Europeans15, and that this was the catalyst for the latent xenophobia which was bubbling 
under the surface in Europe, to find its expression in cultural arrogance and a ‘complex and 
fully articulate theory of defensive war’.16 From this perspective, Latin Europe, from the 
very start, thought of Islam as a menacing ‘other’, and this image continued throughout the 
Middle Ages.
There are thus two main theories regarding the Latin attitude to Islam in the Middle
Ages. Southern and Jones see the Latins as having little interest in Islam during the early
12 W.R. Jones, ‘The Image of the Barbarian in Medieval Europe’, in Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 13 (1971), pp. 388 -3 9 2 .
J E. Said, Orientalism, London, 1995, p.70.
14 ibid., pp. 70 -  1.15He writes that the Europeans had ‘a belief in an Islamic aggression’. N. Daniel, The Arabs and Medieval 
Europe, London, 1975, p. 114.
16 ibid., p. 115.
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medieval period and beyond, occupied as they were by other, more pressing, threats, posed 
by others who were more ‘other’. Southern goes further, and implies that there was a 
gradual interest in learning about Islam which started c. 1100/493; this date would imply 
that the Crusades played an important part in helping Europe to discover Islam. The 
exception to this was in Spain, although Islam had taken hold here so much that it was 
culturally not Latin any more. Said and Daniel take the opposite view, and argue that Islam 
was from the start regarded as a threat by Europe, and the Muslims were thus the very 
definition of ‘the other’ right from the very beginning. Of these two views, that put forward 
by Southern and Jones seems the most plausible, as they engage with source material from 
both sides of the discussion, weighing up both sides of the argument before reaching their 
conclusions, while Said and Daniel do not consider evidence from the opposing view in 
theirs.
In his study of Muslim perceptions of non-Muslims, Azmeh makes a number of
conclusions relevant to this study. Firstly, he notes that many of the stereotypes prevalent
during the crusades were initially voiced during the ninth and tenth centuries, in travellers’
tales, which were copied verbatim by chroniclers across the Muslim world, without
question. The result was that the early prejudices were repeated, without question, over the
centuries until it was commonly acknowledged as ‘the truth’.1 Secondly, the Arabs divided
the world into climactic zones, each of which determined the personality of the peoples of
that zone. Their area, particularly Syria, Mesopotamia and Egypt, was seen as the perfect
zone for human development, meaning that the Arabs regarded themselves as being, through
their civilisation, learning and culture, the pinnacle of humanity. The Franks, on the other
hand, were from a colder northern climactic zone, which meant that they were barbarous -
though not barbarians. This indicates that the Arabs regarded them as given to
17 A. Azmeh, ‘Barbarians in Arab Eyes’, in Past and Present 134 (1992), pp. 5 - 6 .  See also tlillenbrand, 
Crusades, p. 268.
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sociologically inferior pursuits such as war and the chase, instead of more civilised pursuits, 
while their personal cleanliness, sexual licence and funerary rites also demonstrated their
barbarous condition. The Franks were also seen as physically inferior, being fat, infertile,
18and with reddish complexions, all of which contrasted with the Arabs’ own looks. In 
essence, the Arabs formed the image of ‘the other’, and therefore of the Franks, by regarding 
them as being an inversion of the norm -  of the inhabitants of the perfect climactic zones, in 
which they lived.19 This situation was not regarded as accidental. They had been chosen by 
Allah as a special people, and so had been placed in the perfect position in terms of society, 
culture and geography, and this could be seen in the power relations the Arabs had with the 
rest of the world.20 Therefore, Azmeh sees the Arabs as believing that they were superior to 
the Franks through both logic and experience.
General Introduction to Cross-Cultural Relations and the ‘Other’ During the Crusades: The 
Latin Perspective
The address which Pope Urban II gave to the crowd which had gathered in a field at 
Clermont in November 1095/Dhu’l-Qa‘da 488 to hear him was not one about which he had 
any doubts. His sermon which would spawn the Crusades was something which would 
benefit everyone under his care -  all of ‘us’. As head of the Latin Church, with an eye on the 
welfare of the Eastern Christians, he stated that it was his duty to look after their spiritual 
interests, a responsibility he appeared to take very seriously. Using the main tenets of 
centuries-old ideas about just war, together with more recent developments in the scope and 
role of the papacy, a means had been created by which the problems among his own society
18 A. Azmeh, ‘Barbarians in Arab Eyes’, in Past and Present 134 (1992), pp. 6 -  14, and Hillenbrand, Crusades, 
p. 270.
19 A. Azmeh, ‘Barbarians in Arab Eyes’, in Past and Present 134 (1992), p. 17.
20 ibid., p. 18.
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could be channelled to a just cause -  fighting the enemies of Christ -  in the Holy Land. 
The result of this was that those fighting would gain forgiveness for their sins, and the 
Eastern Christians would receive protection. This was required as they had, according to one 
account, been ‘reduced...with sword, rapine and flame’ by the Muslims, who ‘cut open the 
navels of those whom they choose to torment with a loathsome death, tear out their most
vital organs and tie them to a stake, drag them around and flog them, before killing them as
22
they lie prone on the ground with their entrails out’. The imagery used in this account by 
Robert of Rheims is clear in its portrayal of the Muslim ‘other’ as savage and ungodly23, and 
although these may not have been Urban’s exact words, they surely reflect his sentiment.24 
Thus, from the very inception of the Crusades, the lines were drawn -  the Christians, 
including non-Latins, were ‘us’, and the Muslims were the ‘other’.
This Latin idea of the Muslim as the ‘other’ continued throughout the history of the 
Crusades without great change. There were individual cases when a new perspective on 
Muslims developed, particularly among those Latins living in the Holy Land, such as 
Raymond of Tripoli, but generally this assessment holds. However, the attitude of the 
Latins to the Byzantine Greeks, and to a lesser extent to the native Christians of Syria, did 
change. Although the Greeks were initially regarded as being among the beneficiaries of the 
crusade25, political disagreements between the two religious groups meant it was not long 
before the Greeks were being seen in some quarters as another ‘other’. As early as 1104/497 
Bohemond, ruler of Antioch, returned to Europe to seek soldiers to fight against the
21 See, among others, M. Bull., ‘Origins’, in The Oxford History o f  the Crusades, ed. J. Riley-Smith, Oxford, 
1999, and The First Crusade: Scope and Consequences, ed. J. Phillips, Manchester, 1997.
~ From the account of Robert of Rheims (Robert the Monk), in J. & L. Riley-Smith, The Crusades: Idea and 
Reality, London, 1981, p.43.
This is especially underlined in the account of Robert of Rheims, who writes ‘the Persians (Muslims), a 
foreign race, a race absolutely alien to God’. Cited in J. & L. Riley-Smith, The Crusades: Idea and Reality, 
London, 1981, p.43.
24 ibid, pp. 1 0 -1 1 .
Fulcher of Chartres, Robert of Rheims and Guibert of Nogent all underline the threat to Byzantium in their 
accounts o f the sermon of Urban II. See J. & L. Riley-Smith, The Crusade: Idea and Reality, London, 1981, pp. 
4 1 -4 9 .
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Byzantines, presenting them as a religious ‘other’ to be fought after his experiences on the 
First Crusade.26 This awareness of difference grew steadily wider over the next century, 
with demands to attack Constantinople itself being heard as early the Second Crusade in 
1147/541, when a number of crusaders believed that the Greeks were deliberately not 
helping them, thus developing still further the idea of the Greeks as ‘other’27. The situation
came to a head in the Fourth Crusade, in 1204/600, when Constantinople was captured by
28the crusaders, who set about creating a Latin state centred on the city -  creating 
something familiar from something which was an ‘other’. Thus, the history of Latin 
attitudes towards the Greeks during the crusades was one which was transformed from 
regarding them as being part of ‘us’ to being a very different ‘other’.
The crusaders went through a similar process with the native Christians in Syria, 
though perhaps to a lesser extent. When Urban II spoke at Clermont, the protection of these 
groups was a main priority29, and for the first decades the crusaders were supportive of 
them. However, the attitude of the crusaders towards these groups did gradually change, and 
they were eventually regarded as another ‘other’, primarily because of the increasingly bad 
treatment which the Eastern Christians received at the hands of the political and religious 
rulers amongst the Franks. In the same way the Muslims had been able to conquer much 
Byzantine territory in the seventh century because of the resentment among local Christians 
to Byzantine Orthodoxy, so the Latins gradually created the same feeling among the Eastern 
Christians, meaning that this potentially useful group of people did not co-operate.30
26 S. Runciman, A History o f the Crusades, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1952, pp. 4 6 -4 9 ;  and Harris, Byzantium p. 78.
J. Phillips, & M. Hoch, ‘Introduction’, in The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences, pp. 1 0 -1 1 , and 
Harris, Byzantium, p. 100.
~8 M. Angold, The Fourth Crusade, London, 2003.
See the account of the Council of Clermont by Baldric of Bourgeuil, in J. & L. Riley-Smith, The Crusades: 
Idea and Reality, London, 1981, pp. 4 9 -5 3 .
M. Moosa, ‘The Crusades: An Eastern Perspective, With Emphasis on the Syriac Sources’, in The Muslim 
World93:2, 2003, pp. 2 4 9 -2 8 9 .
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The Muslim Perspective
From the perspective of the Muslims, who were on the receiving end of the crusades, 
this phenomenon was not, of course, the noble quest which the Pope had described. The 
Franks of Latin Europe were regarded as a backward and barbarous race by the self-assured 
Muslims; their only skill was in military action, and they had none of the culture, learning or 
sophistication which made the Muslims so self-confident.31 From the very start of Islam the 
Muslim community had been aware that they were one group, an ‘us’, and everyone around 
them was regarded as an ‘other’.32 Whether Byzantine, Sassanian, pagan, or Frank, the 
Muslims saw the ‘other’ everywhere, and although they could, and did, distinguish between 
different groups of ‘other’, the awareness of that concept existed right from the beginning of
33Islam, and was reinforced by Arabic literature of the time. The Crusades did nothing to 
change this, and indeed heightened the Muslim awareness of the Franks as ‘other’34 -  from 
being a previously unencountered group from the remote and cold northern lands who were 
little threat, they became a chief enemy of the Muslims of Syria.
The central cause of this was the unexpected damage wrought by the Franks. The 
results were devastating: many Muslims were killed in the aftermath of crusader victories - 
especially during the early crusader successes - and they lost a large tract of territory. 
However, it was the psychological blow as much as the physical loss which hurt. Never 
before had their territory been conquered so quickly and so unexpectedly, the loss being
31 Hillenbrand, Crusades, esp. pp. 267 — 271; and A. Maalouf, The Crusades Through Arab Eyes, London, 1984,
p. 1
" This concept of Muslim community, known as the ‘umma, as ‘us’, forms one of the core bases of the Islamic 
identity. It is based on the pre-lslamic Arabian tribal system, which regarded everyone outside one’s own tribe 
as an ‘other’. The ‘umma became an ‘Islamic tribe’, being both a new tribe -  thus behaving like the old tribes 
and operating in the old tribal system -  and a supra-tribe, made up of members of many differing tribes. The 
result of this was that, as the previous tribes had done, Muslims automatically regarded anything outside the 
Islamic community as an ‘other’. See H. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age o f the Caliphates, London, 1986, p. 
34.
33
Hillenbrand, Crusades, p. 274.
j4 ibid.
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intensified because it was delivered by so contemptible a people.36 The strength of feeling 
due to the violation was so much that the poetry of the time, such as Ibn Khayyat’s Dlwan, 
described the loss as akin to rape.36 These physical and psychological blows underlined 
clearly to the Muslims how different, how ‘other’, the Frankish crusaders were. Their ethnic 
otherness was understood by the Muslim world, but it was the religious otherness which was 
to matter most, and their mere presence served to underline this.37 Although the regional 
Muslim rulers did not initially regard the crusaders as religious enemies, Muslim religious 
scholars and judges did, and to them the territory lost was part of the Dar al-Islam, Islamic 
territory, and so the loss was regarded not so much a political embarrassment as either a 
challenge from Allah to the faithful, or as punishment for their sins, or both. Whichever it 
was believed to be theologically, this ‘other’ -  in the form of the Latin crusaders -  had 
become their sworn enemies -  the most ‘other of the others’ -  and the belief that this war 
was between two religions gradually permeated Islamic society until it reached the ruler, 
and it was then that the anti-crusader jihadbegm  in earnest.39
The Byzantine Greek Perspective
The Muslims were not the only people to suffer at the hands of the crusaders. 
Although supposedly one of the chief beneficiaries of the whole crusading idea, from the 
very beginning of the enterprise the Byzantine Greeks were affected negatively. The Greeks 
were also very aware, right from the beginning of the Crusades, that the Frankish crusaders
33 ibid, pp. 69 -  74
J’ Ibn Khayyät, Diwan, ed. H. Mardam Bek, Damascus, 1958, pp. 1 8 4 -6 . See also Hillenbrand, Crusades, pp. 
297-298 .
37 Hillenbrand, Crusades, p. 293 -  297.
3i< ibid, pp. 69 -  74.39 x
For a full discussion on the Muslim responses to the coming of the Crusades, see Hillenbrand, Crusades, esp. 
pp. 69 -  84, and P.M. Holt, The Age o f  the Crusades, London, 1986, pp. 27 -  29.
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were an ‘other’.40 Their appeal to the west for help against the Muslims, while having the 
illusion of reflecting similarities between the two groups, actually serves to highlight their 
differences. These differences, while initially hidden, rose to the surface as soon as the 
crusaders approached Greek territory. Whenever a crusading army chose the land route to 
Syria, it had to pass through almost the entire length of the Byzantine Empire, including 
often long stays just outside the capital Constantinople before they were taken across the 
Bosphorus. As is typical of a large army, the crusaders often left a trail of destruction in 
their wake, and on several occasions threatened the capital itself.41 Thus the Greeks became 
terrified of what the crusaders might do42, as they did not comprehend the motives or aims 
of this ‘other’.
Although Byzantine awareness of the ‘otherness’ of the crusaders was at its height 
when crusading armies were passing through Greek territory, it remained high, and 
consequently relations between the two were at a low level, throughout most of the history 
of the crusades, and it was centred around who was to have jurisdiction over northern Syria. 
The seeds of this were sown before the First Crusade had even reached Syria, at the time 
when the crusaders committed to give back to the Byzantine Empire any land which had 
previously been Byzantine land that was captured.43 When the crusaders captured the 
formerly Greek city of Antioch, the Byzantines believed they should be given it, as per the 
terms described above.44 However, the crusaders, and Bohemond in particular, refused to do
40 Relations between the Greeks and Latins over the fifty years leading up to the crusades had served to 
highlight the Greek view of the Latins as an ‘other’, particularly questions over papal primacy and who was the 
inheritor of the Roman Empire. Harris, Byzantium, pp. 22 & 44 -  46.
J. Shepard, ‘Cross-Purposes: Alexius Comnenus and the First Crusade’, in J. Phillips (ed.), The First 
Crusade: Origins and Impact, Manchester, 1997, pp. 108 -  110.
‘ John Kinnamos writes that the crusaders ‘had been set in motion, on the handy excuse that they were going to 
cross from Europe to Asia to fight the Turks en route and recover the church in Palestine and seek the holy 
places, but truly to gain possession of the Romans’ (i.e. Byzantines’) land by assault and trample down 
everything in front of them’, p. 58. This view is echoed by Anna Comnena, The Alexiad, tr. E.R.A. Sewter, 
Penguin, 1979, pp 311 -  312.
J. Shepard, ‘Cross-Purposes: Alexius Comnenus and the First Crusade’, in J. Phillips (ed.), The First 
Crusade: Origins and Impact, Manchester, 1997, pp. 108.
4 Harris, Byzantium, pp. 69 -  70.
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so, claiming the Greeks had reneged on their promise to help, so the agreement was void.45 
The situation was never fully resolved, and other disputes over sovereignty served simply to 
underline the nature o f the difference between the two sides, and that to the Greeks, the 
crusaders were an ‘other’, whose motives and priorities were difficult to comprehend.
Various Differing Perspectives on the ‘Other’:
The relationship described above contrasts sharply with the relationship which the 
Byzantines had had with the Muslim powers in the centuries leading up to the Crusades. 
Despite the loss of huge swathes of territory suffered by the Byzantines as a result of the 
Arab invasions of the seventh century, the ninth century had seen the establishment of a 
something approaching a steady border. There were occasional skirmishes, and territory 
could and did change hands during this time, but the line was reasonably stable.46 This 
period also saw the build-up of diplomatic links between the Byzantine government, and 
those of both the ‘Abbasid and Fatimid Caliphates.47 The main reason for this was the 
Byzantines’ desire to be accepted as head of the Christian world by Christians in these 
lands, with the result that the Greeks were not as interested in physically controlling land as 
they were in extending their spiritual influence over these areas, through gaining positions 
and concessions for churchmen of the Greek rite in these lands from the Muslim rulers.4* On 
the Muslim side the Fatimid Caliphate was more concerned with defeating the ‘Abbasids to 
extend the influence of ShTite Islam49, while the ‘Abbasids had let the concept of jihad lose
43 ibid, p. 70.
J.F. Haldon, and H. Kennedy, ‘The Arab-Byzantine Frontier in the Eighth and Ninth Centuries: Military
Organisation and Society in the Borderlands’, in Arab-Byzantine Relations in Early Islamic Times, ed. M. 
Bonner, Aldershot, 2004, pp. 144 -  145.
For an overview of diplomatic contacts between Byzantium and the Muslims prior to the Crusades, see H.
Kennedy, ‘Byzantine-Arab Diplomacy in the Near East from the Islamic Conquests to the Mid-Eleventh 
Century’ in in Arab-Byzantine Relations in Early Islamic Times, ed. M. Bonner, Aldershot, 2004, pp. 81 -  91.
Harris, Byzantium, p. 15 -  32, especially p. 23.
H. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age o f the Caliphates, Longman, London, 1986, pp. 309 -  345; and I. 
Lapidus, A Histoiy o f Islamic Societies, 2nd Edition, Cambridge, 2002, p. 108.
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its importance and became increasingly decadent.50 This status quo had remained for several 
centuries, and though it was upset in the early decades of the eleventh/fifth century with the 
arrival of the Turks, the Byzantines had generally been strong enough to resist their 
aggressive tendencies.51 It was, therefore, into a generally settled situation that the 
Crusaders came, and their arrival upset this balance.
Furthermore, although one of the original intentions of the First Crusade was, in 
theory at least, to protect the Eastern Christians52, in every possible way it harmed them. 
Before the arrival of the First Crusade, the native Christians had generally been treated well 
by their Muslim masters. As ahl al-kitab, it was believed by most that it was a religious duty 
for the Islamic authorities to protect them.53 There were a number of restrictions on the 
Christians, such as the payment of the jizyatsot, and not being able to build churches bigger 
than mosques.54 Yet these restrictions did not stop many Christians living without 
persecution in Islamic lands, some reaching high office, especially in Egypt, and the 
occasional disruption to this status from individuals such as the Fâtimid Caliph al-Hâkim 
did not last long.
However, in the aftermath of the crusades, the Eastern Christians lived in a much 
changed environment in the Islamic world. A new tone was set after the second Muslim 
capture of Edessa in 1146/540, when the whole native Christian population was massacred,
50 H. Kennedy, The Court o f the Caliphs, esp. pp. 261 -  296; and H. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age o f the 
Caliphates, pp. 158 -  199.
51 Despite the disastrous defeat of the Byzantine army at Manzikert in 1071/463, including the capture of the 
Emperor, Romanus IV Diogenes, which had been considered a sign that the Byzantine Empire was in full
decline, the Greeks were still a very powerful army, and even this defeat, recent research has shown, was the 
result of more of Turkish luck and lack of intelligence from the Byzantines than by one side being much 
stronger than the other. See Harris, Byzantium, pp. 33 -  34.
“ Pope Urban II’s sermon at Clermont specifically mentioned the help and protection needed by the Eastern 
Christians, and was a prime motive for the crusade. See the accounts of Urban II’s sermon in J. & L. Riley- 
Smith, The Crusades: Idea and Reality, London, 1981, pp 40 - 53 
J.J. Saunders, A History o f Medieval Islam, London, 1978, p. 33.
54 Bat Ye’or, The Dhimmi, tr. D. Maisel, P. Fenton, & D. Littman, London, 1985, pp. 51 -  77.
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just as the Latins had been after the first capture of the city in 1144/539.5:1 Although the 
perpetrator of these acts, Zengi, is regarded as a monster, and an evil man even amongst the 
Muslims, it can be argued that there was a sound motivation for his actions. The presence of 
large numbers of Christians in a Muslim-controlled town could constitute a ‘fifth column’, 
and their removal would negate that threat. That the threat was real was evident from the 
very beginning of the Crusades, as the city of Antioch fell to the crusaders in 1098/491 only 
when an Armenian inside the town allowed the crusaders in.56 Salah al-Dm also acted 
against this perceived threat, gradually removing Christians from office when he ruled 
Egypt, and banning non-Muslim traffic from the Red Sea after a crusader raid there in 
1183/578. Similar situations occurred on many occasions thenceforth; the native Christians 
were killed or forced from their lands or jobs, never to get them back, a situation which 
reached its nadir during the Mamluk rule of the thirteenth/seventh century and their 
governance of both Syria and Egypt.'17 But it was not just the Muslim reaction which was 
the cause of woe for the Eastern Christians -  the crusaders themselves could be just as 
problematic for them. For example, the account of Walter the Chancellor states that ‘the 
people of Antioch had been deprived of their goods by the force and deviousness of our 
people (the crusaders)’58, a criticism which, though veiled, was still unusual for the time59; 
while there were several occasions on which the crusaders massacred the native Christian 
population of towns.60
15 Matthew of Edessa pp. 243 -  245; WT, pp. 140 -  144 & 157 -  161; J.B. Segal, Edessa: The Blessed City, 
Oxford, 1970, pp. 2 4 4 -2 5 4 .
3 See Guibert of Nogent, Gesta Dei per Francos, tr. R. Levine, Woodbridge, 1997, pp. 90 -  93; Raymond of 
Aguilers, Historia Francorum qid Ceperunt Iherusalem, tr. J.H. Hill, & L. Hill, Philadelphia, 1968, pp. 46 — 48; 
and Albert o f Aachen, Flistoria lerosolimitana, ed. & tr. S.B. Edgington, Oxford, 2007, pp. 273 -  285.
3 Hillenbrand, Crusades, pp. 415 -4 1 7 .
58 WC, p .138.
3‘7WC, p. 138 n. 136.
For example, the Crusade of 1101 massacred the Christians of Ankyra (modern Ankara) who had come out 
to meet them. Anna Comnena, The Alexiad, p. 356; and Harris, Byzantium, p. 70.
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Thus the understanding of the nature of individual groups as ‘other’ between differing 
religious groups permeated crusading history from the very start. The Crusades were 
launched to try to regain land which had been taken by the Muslims, who were, it had been 
made very clear by the papacy, ‘the other’. And despite the initial claims of goodwill, both 
the Greeks and the Eastern Christian groups were, to the crusaders, an ‘other’, as they are 
identified as separate groups in the initial speeches of Clermont, and became more so, to 
their detriment, during the history of the Crusades. The idea of the ‘other’ in Islamic 
thought, which was any groups or persons not part of the umma -  which was itself 
modelled on the pre-Islamic tribal system in Arabia, where the ‘other’ was any groups or 
persons not part of one’s own tribe -  was heightened and intensified by the Crusades. Not 
only did a group of vicious soldiers from a despised barbaric race arrive unannounced, 
creating cruelty and destruction wherever they appeared, but there was the growing 
realisation that the native Christians who had lived with the Muslims in relative peace for 
centuries were part of another way of life, one that constituted a threat to the established 
Islamic order.
These ideas of the ‘other’ which formed both before and during the crusading period
are based on one central idea. While modern scholars have seen ideas of ethnicity and
nationalism as the basis of ideas of the ‘other’61, the chroniclers and central figures in the
crusades, on all sides, see religion as the defining characteristic. For both Christian and
Muslim, the other was an ‘other’ because they were not of the same religious group, and
while the crusades were initially launched to help Eastern Christians, who were part of the
Christian ‘us’, the experience of the religious differences between the groups soon made it
clear to the Latins that the Eastern Christians were different religiously, so were part of the
‘other’. This thesis will use this idea to examine Najm al-Dm Il-Ghazi and Renaud of
61 See J. Kellas, The Politics o f Nationalism and Ethnicity, London, 1992; and A. Hastings, The Construction o f 
Nationhood:Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism, Cambridge, 1997.
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Châtillon, exploring the ways in which they were perceived through the religious 
perspective, and whether or not this theory is accurate in their case.
The Reasons for the Crusades:
Over the last one hundred and fifty years there has been much scholarly debate 
focussed on the causes of the Crusades, particularly with regard to the First Crusade, with 
ideas about the causes being first posited, subjected to scrutiny and then either accepted or 
discredited.62 Flowever, there are four main points which have stood the test of time, and so 
can be regarded with a certain amount of confidence as being among the main reasons for 
the Crusades. Firstly, there was a purely religious reason. While in the past the tendency has 
been to regard going on crusade as a selfish act, perpetrated for reasons such as profit or land 
acquisition, recent research has shown that these were not major motivating factors, and the 
fact that most crusaders returned to Europe after the Crusade, and the huge expense of 
taking part, highlight that. The evidence gathered suggests that most crusaders went 
because of religious motivation, and that going on crusade was an extremely expensive and 
perilous undertaking. They would lose their income, leave their family, not be guaranteed 
any recompense when they got to the Floly Land, suffer disease, famine and harassing by 
enemies of all faiths and might, of course, die on the way. It was not, therefore, an easy 
thing to do, or something that was entered into lightly.63
Secondly, there was the current of violence in Latin society into which Urban II’s
message fitted perfectly. The society of Western Europe had become steadily more and
more violent throughout the eleventh century for a variety of reasons, and the papacy was
62 One of the most famous of these is the idea that the Crusades were an early attempt an European 
colonialism, which has been discussed among scholars in the West. See, for example, M. Amouroux, ‘L'église 
régulière, outil de la colonisation de la Syrie par les croisés aux XlIe-XIIIe siècles’, in Coloniser au Moyen Age, 
ed. M. Balard, & J. Ducellier, Paris, 1995, pp. 281 —288 & 293 -2 9 5 .
6j See J. Riley-Smith, The First Crusaders 1095 -  1131, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 109 -  113; and G. Constable, 
‘The Financing of the Crusades in the Twelfth Century’, in Outremer: Studies in the history o f the Crusading 
Kingdom o f Jerusalem, ed. B.Z. Kedar, H.E. Mayer, & R.C. Smail, Jerusalem, 1982, pp. 64 -  88.
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looking for a way to control it, because the church itself was being weakened by the lack of 
security. Therefore it took the initiative and created the idea of the Pax Dei\ based around 
solving disputes in the inviolable sanctuary of the church, in the same spirit as the Ka‘ba in 
Mecca. The knights who had previously been the cause of much of the trouble which had 
plagued Europe were now employed in the service of the church to prevent it, and their 
military capability was channelled to keeping peace in Europe. It was just a short step from 
this to using the knights in a whole new form of warfare -  fighting the enemies of the 
church elsewhere.64
The third factor which helped in the formation of the Crusade idea was the reforms in 
the papacy itself which enabled the message to spread so quickly. These reforms were many, 
but the most important was that which led to the centralisation of papal authority, meaning 
that the messages of the papacy to the people of Europe could be disseminated much more 
quickly than previously, and that the idea of an army owned and controlled by the church or 
churchmen could be established. Thus, the message of the crusade could be easily 
disseminated throughout Europe.6'̂
Finally, and most controversially, was the influence of the Byzantines in the whole 
process, the extent of which has been energetically debated by scholars of the Crusades, the 
Latin West, and Byzantium. Opinions have ranged between those who believe that there 
was already a plan afoot by the Pope to launch the Crusades and that the Byzantines’ ideas 
simply encouraged his pre-existing ideas, to those who believe that the whole scheme was a 
Byzantine invention, and that the Papacy and the nobility of Latin Europe had become 
unwitting pawns in the schemes of the Greeks.
Recent research on this subject has favoured a compromise between the two ideas, and
that both sides had been thinking of using Latin forces to conquer Muslim land at the same
64 See J. Riley-Smith, The First Crusade and the Idea o f Crusading, London, 1986, pp. 2 - 4 .
ibid, pp. 4 - 9 .
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time.66 Byzantine appeals for mercenaries from the Latin West to aid them, which was not 
without precedent, was developed by the Pope into a great mission which would both help 
the Byzantines in their struggles with the Turks and liberate the holy places of Palestine in 
the name of Latin Christendom. This scheme only went wrong because the Emperor and the 
Latin rulers disagreed over who should have control over which territories, and because of 
the perceived threat which the unexpectedly large army was to Byzantium. Wherever the 
truth lies, it is clear that there was Byzantine encouragement in plans for the First Crusade. 
At the Council of Piacenza in March 1095/ Rabi‘ I 488, eight months before Clermont, an 
envoy from the Byzantines carried a message asking for assistance from the knights of 
Western Europe against the Turkish threat67, and the speech given at Clermont heavily 
emphasised the plight of the Eastern Christians at the hands of the Muslims.AX
Scholarly works on Naim al-Dln U-GhazI:
The study of Il-Ghazt has been largely ignored by historians in the field, particularly 
when compared to his importance in the history of the Crusades.69 This, like many other 
areas of Islamic interest in this field, has largely been caused by a lack of understanding both 
of Islam and the Arabic language by crusade historians, meaning that little attempt can be 
made. Furthermore, as his dynasty, the Artuqids, were little more than local rulers in the 
Jazira in the early twelfth century, they have been largely ignored by scholars of Islamic 
history, with only a few works devoted to him. The main study which has been carried out
66 See P.E. Chevedden, ‘The Islamic Interpretation of the Crusade: a New (Old) Paradigm for Understanding the 
Crusades’ in Der Islam 83 (2006), pp. 90 -  136; and J. Shephard, ‘Cross-purposes: Alexius Comnenus and the 
First Crusade’, in The First Crusade: Origins and Impact, ed. J. Phillips, Manchester, 1997, pp. 107 -  129.
67 J. & L. Riley-Smith, (eds.), The Crusades: Idea and Reality- 1095 -  1274, London, 1981, p. 10.
68 See the accounts of Fulcher of Chartres, Robert o f Rheims, Guibert ofNogent, and Baldric of Bourgueil, all 
of which underline the distress which the Christians were suffering because of the actions of the Turks. All four 
accounts can be found in The Crusades: Idea and Reality 1095 -  ¡274, ed. J. & L. Riley-Smith, London, 1981, 
pp.41 -53
The namell-Ghazi is an honorific title meaning ‘Land Warrior’; the Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition, Vol. 
Ill, ed. B. Lewis et al, Leiden, 1971, pp. 1118 -  1119, mistakenly translates the name as ‘Champion of the 
People’.
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on Il-Ghazi is primarily a historical account of his life, and there has been little 
prosopographical study, how he is presented across a number of chronicles.70
Scholarly Works on R enaudof Chcitillon:
Renaud of Chátillon is one of the most famous -  or infamous -  crusaders in the whole 
history of the enterprise. From his first appearance in the Holy Land his actions produced 
horror and celebration in equal measure, and they have fascinated historians ever since. The 
first modem historian to produce a work on Renaud was Schlumberger at the end of the 
nineteenth century. Writing at a time when it was acceptable for the German Emperor to 
enter Jerusalem dressed as a crusader, it is perhaps unsurprising that his work is a highly 
romanticised account of Renaud’s life, with little scholarship displayed, presenting Renaud 
as a hero for his raids against Muslims without considering their results.71 In a reaction to 
this presentation, the next wave of scholars to comment on Renaud, in the mid-twentieth 
century, led by Runciman, a titan of crusading history, attacked Renaud severely. He was 
regarded as a buccaneer, a selfish pirate whose actions were politically and diplomatically 
nonsensical, and who could even be blamed for the failure of the whole crusading 
enterprise.72 Recently, however, there has been an attempt to redeem Renaud’s reputation, 
led by Hamilton, who has suggested that Renaud was not a buccaneer causing chaos for his 
own amusement, but instead that there could be logical explanations for his seemingly rash 
behaviour.73 This idea has recently been taken up by Hillenbrand, who has suggested a 
compromise between the two scholarly positions; that Renaud may have been a buccaneer
70 The only major study which has been devoted to Il-Ghází is C. Hillenbrand, ‘The Career of Najm al-Dm ll- 
GházT, in Der Islam 58:2 (1981), pp. 250 -  291, although pail of C. Cahen’s ‘Le Diyar Bakr au Temps des 
Premiers Urtukides’, in Journal A s ia tiq u e lll, 1935, pp. 219 -  276 has also been devoted to the Artuqid.
G. Schlumberger, Renaud de Chatillon, prince d'Antioche, seigneur de la terre d'Outre-Jourdain, Paris, 1898.
" S. Runciman, A History o f the Crusades, vol. II, Oxford, 1952, pp. 185 -  186.
’ B. Hamilton, ‘The Elephant of Christ’, in Studies in Church History 15: Religious Motivation, ed. D. Baker 
(Oxford, 1978), pp. 97 -  108; and B. Hamilton, The Leper King and his Heirs (Cambridge, 2000), esp. pp. 159 -  
185.
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before a period in prison, but that afterwards he was a changed man, devoting much energy 
to aiding the crusader states.74
Limitations o f  this Study:
The study of the Crusades is one which encompasses a huge number of different ethnic 
and religious groups, each one o f which had their own language or languages in which their 
chronicles were written down. As previously stated, the aim of this thesis is to open up a 
new perspective on the Crusades by using material from both sides of the Islamic/Christian 
divide. However, there is, unfortunately, plenty of material which cannot be utilised, as it is 
still not translated from the original language, or the author of this thesis cannot as yet read 
these languages; thus, the evidence from the Greeks and native Christians which will be 
used is based around the few translations which have been carried out so far. In 
consequence, although this study will open up a new perspective on the crusades, it is by no 
means an exhaustive study of all the extant material.
Furthermore, the study has been limited to only two individuals. Although this will 
prove extremely useful in some areas, it does mean that any conclusions reached can only be 
used to understand the two individuals studied, and cannot be used to make assumptions 
about other leaders. Consequently, there is much more research to be done on the other 
individuals who both led and resisted the Crusades.
General Comments on the Sources:
Islamic Sources -  There are two main problems facing the predominantly western 
crusade historians of the crusades in dealing with the Islamic sources of the period. Firstly, 
there is the problem alluded to above, that few crusade historians can read Arabic, and that
74 C. Hillenbrand, ‘The Imprisonment of Reynald of Chatillon’ in Texts, Documents and Artefacts: Islamic 
studies in honour o f D.S. Richards, ed. C.F. Robinson (Leiden, 2003), pp. 79 -  102
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the main translations they use are faulty.7' Secondly, even when the Arabic sources are 
translated well, there are still problems with them which only the Arabist is aware of, such 
as the stereotyped images Arab writers had of the Turks or Kurds -  such as the Turks’ 
penchant for alcohol -  an important feature of some works, but one which cannot be fully 
understood by western, Latinist historians of the crusades due to their lack of understanding 
in this area. In contrast to this situation, this study will employ a broad range of the 
available sources, and use them in the original Arabic where possible, in order to fully 
recognise their implications and importance, which will ensure a better overall 
understanding of the opinions of the Islamic writers of the time and the images they created.
The Purpose o f  History in Islam:
The history recorded by Muslim scribes in the period of the Crusades had a specific 
purpose to it, and certain rules governed its writing. Its function was partially as 
entertainment, but its main import was in how it related to Islam, and the advancement of 
Islam. This could be achieved in several ways: it served to highlight both good and bad 
rulers, so that later generations would know how to be good rulers76; the study of history 
would allow a person to develop a good character77; and it was through history that Allah’s 
revelations were made known to humanity.78
With regard to the Crusades, references to the events and personalities in question are 
found in many different forms of historical writings, including universal histories79, histories
75 See above, p. 12.
’ See M. Hilmy M. Ahmad, ‘Some notes on Arabic Historiography During the Zengid and Ayyubid Periods’, 
in Historians o f  the Middle East, ed. B. Lewis, & P. Holt, (Oxford, 1962), esp. pp. 81 -  82; and T. Klialidi, 
Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period, Cambridge, 1994, p. 216. See also A. A. Duri, The Rise o f  
Historical Writing Among the Arabs, ed. & tr. L.I. Conrad, Princeton, 1983, pp. 152 -  159.
M. Hilmy M. Ahmad, ‘Some notes on Arabic Historiography During the Zengid and Ayyubid Periods’, esp. 
p. 81.78 ISee also F. Rosenthal, Muslim Historiography2" Edition, Leiden, 1968, esp. pp. 3 0 -5 3 .
The best example of this for the crusades is Al-Kamil.
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of cities80, and biographies.81 They are couched both in certain ideological terms and within 
a specific historiographical framework, so it is vital to understand these terms and 
frameworks in order to fully appreciate the sources.82 Thus, there are numerous sources 
available of varied types, resulting in a broad historiography of the period. This means an 
overall understanding of the period and personalities can be developed by utilising the 
various forms together.
The Islamic Chronicles:
The writings of Islamic medieval historians provide modem crusade historians with a 
wealth of information which is both illuminating yet difficult to penetrate. The accounts are 
illuminating for the perspective they provide for crusade historians, and they also reveal 
events which were not recorded by Latin historians, because they deal with subjects outside 
their range of knowledge, such as how Islamic rulers gained or kept power, or how they 
recruited their armies. However, the Islamic records also present problems to the modem 
historian, based on the methodology used by the chroniclers.
Firstly, many Arabic chronicles are in the form of annals which, useful though they are 
for recording events, rarely give explanations for events or contain the writer’s opinion on 
them. Thus the historian has to infer from the limited information what the chronicler’s 
opinion was, and often why the event happened.83 Secondly, the Crusades as understood in 
the western sense were not seen as a separate phenomenon and so do not have whole 
histories devoted to them; information only occurs about the events when they relate to a 
different topic which the chronicler is describing.84 For example, a chronicler may only 
speak of the crusaders in relation to how they behaved towards a Muslim ruler, or when they
80
Examples of these include IQ and Ibn al-‘ Adlm.
 ̂For example, Ibn al-‘Adhn, Bughyat al-talab, ed. S. Zakkar, Damascus, 1988.
'  See Hillenbrand, Crusades, pp. 9-10.
Hillenbrand, Crusades, pp. 9 - 1 0 .
84 ibid.
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relate to a particular city about which the chronicler was writing. There is, therefore, a 
deliberately slanted view of every situation. Finally, the ideological world in which they 
operated means terms are often employed about which the modern reader cannot be sure of 
their meaning -  a crusader may be termed a ‘devil’, for example (i.e., particularly evil) yet it 
is not clear whether this is the author’s actual opinion, or whether just the rhetorical device 
used many times by Islamic writers.85
These problems, though, can be mostly avoided if the modern historian is aware of 
them, and if the style of each medieval writer is appreciated, as this helps to sort out 
rhetoric from conviction, and understand the author’s views through the distorting lens of 
the annalistic form. With this in mind, a deconstruction of each chronicle utilised in this 
thesis is a necessary starting point for examining images within them, which will be carried 
out in chronological order.
Ibn al-OalanisI:
Ibn al-Qalanisl (d. 1160/555) came from a notable family in Damascus, and was well 
educated in order to be able to embark on a career in the civil service of the city. In this, he 
rose to become a secretary in the chancery before becoming ra ’Is (‘chief, or ‘mayor’) of the 
town twice, one of the highest civil offices there was.86 His work is extremely useful for the 
historian of the Crusades as it is one of few contemporary accounts for the time he writes of 
-  all the events which are reported occurred in the lifetime of either himself or his father.87 
Not only that, but it is believed to be accurate in both chronology and its reports of events, 
and was extensively used by others later including Ibn al-Athir and Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi -
’ See Gibb’s Introduction to IQ; p. 8, Amedroz pp. 6 - 7 .  
ibid, p. 9, Amedroz; p. 4.
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88which attests to its supposed accuracy. ' In its focus it is slanted towards events surrounding
89the city of Damascus , meaning it has little to say about events in northern Syria, so fl- 
Ghazi is mentioned only sporadically, while the geographical focus for the piece precludes 
any appearance from Renaud of Chátillon. That which it does say about Il-Ghazl is 
important, however, as it may reveal the attitudes of Muslims towards co-religionists under 
different rule and of different ethnic stock.90
Ibn al-Azraq:
Reading the Ta’rlkh Mayyafariqln of Ibn al-Azraq (d. after 1176/571), the historian 
faces the problem of a lack of evidence regarding both the name of the text and who the 
author himself was. This means that it is not immediately clear what the prejudices of the 
author were, and so their avoidance is all the more difficult.91 There is, however, one main 
assumption which can be made over the reason for writing, that Ibn al-Azraq composed his 
work under the patronage of local dynasts, who he was expected to glorify, and that these 
were the Artuqids, of whom 11-Ghazi was a prominent member. However, there are several 
problems which it is difficult to resolve about Ibn al-Azraq’s work. Firstly, it has been 
argued by some, and disputed by others, that the author was a ShTite, which would of 
course have a significant influence on his interpretation of persons, particularly those of 
Sunni leaders, but also influencing how he views events involving Fatimid and Nizari
88 ibid, p. 10.
ibid, p. 11 Amedroz; p. 3.
90 It is a little acknowledged and little explored truth that while the vast majority o f Islamic writers on the 
subject o f the crusades were Arab, the Muslim rulers they were writing about were almost exclusively not -  
they were either Turkish or Kurdish. This naturally leads to further extension of the concept of the ‘other’ into 
Sunni Muslim Arab circles.
C.F. Robinson, ‘Ibn al-Azraq, his Ta’rTkh Mayyafariqln, and early Islam’, in Journal o f  the Royal Asiatic 
Society, 3rd Series, Vol. 6, 1996, p. 8.
92 ibid, p. 13.
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Shi‘ites.93 There is also a limited influence by that which has been described as ‘regional 
chauvinism’ in the work of Ibn al-Azraq, the copying of other histories of cities of the 
region which were written solely to glorify that city.94 Furthermore, the author is said to be 
‘no great historian’ when compared to others of a similar period, with poor chronology, 
while ‘his historical narrative is frequently garbled’.9' Despite these issues, his sources are 
believed to have been eye-witnesses96, so it remains a useful work.
Usama bin Munqidh:
Usama bin Munqidh’s (d. 1188/584) work is unique as it is the only account of Syria at 
the time of the Crusades taking the form of memoirs, the recollection of the personal 
experiences of his life, rather than being a town chronicle or universal history. The 
importance of this is because it gives the view of someone who was writing outside the 
strict governmental boundaries of other chronicles. As well as this, the work also captures 
the mood amongst others in Muslim society of the time who were also outside those 
boundaries, and highlights the views of an Arab Muslim at a time when the crusades were 
being fought between Western Europeans and Muslims under Turkish command; thus, 
ethnically at least, Usama was not linked to either of the protagonists.
‘Imad al-Dln al-Isfahanl:
The writings of ‘Imad al-Din (d. 1201/597) are some of the most important works for 
the whole period of the Crusades. The source used here, the Kitáb al-fath al-qussi f i ’l-fath
93 This view has been put forward by V. Minorsky in A Histoiy o f  Sharvrn and Darband in the 1Ú1' and 11th 
Centuries (Cambridge, 1958), p. 170, and C.F. Robinson, ‘Ibn al-Azraq, his Ta’rikh Mayyafariqin, and early 
Islam’, in Journal o f  the Royal Asiatic Society, 3rd Series, Vol. 6, 1996, pp. 14 - 16. This view was challenged 
by C. Hillenbrand in A Muslim Principality in Crusader Times, (Leiden, 1990), p. 6.
C.F. Robinson, ‘Ibn al-Azraq, his Ta’rlkh Mayyafariqln, and early Islam’, p. 24.
3 C. Hillenbrand, ‘Some Medieval Islamic Approaches to Source M aterial’, in OriensYl, 1981, p. 197.
96 ibid, p. 197.
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al-qvdslis, as a piece of Arabic, an extremely intricate work, full of rhetoric and overblown 
language97, yet under these trappings it is ‘an excellent first-hand source, a faithful witness, 
intelligent and informed...free from prejudice as well as flattery’.98 The text is very useful in 
itself as the author was the personal secretary of Salah al-Dln after 1175/570, meaning he 
had a wealth of information available to him from this period onwards, and it broadly agrees 
with the other chronicles. However, there are a number of problems associated with the text. 
A consequence of his position is that ‘Imad al-Dm’s chronicle is, like Baha’ al-Dm’s, biased 
in favour of Salah al-Din, resulting in little assessment of the Sultan, instead being full of 
praise and in agreement with the ruler in almost every point. There is also the fact that 
‘Imad al-Dm’s work can be regarded as being useful only after 1 187/5 8 399, as it was during 
this period that he was an eyewitness to the events he describes.100
Ibn al-Athir’s Al-Kamil f i ’l-ta ’nklr.
Ibn al-Athir (d. 1233/630) is one of the greatest of thirteenth/seventh century Islamic 
scholars. He was bom in Cizre, now in Turkey, but moved at the age of twenty-one to 
Mosul, where he served the Zengids for many years. His majestic work of universal history 
contains perhaps the largest amount of material on the period of the Crusades, chronicling 
events which were not recorded by others, and over a greater timescale.101 It is also useful 
because, unlike most other writers of the time, Ibn al-Athir is not merely a chronicler, but he 
also attempts to explain events and develop a historiography, thus having ‘the instincts of a
,7M. Hilmy M. Ahmad, ‘Some notes on Arabic Historiography during the Zengid and Ayyubid Periods 
(521/1127 -  648/1250), in Historians o f  the Middle East, ed. B. Lewis & P.M. Holt, London, 1962, p. 87.
F. Gabrieli, ‘ The Arabic Historiography of the Crusades’, in Historians o f  the Middle East, ed. B. Lewis & 
P.M. Holt, London, 1962, p. 104.
qq r
H.A.R. Gibb, ‘The Arabic Sources for the Life of Saladin’, in Specuiwn25, 1950, p. 71.
Ahmad, M. Hilmy M., ‘Some notes on Arabic Historiography during the Zengid and Ayyubid Periods 
(521/1127-648/1250)’, p. 87.
F. Gabrieli, Arab Historians o f  the Crusades, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1969, p., xxvii.
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true historian’. He tries to explain the Crusades as one stage in the struggle between 
Christianity and Islam, and as one part of a larger assault on Muslim lands by Europeans, 
which also included Sicily and Spain.103 This means, according to one scholar, that his 
perspective on the Crusades is closer to that of the Latin Church than to that of other 
Muslim chroniclers.104
It has been suggested that there are numerous problems with his chronicle -  such as 
Gibb’s view that some parts of Ibn al-Atlfir’s chronicle were lifted wholesale from the work 
of ‘Imad al-Dln and Ibn al-Qalanisi, and often misinterpreted or deliberately altered them, 
which, he suggests, means that Ibn al-Athlr’s work is sometimes of no real value as an 
independent source.105 There is also believed to be a pro-Zengid bias which affected all his 
writings106, and as a consequence he had a bias against Saláh al-Dm and the Ayyubids which 
has been called ‘notorious’.107 However, these issues have been somewhat over-played by 
Gibb, as his own appreciation of Salah al-Dln has distorted his whole view of Ibn al-Athlr, 
who is not so complimentary to the conqueror of Jerusalem as some writers.
102
Baha’ al-Dln Ibn Shaddad:
It is fortunate that a long account of the life of Baha’ al-Dln (d. 1239/636) was penned 
by the Arabic biographer Ibn Klrallikan in the thirteenth/seventh century, less than a century
102
” C. Hillenbrand, ‘Sources in Arabic’, in Byzantines and Crusaders in Non-Greek Sources, ed. M. Whitby, 
Proceedings o f  the British Academy 132, Oxford, 2007, p. 315. Also F. Gabrieli, Arab Historians o f  the 
Crusades, p. xxvii.
103 Hillenbrand, Crusades, p. 50.
See P.E. Chevedden, ‘The Islamic Interpretation of the Crusade: A New (Old) Paradigm for Understanding 
the Crusades’, in Der Islam 83 (2006).
105 H.A.R. Gibb, ‘The Arabic Source for the Life of Saladin’, in Speculum 25, 1950, p. 61; FI.A.R. Gibb, ‘Notes 
on the Arabic Materials for the history of the Early Crusade’, in The Bulletin o f  the School o f  Oriental and 
African Studies 7, 1933 -  5, pp. 739 -  754, esp. pp. 745 -  753. See also D.S. Richards, ‘Ibn al-Atlur and the 
Later Parts of the Kamil’, in Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds, ed. D.O. 
Morgan, London, 1982, p. 83.
The main Zengid rulers for the period of the Crusades were Zengi (1127/521 -  1146/541) and Nur al-Din 
(1146/541 -  1174/569).
H.A.R. Gibb, ‘The Arabic Source for the Life of Saladin’, in Speculum 25, 1950, p. 58. This view is also 
taken by M.F. Elshayyal in ‘Relations between Nur al-Din and Saläh al-Din as portrayed in Ibn al-Athlr’s al- 
kämil fi al-tärikh’, in Islamic Quarterly^of 48, 2004, pp. 238 -249.
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after the death of the chronicler, as a great deal can be deduced about his reasons for writing 
from the entry in that biographical dictionary.Inx The most important point from the 
perspective of this study is that Baha’ al-Din was in the service of Salah al-Din as a qadl 
from 1188/584 until the Sultan’s death in 1193/589. So while he used the writings of ‘Imad 
al-Dln to supplement his information, he probably also had Salah al-Dln’s own testimony, as 
well as his own eyewitness account.109 Thus he had plenty of evidence about the events 
during his time as qadi\ and the work is unusual in being a biography based on character, 
instead of just anecdotes as was usual for medieval Muslim chronicles.110 For some time, a 
belief persisted that there is not an obvious personal bias in his work -  which was seen as 
quite an achievement for that time and his position in society -  and that he wrote with 
‘sober good sense and honesty’.111 This has led to some believing that his writings are much 
more reliable than those of Ibn al-Athlr. However, some historians have challenged this 
view, and are much more cautious in the claims made about the chronicle, mainly because 
the reason for its having been written was ‘out of a pious wish to record the moral 
excellencies of its main subject, the Sultan Saladin’.112 This means, of course, that the 
virtues of Salah al-Dm are overplayed, and his flaws understated. Consequently, not only 
will this be the basis for the image of Salah al-Dm, but it may also affect other personalities 
in the account -  those who the Sultan judges as good will be seen as good, those who he 
judges as bad will be seen as bad. Furthermore, the information in the chronicle for the 
period from its beginnings as an historical account in 1163/558 up until 1188/584, when 
Baha’ al-Dm joined the service of the Sultan, which includes that about Renaud, needs to be 
used carefully. This is because the chronicler was only in a position to be able to gain the
108 Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat al-a'yan, ed. I. ‘Abbas, Vol. VII, Beirut, 1977, pp. 84 -  100. This is well 
summarised in Richards’ introduction to Balia’ al-Dln, pp 1 -  3.
109 Balia’ al-Dln, p. 5.
110 F. Gabrieli, ‘ The Arabic Historiography of the Crusades’, in Historians o f  the Middle East, p. 104.
111 H.A.R Gibb, ‘The Arabic Source for the Life of Saladin’, p. 58.
112 Balia’ al-Dm, p. 4
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information he required for writing his work after 1188/584 when he was made judge of the 
army. Thus the account of Renaud is necessarily drawn from other sources whose 
provenance is not clear.
What all agree on, however, is that as well as a biography of Salâh al-Din, the reason 
for the text’s existence is as a propaganda piece for the jihad. Its existence is based on a 
concern in the mind of the writer, which is put into the mouth of Salâh al-Din in the text, 
that after the death of the Sultan the struggle will not be carried on, allowing the crusaders 
time to regain possessions and territory.113 The text is also a reminder to the Muslims that 
they should not give up the struggle, and that those who Salâh al-Din struggled against are 
those who should be fought, as they are evil and unbelievers.
The chronicle is therefore a combination of praise for Salâh al-DIn and encouragement 
to others to continue the struggle which forms the core of the work. As such, any events or 
people who appear in the narrative are bound by these principles.
Ibn al- ‘Adhn:
Ibn al-‘Adim (d. 1262/660) was bom into an important Aleppan family in the second 
half of the twelfth century, whose members had held important positions within the 
government for many years. His father was a qadi in the administrations of Nur al-Din, 
‘Imâd al-Dln, and Salâh al-Dm.114 Thus, he had access to official records and the testimony 
of people who had taken part in some of the events he describes. The account used here, 
Zubdat al-halab fi ta ’rlkh Haiab, is based to a large degree on historiographical traditions
113 ibid\ pp. 4 - 5 .  This, indeed, did happen, as Salih al-DIn’s Ayyubid descendants were very apathetic to the 
idea of the jihâd -  see Hillenbrand, Crusades, p. 204 - 211.
F. Gabrieli, ‘The Arabic Historiography of the Crusades’, in Historians o f  the Middle East, p. 111.
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which are not used by other extant sources. He also seems to be very reliable in the details 
of his work.115
Despite these, there is a significant part of his work which is based on Ibn al-Athiir’s 
chronicle, and as such those parts do not add much to the overall perspective on an event.116 
It is also a work which is a history of the city of Aleppo, meaning that his work is very 
useful and detailed when it dealing with that city, but it is not very helpful for the history of 
other theatres of the Crusades. In reality, this means that for the purposes of this study, his 
image of Renaud is less important than that of Il-Ghazi. He is also regarded as being 
generally pro-Zengid and Ayyubid in his outlook, as his family worked for them, meaning 
that he is naturally biased against those who opposed those families, such as the Artuqids 
from whom Zengi wrested Aleppo in 1128/522.
General Comments on the Arabic Sources:
While the Arabic sources do, in individual terms, all have their faults, one of the most 
pleasing and useful aspects of the total extant corpus is that there is a good mix of styles, 
genres, dates of composition, and political persuasion. This means, in practice, that many of 
the possible interpretations for events are found in these chronicles, and thus it is easy to 
know which issues are contentious and close study can help to resolve them. On the other 
hand, if  there is consensus across these boundaries of time, space, and politics, then it will 
be reasonable to assume that this consensus reflects opinions of Islamic society at the time.
Latin Sources -  There is a huge body of sources available on the Crusades which have 
been translated into English, and a similarly large canon of works which have been edited in
115 ibid, p. 113.
1 See H.A.R. Gibb, ‘Notes on the Arabic Materials for the history of the Early Crusade’, p. 753
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their original language. By far the largest of these collections is the Recueil des Historiens 
des Croisades; Historiens Occident aux.ul These were edited and published at the end of the 
nineteenth century with a French translation, and are useful as they provide a huge amount 
of primary source material in one place. Flowever, some of the translations are very poor, 
and as a result of this, new translations have been made of some, particularly those in the 
series Crusade Texts in Translation.
Latin Chronicles:
The phenomenon known as the Crusades has left a canon of history and literature 
unequalled in both scope and measure from medieval times. While some were writing 
histories1 Ix, others wrote hagiographical pieces"9, while still others wrote down crusading 
songs which were popular at the tim e120; these, along with charters and papal bulls issued at 
the time, provide a rich variety of sources from which historians can gather evidence. For 
the purpose of this thesis, however, the evidence comes from only a few sources, which are 
either histories in the medieval sense or hagiography. This is both to fit in with the overall 
purpose of the thesis, and because very few chronicles make reference to Renaud, important 
though he was. Thus, the evidence is limited to the writings of William of Tyre, Peter of 
Blois, and the anonymous author of the Lyons Eracles text. Latin writings referring to II- 
GhazI are even scarcer, with only Walter the Chancellor and William of Tyre giving enough 
of an account to build up an image. Thus both Renaud and Il-GhazI are seen through the 
eyes of very few Latin historians.
111 Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Documents Occidentaux, 5 Vols, Paris, 1844 - 18951 IS There are many Latin historical chronicles which deal with the Crusades; see, for example, Guibert of
Nogent Dei Gesta per Francos, ed. R.B.C. Huygens, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis 127a,
Tumhout, Brepols, 1996; Odo of Deuil, De Profectione Ludovici VIIin Orientem, ed. V.G. Berry, New York,
1948; Albert o f Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana, ed. S.B. Edgington, Oxford, 2007; and John of Joinville,
‘History of St. Louis’, in Chronicles o f  the Crusades, ed. M.R.B. Shaw, Penguin, 1963.
See, for example, Peter o f Blois
La Chanson d ’Antioche, ed. M. Duparc-Quioc, 2 vols., (Paris, 1977 -  8).
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The Purpose o f  History in 12th -century Europe:
The writing of history in twelfth-century Europe had various rationales, and these did 
not vary to a great extent across the range of religious writing which made up the majority 
of the chronicles of the time. What all history writing had in common, however, was that it 
was written down because ‘it mattered to somone’121. The chronicles of the Middle Ages 
were not meant to be history in the modern sense; instead there is more emphasis put on 
history as a form of literature, and because of these histories were meant to be as much 
entertainment as an aid to knowledge. Yet being an aid to knowledge is certainly an 
important part of history’s role; it was aimed at being a way in which the mistakes of the 
past could be learned and avoided, and seeing and understanding the role of God in the 
events of the world.122 It could also be written simply from scholarly curiosity, as a 
justification of contemporary modes of thinking, or to ‘create, establish or justify an 
institution’.123 Thus, among the chronicles of the crusading period, each will have been 
written with a particular idea in mind, and so it is necessary to discuss each in turn, to 
understand what the writers were hoping to achieve overall.
The Latin Chroniclers:
Walter the Chancellor.
Walter (d. mid-twelfth/fifth century) was the Chancellor of Antioch from c. 1114/507- 
8 to 1119/512, and from his position was in contact with the highest authorities in the
121 D.M. Deliyannis, ‘Introduction’, in Historiography in the Middle Ages, ed. D.M. Deliyannis, Leiden, 2003,
p. 12.
127 See, among others, N. Partner, Serious Entertainments: The Writing o f  History in Twelfth Century 
England, Chicago, 1977, and C. Brooke, Europe in the Central Middle Ages, 962-1154, London, 1975, p. 5.
~J D.M. Deliyannis, ‘Introduction’, in Historiography in the Middle Ages, ed. D.M. Deliyannis, Leiden, 2003, 
p. 12.
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principality.124 His writings also show that he was an eyewitness to many of the events he 
described, including the Battle of Balat in 1119/512 at which he implies he was captured
125and sent as a prisoner to Aleppo. His chronicle seems to have been written in three 
sections -  Book One between 1115/508-9 and 1119/512 before Balat; Book Two up to 
chapter twelve soon after 1119/512, and the remainder sometime later, though exact dates 
are difficult to ascertain.126 The themes which permeate the chronicle are not uniform 
throughout the text, because of how it has been arranged into two books. Book One’s main 
theme is that ‘Christian warfare must be carried out with divine sanction and with pure 
intention’ -  everything else flows out of this idea.127 The theme of the second book is much 
more difficult to pin down, as there are several interrelated themes which form the basis for 
the work. The main one is a need to ‘rationalise the Latin defeat at the Field of Blood 
(Balat)’, the reason for which was ungratefulness to God for their victory in 1 1 15/50 8 - 9128, 
leading to a need for spiritual purity in warfare. Other themes in Book Two are the spiritual 
purity of Roger of Salerno, God’s favour returned on the crusaders, and His omnipotence.129 
Thus, these two themes are the framework around which interpretations are hung.
William o f  Tyre:
William (d. 1184-5/579-81) was bom around the year 1130/524 in Jerusalem, and was 
sent to Western Europe for an education in the liberal arts and canon law when he reached 
his mid-teens, staying there for around twenty years, returning to his homeland around
124 Walter says that on the eve of the Battle of the Field of Blood, Prince Roger ‘secretly called his chancellor 
and settled with him what should properly be done for the business in hand’, thus implying he had a direct 
hand in the events -  WC II.3, p. 120.
5 WC, p. 114 implies Walter was present at the battle, and his vivid descriptions of the aftermath reinforce 
this possibility.
126 For a full discussion, see the Introduction to The Antiochene Waisby S. Edgington and T. Asbridge, pp. 1 -  
72.
127 WC, p. 11.
128 WC, p. 11.
129 ibid, p. 12.
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1165/5 60.130 Almost immediately he was given important duties in the service of the 
Kingdom of Jerusalem. He was sent as a diplomat for King Amalric to the Greeks in 
1168/563 to organise a joint Byzantine-Crusader offensive against Egypt131, and in 1170/565 
- 566 he was appointed tutor to the future King Baldwin IV.132 Being placed in these two 
positions of responsibility show how trusted he was by the king, and how suitable he was 
regarded for high office. William was elected chancellor in 1174/569 - 570 and appointed 
Archbishop of Tyre in 1 175/570 -  571.133 It is believed that he wrote the Chronicon between 
approximately 1170/565 - 566 and 1184/570 -  580.134 While it is generally agreed that 
William of Tyre was an excellent historian of the time, seeking out the truth and writing as 
accurate an account as possible with access to members of the ruling classes and important 
documentation, it is necessary to note two important issues which affect the reliability of 
the work. Firstly, as he was bom in the year 1130/524, was a child for the time before he 
went to Europe, and did not re-enter the Holy Land until the year 1165/560, it follows that 
he was not an eyewitness for the events of the period when he was in Europe. Thus, he must 
have used other accounts and witnesses for events in this period, possibly utilising the same 
sources for his Chronicon as for his now lost Gesta Orientalium Principum, meaning it is not 
possible to gauge the accuracy of his accounts where there is no other evidence. Secondly, in 
the bitter factional dispute which plagued the Kingdom of Jerusalem after the death of King 
Amalric in 1174/569 - 570, he sided with Maria Comnena. Consequently, it has been 
suggested that he may have been willing to assign more criticism to members of the 
opposing faction than they deserved135, of which Renauld of Chátillon was one member.
b0 Edbury & Rowe p. 13.
bl ibid, p. 16.
132 ibid, p. 17.
133 ibid, p. 18.
L’4 ibid, p. 26.
135 ibid p. 18.
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The Continuations o f  William o f  Tyre:
During the thirteenth century, the popular appeal of William of Tyre’s history was so 
great in Europe that many translations were carried out, especially into the French 
vernacular of the time, and many -  both in the original Latin and Old French -  had 
continuations added to the end. Together, these form a corpus known as the Eracles 
manuscripts, all of which seem to have been based on an original continuation. This original 
is the now lost chronicle of Emoul, who was a participant in the Battle of Ffattln, and who 
was a squire of Balian of Ibelin. The main point which should be understood from this is 
that because Emoul was part of the Ibelin retinue, he was automatically hostile to the king, 
Guy, and to the king’s men, of whom Renaud was one, because of the factionalism which 
plagued the kingdom of Jerusalem at the time. Furthermore, as each individual manuscript 
in the Eracles corpus is ‘a collection of sources rather than each a source’136, it means that 
they were each compiled from a number of sources without much thought as to continuity or 
understanding. Thus, Renaud’s role as a villain is retained from Emoul’s part of the Eracles 
chronicles, while he could just as easily be a hero in another part of the same account. The 
extant accounts are adaptations and continuations of this original, and have very complex 
relations with each other.137
The Old French Continuation o f  William o f  Tyre:
The continuation of William of Tyre’s chronicle used in this thesis is found in a single 
manuscript in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Lyon138, was edited by Morgan139, and
136 M.R. Morgan, The Chronicle ofErnouland the Continuations o f  William o f  Tyre, Oxford, 1973, p. 177.
For attempts to explain the monumentally complex relationships between the extant manuscripts, see L. de 
Mas-Latrie, Chronique d ’Ernoul et de Bernai'd le Trésorier, Paris, 1871; Comte-Riant in Archives de l ’Orient 
Latin, I Paris, 1880 -  1; M.R. Morgan, The Chronicle o f  Emoul and the Continuations o f  William o f  Tyre, 
Oxford, 1973; Introduction to Continuation
n o
Bibliothèque de la Ville de Lyon MS. 828. The Continuation begins at f. 286r.
139 M.R. Morgan, La Continuation de Guillaume de T y r (l184 -  1197), Paris, 1982.
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translated by Edbury.140 For the purposes of this thesis, only this Eracles text will be 
examined, reasons for which are twofold. Firstly, the other edited texts, such as La 
Chronique d ’Ernoul et La Continuation de Bernard le Trésorier; while having some marked 
differences with the Lyons manuscript, are practically identical in their reportage of Renaud, 
therefore only one needs to be utilised. Secondly, the Lyons manuscript is that which has 
most recently been edited, and with due respect to the nineteenth-century scholars who 
edited the aforementioned texts, the Lyons’ edition is far superior, so this is the version 
which shall be used. The Lyons Eracles is a re-working of the account of Emoul, yet it 
contains more information than this or any other source, which led the editor to state that 
this chronicle ‘provides the fullest version of the narrative for 1184 -  97’.141
Peter ofBlois:
The Passio Raginaldi of Peter ofBlois (d. c. 1203/599) is one of the most extraordinary 
sources for the Crusades. An intense, vital, vivid description of the end of Renaud, it 
describes in deeply spiritual terms his demise, using it to summon the powers of Europe 
from their slumber with regard to the crusader states. Peter presents the heroic Renaud as 
the perfect Christian, and writes how he had laid down his life for Christendom, while 
urging others to do the same. The tract was written between the time when news of the 
defeat at Hattm reached the west in late 1187/583, and the departure of the Third Crusade in 
1189/5 85142, and the highly charged emotions evident in the chronicle were caused by 
Peter’s horror at the news of the defeat at FIat tin and the loss of Jerusalem.143 This, in turn,
1411 Continuation, pp. 11 -  145.
141 Continuation, p. 6.
142 R.W. Southern, ‘Peter ofBlois and the Third Crusade’, in Studies in Medieval History presented to R.H.C. 
Davies, ed. H. Mayr-Harting & R.F. Moore, London, 1985, pp. 207 -  218.
143 Southern has written that the Passio ‘gives us oui' best view of the passions aroused by the disasters which 
preceded the Third Crusade’; see ‘Peter ofBlois: A Twelfth-Century Humanist?’, in Medieval Humanism and 
Other Studies, ed. R.W. Southern, Oxford, 1970, p. 127. Markowski reports that Peter received this news while 
at the Papal Curia, the place at which the news would have met its most intense reception. M. Markowski,
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caused him to write the piece, a powerful part of the propaganda which accompanied the 
call for the Third Crusade. Its purpose, therefore, was to inspire the men of Europe to the 
Crusade.
Greek Sources -  With the benefit of hindsight, it is all too easy for the modem 
historian to regard the twelfth/sixth century Byzantine Empire as being in a constant state 
of decline from the heights of power and strength it had enjoyed in the sixth century under 
Justinian. However, that is certainly not the viewpoint which the Byzantines of the time had 
themselves, nor was it the view of contemporary outsiders.144 The Byzantines regarded 
themselves as the continuators of the Classical Roman Empire, to the extent that public 
disagreement occurred with the western powers and the Papacy over who had the right to 
the title ‘Emperor of the Romans’145; this belief encouraged them to regard themselves as 
being the most powerful and important empire on earth. Reinforcing this view, the 
Byzantine Emperors saw themselves as the heir of Constantine, and by extension God’s 
representative on earth146 (what position could be more powerful or important?) and 
protector of Christians everywhere.147 And even when the empire had an emperor whose 
leadership skills lacked something, it was the civil service who ran the country and so the 
emperor’s lack of governmental talent did not affect how the empire was run, because the 
civil service ran it. Treaties were made with potential enemies, of course, but that had
‘Peter o f Blois and the Conception of the Third Crusade’, in The Horns ofHattin, ed. B.Z. Kedar, Jerusalem, 
1992, p. 263.
Harris, Byzantium, esp. pp. 1 -  32.
145 Harris, Byzantium, pp 22 & 42; S. Runciman, The Eastern Schism, Oxford, 1955, pp. 1 - 2 7 ;  J.M. Hussey, 
The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire, Oxford, 1986, p. 72 -79
Harris, Byzantium, p. 14; S. Runciman, ‘The Byzantine Theocracy’, Cambridge, 1977, p. 5 -25; D.M. Nicol, 
‘Byzantine Political Thought’ in Cambridge History o f  Medieval Political Thought ed. J.H. Burns, Cambridge, 
1988, p. 51-79, esp. 52-3; and P.A. Alexander, ‘The Strength of Empire and Capital as Seen Through 
Byzantine Eyes’, in Speculum 37, 1962, pp 339-357
Harris, Byzantium, p. 23 - 4 ;  G. Ostrogorsky, History o f  the Byzantine Slate, tr. J.M. Hussey, Oxford, 1968, 
p. 553-4; F. Mikloisch & W. Muller, Acta et Diplomatica Grace Medii Aevi Sacra et Profana, Vol. II pp. 190- 
2, Vienna, 1862, tr. in Social and Political Thought in Byzantium, ed. E. Barker, Oxford, 1951, pp. 194 -  196;
D. Obolensky, ‘The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe 500 -  1453’, London, 1971, esp. pp. 287 -  302.
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always been done. The Byzantine Empire itself was still the vast, powerful, important 
empire it had always been, despite the loss of territory it had been suffered, as it was not 
land or possessions which were of concern to them, but ideas of sovereignty and its spiritual
• • 148position.
This Byzantine viewpoint was reflected in that of their enemies. To practically all 
outsiders, Constantinople was the greatest city in the world, and evinced both the greatest 
respect and the greatest envy. Thus the Muslim forces of the Arabs, the Bulgars and the 
Vikings, had all tried, and failed, to capture the imperial capital in the centuries before the 
First Crusade, which highlight both the desire to possess the city and the respect these 
Byzantine victories must have gained for the empire.
Therefore, at the time of the Crusades, Constantinople was still, in the eyes of most, 
one of the most important cities in the world, and the main theme which runs through the 
Byzantine historical narratives of the time is that what is good is what is good for 
Byzantium, and what is bad is what is bad for Byzantium.149 Furthermore, these histories 
are, despite notable exceptions such as John Kinnamos, mercifully free of much of the 
flattery which sometimes affects medieval histories, and could be very critical of certain 
rulers or events.150 They are, however, generally regarded as reflecting contemporary 
Byzantine attitudes, as they were mostly written by civil servants who had been classically
148 Harris, Byzantium, p. 23; G. Ostrogorsky, History o f  the Byzantine State, tr. J.M. Hussey, pp. 553-4; F. 
Mikloisch & W. Muller, Acta et Dipiomatica Grace Medii Aevi Sacra et Profana, Vol. II pp. 190-2, tr. in 
Social and Political Thought in Byzantium, pp. 194 -  196.
The main theme running throughout Harris’ book Byzantium and the Crusades is that the foreign policy 
aims of the Byzantines were dictated by two ideological absolutes. The first was to ensure the safety of 
Constantinople and the Greek Christian community; the second was to ensure that the emperor’s position as 
supreme Christian ruler was accepted by everyone. Because almost all o f the writers o f the period had 
originally been trained as civil servants, with a good deal of foreign policy experience, these chroniclers’ 
priority was to illustrate that this foreign policy was a worthy one. Thus, a policy, whether Byzantine or 
foreign, was good when it achieved the above aims and bad it if  obstructed them. Harris, Byzantium, esp. pp. 
15-32 .
educated and had spent their life in government, in close contact with the events and 
personalities they described.
This becomes very interesting during the period of the Crusades, as it is possible to 
trace the mood of the Byzantines throughout their relationships with the crusaders, as they 
alternatively suffered at the hands of the crusading armies, fought with them, against them, 
made treaties with them, before ultimately being defeated by them.151
There are three main Greek sources for the period of the crusades in English 
translation. These are the Alexiad of Anna Comnena, the Deeds o f  John and Manuel 
Comnenus by John Kinnamos, and O City o f  Byzantium  by Niketas Choniates, though only 
the latter two will be employed here, as the Alexiad contains no pertinent information.
John Kinnamos’ Deeds o f  John and Manuel Conwcnus:
The chronicle of John Kinnamos (d. 1185/580 - 1) was written between 1180 -  2//575 - 
578, by a man who was an imperial secretary, thus being attached to the imperial courts and 
the emperor himself. Though his chronicle covers the period 1118/511 -  1176/572, he was 
only an eye-witness after 1165/560, so had to rely on others for periods beforehand, though 
his sources are not clear in the chronicle. In respect of his personal views which come 
through in the chronicle, John Kinnamos is very hostile to the Latins in general, while his 
praise for Manuel Comnenus is hyperbolic152, and unfavourable events are ignored. This, 
though, was central to his purpose of writing, as by praising the emperors, he was trying to 
regain his place at court which he had lost. Thus, the chronicle is based around praising the
bl For a general introduction to the state of the Byzantine Empire before and during the period of the 
Crusades, and Byzantine relations with the Crusaders, see Harris, Byzantium, and M. Angold, The Byzantine 
Empire: 1025-1204, 2nd Edition, London, 1997.
‘his (John Kinnamos’) style is partially spoilt by his excessive praise for Manuel Comnenus. Every quality 
of Manuel, his dashing valour in warfare, his shrewd perception of an enemy’s strategic dispositions, his 
horsemanship, his medical skill, and his penetrating intellect all inspire Kinnamos to excesses of enthusiastic 
admiration’ See C. M. Brand’s Introduction to John Kinnamos, p. 8
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emperors, which by extension means criticising Latins generally, and particularly those with 
whom the emperors had disagreements.153
Niketas Choniates’ O City o f  Byzantium.
Niketas Choniates (d. 1215-6/611-3) was the son of a minor noble from the provincial 
town of Khonas, bom around 1 155/550.154 He was sent to Constantinople at the age of nine 
in order to gain an education, and here he started a career in the imperial government which 
lasted until his voluntary exile after the capture of the city by the Fourth Crusade in 
1204/600. The aim of his history is stated as being to achieve objectivity without rhetoric or 
storytelling135, and it is based on eye-witness accounts, and so contains information which is 
not recorded in any other source. For the purposes of this study, however, the most 
important fact to note is Choniates’ attitude to the Latins, who he implies were uncouth, 
unrefined and uneducated, and he ‘could not forgive the Latins for their wanton acts of 
sacrilege’ in 1204/600 after they attacked Constantinople.156 This, then, must be assumed to 
colour his entire writing, because although much of it was written before this date, it was 
revised afterwards, and presumably changed to reflect his new feelings towards the 
Latins157.
Sources from Other Ethnic Groups:
In contrast to the huge amount of work carried out on Latin, and to a lesser extent 
Greek and Arabic, sources in western academia, the research carried out on sources from 
other linguistic and ethnic groups who were involved in the great drama of the Crusades has
153 See C.M. Brand’s Introduction to John Kinnamos, p. 1 -1 1 ;  Harris, Byzantium, p. 93.
H.J. Magoulias, Introduction to Choniates, p. xi 
135 ibid, p. xvi
’ H.J. Magoulias, Introduction to Choniates, p. xxvi. There is no mention of individual Muslims in his work 
so there is no comparative opinion for them.
3 ibid
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been relatively scant. Some sources from the period have been translated from a relatively 
obscure language into English, and they are useful to show the opinions of those who were 
caught between the two sides in the Crusades. However, little quality research has been 
carried out on them, and consequently problems arise when one source contradicts other 
sources, as even educated guesses are difficult. Despite this, each source is useful, and with 
the little research which has been done, they can give a picture of the situation as the 
chronicler saw it. The fruit of research on the major work is set out below.
Armenian Sources:
The main source for the period of the Crusades which has been translated into English 
is the chronicle entitled The Chronicle o f  Matthew ofEdessa.1 N The author of this chronicle 
was a monk of lower-order rank who was an eyewitness of some of the events and persons 
with which this study is concerned, those of 1101/494 -  1136/528. As a monk, religious 
interpretations permeate Matthew’s chronicle, as God is shown as being the agent of victory 
or defeat, and Matthew tries to explain these as far as he can. He also has a passion for the 
Armenian Christians and is critical of the sufferings they endure. As a result of this, he 
‘praises all individuals, including Muslims, who act benevolently towards the Christians’159, 
and is very concerned with the universal church, rather than just his own rite.160 The 
chronicler known as Matthew, however, only wrote up until the year 1137/531, presumably 
a year close to that in which he died. The chronicle for the period after that date -  and 
therefore containing all references to Renaud -  was compiled by one Gregory the Priest, 
although this only runs until 1162/557, and there has been little commentary on this author.
158 Available in Armenia and the Crusades, tr. & ed. A.E. Doustourian, University Press of America, 1993.
Introduction to Armenia and the Crusades, tr. & ed. A.E. Doustourian, University Press of America, 1993, 
P.6
A full appraisal of Matthew o f Edessa’s work is in ibid., pp. 1 -  16. See also T. Greenwood, ‘Armenian 
Sources’, in Byzantines and Crusaders in Non-Greek Sources, ed. M. Whitby, pp. 221 - 252
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Syriac Sources:
There are several Syriac sources which deal with the crusades, each of which lends a 
different perspective on the Crusades, though as their insights into Renaud and Il-Ghazi are 
brief, only a short description of them will be carried out. The main source is that written by 
Michael the Syrian (d. 1199/595), the Jacobite Patriarch of Antioch between 1166/561 and 
1199/595, the critical period in the crusading enterprise when almost the entire crusader 
territories were lost161, and which, in crusading terms, deals with events from the coming of 
the First Crusade until the death of Salah al-Dfn in 1193/589. As a work of history, it is 
extremely useful, as it not only provides information found nowhere else, but also because it 
provides a fairly objective view of the events and personalities of the time, whether they 
were Muslims or from his own church.162
Secondly, there is also an anonymous Syriac chronicle which deals with the events of 
the First and Second Crusades163, whose author was an eyewitness for some of the events of 
the Crusades in the late twelfth century, although his sources for the earlier episodes of the 
Crusades are unknown.164
An Historical Overview o f  the Crusades and Preceding Events'6' :
161 This is available only as a French translation, as Chronique de Michel le Syrien, Patriarche Jacobite 
d ’Antioche (1166 1199), ed. & tr. J.B. Chabot, 4 vols, Paris, 1899 -  1924
See M. Moosa, ‘The Crusades: An Eastern Perspective, With Emphasis on the Syriac Sources’, in The 
Muslim World93:2, 2003, pp. 249 -  251.
Anonymi Auctoris Chronicon ad Annum Christi 1234 Pertinens, ed. J.B. Chabot, tr. A. Abouna, 2 vols, 
Louvain 1952 -  1974. There is a partial English translation by A.S.Tritton as ‘The First and Second Crusade 
from an anonymous Syriac Chronicle’, in Journal o f  the Royal Asiatic Society, 1933, 6 9 -  101 & 273 -  305 
M. Moosa, ‘The Crusades: An Eastern Perspective, With Emphasis on the Syriac Sources’, p. 251; and W. 
Witakowski, ‘Syriac Flistoriographical Sources’, in Byzantines and Crusaders in Non-Greek Sources, pp. 253 -  
282.
" References for this section of the paper will cite secondary sources only -  references to primary sources can 
be found in these secondary sources.
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In order to understand the significance of the personalities examined, it is necessary to 
construct a brief overview of the historical circumstances in which they played a part.
Since the death of Muhammad in 632/10, Islamic armies had steadily spread out from 
the Arabian peninsula in every direction. They moved east into Persia, defeating the 
Sassanian empire which had grown weak through its constant struggles with Byzantium, 
north into Syria where they soon captured, among others, Jerusalem and Damascus, thus 
taking a large proportion of Byzantium’s land, and west across north Africa as far as 
Morocco and then north into Spain and France.160 Since the middle of the eighth/second 
century, however, the Islamic armies had not, with the exception of several Mediterranean 
islands, made any significant gains. Through the internal squabbles of a large empire, the 
united front that had been the mainstay of the early Islamic world crumbled, leaving by the 
eleventh/fifth century two main, mutually hostile, political units in the Middle East, the 
Sunni ‘Abbasid caliphate based in Baghdad, and the ShTite Fatimid caliphate in Cairo.167 
By the end of the eleventh/fifth century, each of these had become so weakened that the 
Islamic world had become, in effect, a feudal system, with the ruler of each city holding that 
territory, in principle at least, through being empowered by one of the two caliphs. This 
resulted in plenty of internal problems for the caliphs to deal with and in great difficulty 
organising resistance to any outside threat.168
The first occasion on which this had been realised was in the tenth/fourth century 
when waves of Turks began to penetrate the Islamic Empire from Central Asia. These 
nomadic peoples had recently converted to Islam, and took over the governance of large 
swathes of territory in the Muslim Middle East.169 As a consequence, the mood in the
166 H. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age o f the Caliphates, London, 1986, pp. 57 - 103
167 H. Kennedy, The Court o f  the Caliphs, London, 2004, pp. 294 -  296. 
ibid, p. 295.
B. Spuler, ‘The Disintegration of the Caliphate in the East’, in The Cambridge History o f  Islam, Vol. IA,
ed. P.M. Holt et al, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 143 -  174.
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Islamic world changed considerably, as the refined, cultured Arabs made way for the more 
earthy ways of the Turks.
Then, in 1071/463 - 464, two important events happened to the Byzantines. Firstly, 
the Normans of southern Italy, under Robert Guiscard, captured Bari, the last Byzantine 
territory in Italy, so permanently removing Greek rule from Italy after 1500 years.170 
Secondly, a Turkish army under Alp Arslan inflicted a huge defeat on the Byzantine army at 
Manzikert, capturing the emperor Romanus IV Diogenes in the process, and swept through 
Asia Minor, capturing and settling in cities on the Anatolian plateau, from where they 
started making incursions ever closer to Constantinople.171 Both these events would have 
lasting repercussions.
By the 1090s/480s -  490s, however, the Byzantine Emperor Alexius I Comnenus had 
managed to recapture some of the lost territory in Asia Minor and this, combined with a 
chaotic situation in northern Syria, meant that the Byzantines were in a much better 
position than they had been in the preceding decades.172 The political situation in Syria in 
the late-1090s/early-490s made it much easier for the Crusades to be successful than they 
would have been if they had arrived a few years earlier. If the crusading armies had invaded 
before 1092/485, they would have faced a united Seljuq empire under the great vizier Nizâm 
al-Mulk. He died in this year after a reign of thirty years, and two years later, in 1094/487, 
the Fâtimid Caliph al-Mustansir and his vizier, al-Jamâlî, both died, along with the Sunni 
‘Abbâsid Caliph al-Muqtadi.173 At the end of this period, Islamic Syria, which had 
previously been a relatively strong and united state, collapsed into a series of small, 
mutually hostile geo-political units, many of whom were no bigger than a single city.174 As a
170 Harris, Byzantium, p. 34.171
J. Richard, The Crusades, 1071 -  1291, Cambridge, 1999, p. 12; Harris, Byzantium, 33 -  34.
‘ Hands, Byzantium, p. 47.
173 Hillenbrand, Crusades, p. 33
174 ibid, p. 47
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consequence of their hostility to each other, some were to ally with the crusaders against 
their enemies, rather than fight with their co-religionists against a foreign invader.177
In the year 1095/488 the Pope, Urban II, held the council of Clermont in France, at 
which he gave the call to go to the Holy Land and recapture Jerusalem, in order to protect 
it.176 The reasons for his call include an attempt to curb the endemic warfare in Europe177, to
178protect the Byzantine Empire , and to ensure that Christian pilgrims had access to the city
179of Jerusalem. Whatever the reasons, however, there was an immediate wave of 
enthusiasm across Europe, and the First Crusade departed the following year. Travelling for
the most part overland, successive waves of crusaders passed through the Byzantine lands
180causing a certain amount of mayhem wherever they went , until they arrived in Syria, 
having suffered several lost battles against the Turks in Asia Minor.1X1 Immediately the 
crusaders besieged two important cities, Antioch and Edessa, both important centres to the 
Christians. Edessa was captured in February 1098/491, while Antioch fell on the June 
3rd/29th Jumada II after a siege lasting almost ten months.182 Each of the two cities was 
declared the centre of an administrative district, the county of Edessa and the principality of 
Antioch, and each was made up of other towns which had been, or soon would be, captured 
by the crusaders. It was against these two states that Il-Ghazi, emir of Mardin, was ranged.
Meanwhile, after the capture of Antioch, most of the army continued south down the 
Levantine coast, besieging and capturing towns and cities on the way, until they arrived at
‘ S. Runciman, A  History o f  the Crusades, Vol. II, Cambridge, 1952, pp. 112-114 .
176 J. & L. Riley-Smith, The Crusades: Idea and Reality, London, 1981, pp. 37 -  53; J. Richard, The Crusades, 
1071 -  1291, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 19 -  30; P. Cole, The Preaching o f  the Crusades to the Holy Land, 1095 -  
1270, Cambridge, Mass., 1991.
177 J. Riley-Smith, What were the Crusades?, 2"d Ed., London, 1992, p. 37
178 J. Riley-Smith, ‘The Crusading Movement and Historians’, in The Oxford History o f  the Crusades, Oxford, 
1999, p. 2; Harris, Byzantium, pp. 46 -  51.
179 S. Runciman, ‘The Pilgrimages to Palestine before 1095’, in K. Setton et al (eds.), A  History o f  the 
Crusades, University of Pennsylvania Press, Phildelphia, 1955, p. 78.
Harris, Byzantium, pp. 6 0 -6 3 .1X1
Hillenbrand, Crusades, pp. 5 4 -5 5 ;  J. Richard, The Crusades, 1071 -  1291, pp. 47 -  49.
18^'  S. Runciman, ‘The First Crusade: Constantinople to Antioch’, and ‘The First Crusade: Antioch to Ascalon’, 
in K. Setton et al (eds.), A History o f  the Crusades, Pennsylvania University Press, Philadelphia, 1955, pp. 299 
-  324; Hillenbrand, Crusades, pp. 56 -  59; Harris, Byzantium, pp. 68 -  69.
Jerusalem.183 After a 6-week siege, Jerusalem fell on July 15lh 1099/23rd Sha‘ban 492. 
Godfrey of Bouillon was elected to be king in all but name -  he had the title of Advocate of 
the Holy Sepulchre -  and ruled over the largest of the four crusader states, the kingdom of 
Jerusalem, until his death almost exactly a year later.184
Over the next forty years, the crusaders cemented their position in the Levant, 
establishing four states -  centred at Jerusalem, Antioch, Tripoli and Edessa -  and a feudal 
system which linked these states to each other, to the Byzantine Empire, and to Western 
Europe. During this period there were numerous battles between the Muslim powers of 
the region and the crusader states, but the lack of a united Islamic front against the 
crusaders meant that the crusader states were able to resist, for the most part, the attacks of
Muslim armies. There were battles won by both sides during this period, such as battle of
Hauran in 1104/497186 and the battle of The Field of Blood/Balat of 1119/512187, both 
Muslim victories, and Tell Danith, a crusader victory in 1119/51318X, and the outcome of 
these underline the situation of stalemate in the Levant. The Latins were not particularly 
concerned with conquering other Muslim territory, except to protect what they already 
possessed, while the Muslims were not able to mount any kind of successful campaign 
against the crusaders.189
However, in the late 1120s/early 520s Zengl, the atabeg of Mosul, started a campaign 
to unify the disparate Muslim powers in Syria which turned into a concerted resistance 
against the crusader states. Through a systematic campaign of warfare, treaties, and
183 T. Asbridge, The First Crusade, London, 2004, pp. 241 -  319.
184 J. Richard, The Crusades, 1071 -  1291, Cambridge, 1999, p. 791RS
J. Richard, The Crusades, 1071 -  1291, pp.77 - 123 
’ S. Runciman, A History o f  the Crusades, Vol. II, pp. 41 -  44.
187 T. Asbridge, ‘The Significance and Causes of the Battle o f the Field of Blood’, in, Journal o f  Medieval 
History 23, 1997, pp. 301 -  316; S. Runciman, A History o f  the Crusades, Vol. II, Cambridge, 1952, pp.148 -
151, and Hillenbrand, Crusades, p. 22.
188 See S. Runciman, A  History o f  the Crusades, Vol. II, pp. 153 -  4, who refers to the battle as the battle of 
Hab.
189
Hillenbrand, Crusades, pp. 103 -  108.
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intimidation, he was gradually able to gain control of a number of cities in Syria, including 
Aleppo, Hama, Ma‘arrat al-Nrfman, and al-Atharib, thus gaining a power-base in both the 
north and south of Syria.190 It was to the forces of Zengi that the Crusaders suffered their 
first major setback in 1144/539, when the city of Edessa and all the territory east of the 
Euphrates was captured, thus reducing the county of Edessa to a small area of land on the 
west bank of the river.191 However, while it was a blow to the crusader states, it was even 
more important an event, ideologically and politically, to the Muslims. While the crusaders 
had from the very start been fighting the Muslims for religious reasons, the forces of Islam 
were slower to respond in an ideological, religious manner. Although Zengi’s capture of 
Edessa was an important event for him, its role as part of a jihad has been disputed, and is 
currently viewed as another step in the atabeg’s attempts to carve out a personal territory; it 
had not, for example, been great leadership, but luck or opportunism which led to his 
capture of the city.192 It was not until the time of Zengi’s son Nur al-Djn that the idea of 
jihad.\ such a prevalent idea in the early days of Islam, resurfaced.193
To the Christians, however, this was an ideological challenge, and in response to it 
Pope Eugenius III produced the papal bull Quantum Praedecessores, encouraging people 
from the Latin west to go to the Holy Land as their forebears had done, to protect the land 
from the Muslims.194 The consequence of this call was the Second Crusade, which is 
believed to be the time Renaud of Chatillon left France for the Holy Land.195 This was very 
different from the First Crusade for a number of reasons. Firstly, unlike the First Crusade,
190 C. Hillenbrand, “‘Abominable Acts” : The Career of Zengi’, in The Second Crusade: Scope and 
Consequences, eds. J. Phillips & M. Hoch, Manchester, 2001, pp. 111 -  132, and H.A.R. Gibb, ‘Zengi and the 
Fall of Edessa’, in A History o f  the Crusades, ed. K. Setton, Vol. I, University o f Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia, 1955, pp. 449 -4 6 2 .
191 H.A.R. Gibb, ‘Zengi and the Fall o f Edessa’, pp. 460 -  462, J. Richard, The Crusades, 1071 -  1291, p. 153, 
and S. Runciman, A History o f  the Crusades, Vol. II, pp. 235 -  237.
192 C. Hillenbrand, “ ‘Abominable Acts” : The Career ofZengi’ pp. 118-119 .
193
Hillenbrand, Crusades, pp. 116 -  141.
1M In L. & J. Riley-Smith, The Crusades: Idea and Reality, London, 1981, pp. 57 -  59.
3 M.W. Baldwin, Raymond III o f  Tripoli and the Fall o f  Jerusalem, Princeton, 1936, p. 61.
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there was no agreed target for the expedition. Jerusalem had been clearly in the minds of all 
of the First Crusade, yet that was still in crusader hands, and the papal bull mentioned only 
the need to go to the East and ‘defend in this way the Eastern church’ -  not a very clear 
instruction from the man who launched the crusade. There were, therefore, already seeds of 
discord which would plague the journey.196
The expedition started badly, with simmering disharmony with the Greeks, flash- 
floods destroying camps, and disastrous defeats to the Turks in Asia Minor.197 When the 
expedition finally arrived in the East, Raymond, the Prince of Antioch, wanted to entice 
Louis, because of his ties of vassalage, to campaign in northern Syria.198 For a number of 
reasons, though, Louis decided against this, and instead marched south to Jerusalem, and 
near there attended a conference of the nobility of Jerusalem, where the decision was taken 
to try to capture the city of Damascus. In the event, this siege was a disaster. The army 
started to besiege the south of the city, and then -  it is thought -  moved to the north of the 
city. However, they found no water there, and had to abandon the operation after just three 
days.199 Thus the high hopes of the Latin East and West were dashed, and many bitter 
accusations were thrown around in the aftermath.200 Whatever the reason for the debacle, 
the majority of the western armies returned home, having achieved nothing, though a few -  
Renaud of Chatillon among them -  remained. It seems that if territorial progress was to be 
made by the crusader states, it would have to be the nobility of those lands which would 
make it -  the west could not help.
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In the next few years some territorial advances were made, as the crusaders captured 
the city of Ascalon in 1153/548, and came close to achieving the same feat at Shayzar.201 
However, in general terms, the period after the fall of Edessa marked the beginning of the 
very slow death of the crusader states, and even of the crusading ideal itself. Zengi’s 
struggle against the crusaders states was continued after his death by his son Nur al-Dln. 
Firstly, through treaties and intrigue, he brought all Syria under his control, with the 
consequence that for the first time the crusaders were faced with a united Islamic polity 
down almost the whole length of the eastern frontier. The Latins, with Amalric, a powerful, 
resourceful and intelligent king, as leader, were able to counter-balance the strength of the 
Muslims almost perfectly. Because of this, both leaders started to look elsewhere, and the 
struggle between the two powers became focussed on Egypt, the seat of the rich yet 
politically impotent Fatimid Caliphate, under the last Caliph, Al-‘Adid. In the 1160s/560s 
both the crusaders and Nur al-Dln tried to gain influence over Egypt, either through treaties 
with the Fatimids or military power, as Egypt was regarded as the key through which the 
future of Syria and Palestine would be decided.202 Yet throughout the decade the trend was 
for military action by the crusaders aimed at capturing Egyptian cities for the crusader 
states, and for the Zengids to use military force as a way of preventing the triumph of the 
crusaders, while keeping dialogue open with the Fatimids.203 By the end of the decade the 
tactics employed by Nur al-Dln’s deputies had won through, and one of Nur al-Din’s 
followers, Salah al-Dln, became the Caliph’s vizier in 1 171/566.204 The Caliph died shortly 
afterwards, possibly murdered, leaving Salah al-Din as ruler of Egypt, and the Syria and
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Egypt united against the crusaders for the first time.205 Though some Latin commentators of 
the time saw the danger of this situation, they could not persuade others of it, and so there 
was little help coming from Europe for the increasingly beleaguered crusader states.206
Nur al-Dln died in 1174/571 and on his death Salah al-Dln took over his position. In 
the same year Amalric died, and he was succeeded by his son, Baldwin IV.207 This is a 
microcosm of the way fate seemed to be intervening in the destiny of the crusading 
enterprise. While the Muslims were ruled by an ambitious, strong, and strategically 
intelligent general, the position of head of the crusaders was taken by a boy of fourteen who 
had been struck with leprosy, and who could not contain the powerful political forces 
around him. Thus, as the Muslim world became more united, the crusaders became more and 
more divided. Over the next decade there was both regular skirmishing and treaties between 
the crusaders and Muslims, but in 1187/583 the situation was brought to a head. Salah al- 
Dln had spent his time as leader of the Muslim lands of Egypt, Syria and the Jazira 
consolidating his position of power and preparing his men for a large-scale assault on the 
crusader states, especially on Jerusalem.208 Meanwhile, Renaud of Chatillon, who held the 
position of lord of Kerak in Oultrejourdain, had become increasingly belligerent in his 
actions in the previous years, including an alleged attempt to attack Mecca and Medina in 
1183/578.209 The last straw, or possibly the excuse, for Salah al-Dln was in February 
1187/DhuT-Hijja 582, when Renaud attacked a Muslim hajj caravan containing some of 
Salah al-Dln’s relatives while it was passing through his territory during a time of truce.210
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He is also said to have insulted Muhammad during this incident.211 As a result of this, Saläh 
al-Din mobilised his forces and prepared to attack the crusaders.212 The crusader army was 
made up of the army of all three remaining states, as well as the Templars and Hospitallers -  
almost all the fighting men in the crusader states, as well as hired mercenaries. On July 4th, 
they were outmanoeuvred and then routed at the Battle of Hattln, after which the knights of 
the military orders were all executed, along with Renaud.213 Saläh al-DJn allowed the king 
of Jerusalem to go, along with most of the other nobility, but the destruction of the crusader 
army meant that Saläh al-Dln was able to take Acre, Jaffa, Haifa, Caesarea, Toron, Sidon, 
Beirut, Ascalon, and Jerusalem, all in the last six months of 1187/583.214
A Historic Overview of the Lives of the Protagonists:
In order to fully appreciate the image of the ‘other’ in the chronicles regarding Tl-Ghäzi and 
Renaud of Chätillon, a brief account of their lives is necessary.
The Life o f  Tl-Ghäzi:
Najm al-DIn Tl-Ghäzi was a Turkish warrior (d. 1124/518) who fought in the service of 
the Great Seljuq Sultan Malikshäh until the latter’s death in 1092/485.215 His reward for his 
services to the Sultan was to join his brother Suqmän in controlling the territory of 
Jerusalem, as his father Artuq had previously.216 After the capture of Jerusalem by the 
Fätimids in the year 491/1098, Tl-Ghäzi and Suqmän moved to the Jazira, and Tl-Ghäzi 
gained high position within his Artuqid family dynasty upon the death of his father that
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year. When Malikshah died Tl-Ghazi, along with other commanders in the Seljuq armies, 
fought to free himself of control by the Seljuq sultanate and so gain a position of
217independent power. His initial attempts in this area were unsuccessful, but he did manage 
to gain some authority when he was appointed Shihna of Baghdad by the new Sultan, 
Muhammad, in 1102/495.21S However, this position lasted only until 1105/498, when he was 
replaced in the role because he had switched his allegiance from Muhammad to Berk-Yaruq, 
Muhammad’s rival for the sultanate, in 1102-3/494.219 Following this Tl-Ghazi went to Diyar 
Bakr in the Jazlra in order to exercise the power which his position as one of the heads of 
the Artuqid family would permit. While maintaining a pretence of obedience to the Sultan, 
he started to ally himself with the latter’s enemies and to control more territory. In the year 
1108-9/502, he gained control of the city of Mardin, a position of strength from which his 
position became more and more hostile to the Sultan.220 As a result of this attitude, Tl-Ghazi 
became a main focal point for a series of expeditions by Mawdud, the leader of Mosul, 
against rebellious emirs in the years 1106-7/500 -  1115-6/509. His behaviour during this 
period did, however, remain inconsistent, perhaps because he still hoped to gain favour with 
the Sultan to gain advancement in his career. When Mawdud was murdered in 1113-4/507, 
it was al-Bursuqi who was made his replacement at Mosul instead of Tl-Ghazi, who wanted 
the post. As a result of this, Tl-Ghazi stopped co-operating with the Sultan altogether. To 
counter this, the Sultan sent an army against him in 1114-5/508 under al-Bursuqi to force 
the Artuqid to submit, but Tl-Ghazi defeated him in battle. This victory was quickly 
reinforced when Tl-Ghazi made an alliance with Tughtegln of Damascus and the crusader
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prince Roger of Antioch against the Sultan.221 Il-Ghazi’s victory and the subsequent treaty 
caused the Sultan to send another army into the area in 1115-6/509, both to quell the 
resistance of the Turkish emirs and to continue the struggle against the Franks. This second 
expedition also ended in defeat, as the army, under the command of Bursuq ibn Bursuq, fell 
into an ambush set for him by Roger of Antioch at Tell Danith.222 Flaving neutralised the 
threat from the Sultan, Il-Ghazl asserted his independence further by breaking his alliance 
with Roger, and continuing to ignore the Sultan, seeing no need to be reconciled. When the 
Sultan Muhammad died in 1118/512, Il-Ghazl sent his son to the successor, Mahmud, 
presumably because he wanted to have better relations with the new holder of the title, 
while still maintaining independence for his small territory.223
From the time of his breaking off the truce with Roger until his death, Il-Ghazl was 
heavily involved in the Muslims’ struggle with the Frankish crusaders of Antioch and 
Edessa. His main victory during this time was in 1119/513, at the battle of Balat/Field of 
Blood, in which he inflicted a crushing defeat on the army of Antioch and killed Roger, 
Prince of Antioch.224 This was short-lived, however, and soon Baldwin, king of Jerusalem, 
anived with an army and defeated Il-Ghazl, thus meaning the emir lost any advantage he 
had gained.
During Mahmud’s sultanate (1118-1131/511-525), Il-GhazI extended his influence 
over other cities of the Jazira, including Mayyafariqln, Arzan, and Amid, but his position as 
lord of Mardin remained, personally, his most important position, as it was strategically 
vital in order to ensure the survival of the Artuqid dynasty as a political power. The most 
politically valuable city he gained possession of was, though, Aleppo. He became the ruler
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in 1117-8/511, after the townspeople had reluctantly offered it to him. Though it had once 
been an important town, and though there was still kudos around its possession, Aleppo was 
in a difficult state, the countryside around it having been subjected to ravaging by various 
armies for over thirty years. At the time Il-Ghazi took over the city it was threatened by the 
crusaders of Antioch, and the treasury was empty.225 This explains why, despite Aleppo 
being in theory a much more important city, Il-Ghazi did not choose to reside there but at 
Mardin.226 Instead, he left his son Sulayman in charge of the town, to deal with the dual 
threat of the crusaders and the large number of Nizaris in the city. In 1121/515 Sulayman 
revolted against his father, so Tl-GhazI tried to exert his control over the city by marrying 
the daughter of Ridwan, the former ruler of Aleppo, by removing his own son and replacing 
him with his nephew, Badr al-Dawla.227 Having accomplished this, Il-Ghazi negotiated a 
one-year truce with the Franks in order to try to allow Aleppo to recover. In 1122/516 he 
went to the city of Tiffis to try to exert his influence over this potentially useful area; yet 
despite his military strength, his ignorance of the terrain meant that he suffered a large 
defeat at the hands of the Georgian king, David, and his son Dmitri. Many of Il-Ghazi’s men 
died or were taken prisoner, and only a small number, including himself, escaped back to 
Mardin, where he died soon afterwards.228
The Life ofRenaud o f  Chatillon:
Throughout the history of crusade scholarship no individual has aroused stronger
feelings than the hot-headed Renaud of Chatillon229, erstwhile Prince of Antioch and Lord of
Oultrejourdain. These feelings have been almost exclusively negative. As far back as the
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twelfth century writers started to disparage Renaud, and his presentation in the writings of 
William of Tyre, the foremost historian of the twelfth centuiy Latin East and a 
contemporary of Renaud, is believed to have done much to create these feelings. Historians 
have traditionally seen in William’s works a hatred and contempt for a man who was a 
member of the rival court faction.230 However, I will argue that this is inaccurate, and that 
William of Tyre did not criticise Renaud as is believed. Instead, this disparagement of 
Renaud started with chroniclers who disliked him for political reasons, such as Ernoul, the 
original author of the Eracles texts.231 Unlike the kings of Jerusalem or house of Ibelin, 
whence came Emoul, there was no-one who wrote a historical narrative from the perspective 
of Renaud or which glorified his deeds, which explains his presentation in the sources. This 
hatred is also reflected in the writings of the Arab historians of the time who, while having 
no great regard for the leaders of the crusaders generally, spared no ire in their description of 
Renaud.232
However, despite this wave of contemporary criticism, there were some who tried to 
rehabilitate Renaud soon after his death, notably Peter of Blois, whose spiritual piece Passio 
Ragmaldiis remarkable in its praise of Renaud, regarding him almost as a second Christ.233
Yet when the propaganda from all sides had subsided, along with the raw emotions 
which had created it, the feeling which remained, and which persisted down the centuries, 
was that Renaud was at best a loose cannon who was a crusader entirely for selfish reasons,
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and at worst someone on whom blame for the loss of Jerusalem, and consequently the failure 
of the whole crusading enterprise, could be placed.
That this view existed in the first place is not surprising from the sources. Renaud 
appears to have gone out of his way to infuriate those around him. During his life in the 
Latin East, he provoked the wrath not only of his Muslim foes, but also individuals and 
groups who could -  perhaps should -  have been allies, such as the Byzantine Emperor 
Manuel Comnenus234, and even a large section of the nobility of the Kingdom of 
Jerusalem.235 As a result, there were very few people he had not exasperated by the end of 
his life, and his behaviour has fascinated historians ever since, being both abhorred and 
praised.236
Very little is known of Renaud before he exploded onto the political scene of the Latin 
East with his marriage in 1153/547. He was the youngest son of a French noble of the great 
Donzy family from the town of Chatillon-sur-Loing237, and he left for the Holy Land around 
1147/542, when he took the cross and joined the Second Crusade with King Louis VII of 
France. This expedition ended in disaster, first with the defeats by the Turks of Asia Minor 
in 1147/542 and 1148/543, then with the fiasco under the walls of Damascus in July of that 
year. On the departure of the European armies from the Latin East, Renaud was one of a 
small minority of pilgrims who decided to stay in the crusader states. After a short space of 
time, he married Constance, the dowager heiress of Antioch, in 1153/548. The consequence 
of these nuptials was that this newly arrived, relatively minor noble, instantly became the 
ruler of the Principality of Antioch, a position second in importance only to Jerusalem on
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the political scene of the Latin East.23x This was a highly controversial choice on the part of 
Constance, and it seems to have caused the first stirrings of criticism against Renaud among 
others in positions of power.239 He was to hold this position for just seven years, yet during 
this short time he managed to cause major embarassment to the polity of the crusader states, 
especially the Kingdom of Jerusalem, through his politically senseless actions.
In 1153/548, Renaud appears to have single-handedly caused the abandonment of the 
siege of Shayzar when it was on the verge of falling after he demanded that Thierry of 
Flanders, the ruler-in-waiting of the city, had to pay homage to him as well as the king.240 
Thierry refused and because of this, the crusaders abandoned the town and never returned -  
it is only possible to speculate how the whole history of the crusades may have unravelled 
differently had the crusaders captured it. However, perhaps his most notorious effort 
occurred in 1156/551, when he attacked and pillaged the Byzantine island of Cyprus after 
the Byzantine emperor - Renaud’s own liege-lord - was slow in giving Renaud what he 
believed he was owed.241 Renaud’s reign in Antioch was brought to an abrupt end in 
1160/555, when he was captured by the local Muslim emir Majd al-Din while raiding the 
lands of Christian peasants in Islamic territory to the east of his Antiochene possessions in 
northern Syria, and was taken to Aleppo where he was imprisoned for sixteen years.242 This 
capture is regarded by some scholars as being yet another example of his recklessness, as he 
was captured after he failed to retreat when he perhaps should have done, thus losing
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everything through his impulsiveness.243 The period of his life in prison is shrouded in 
darkness, with no hard evidence whatsoever of the occurrences or his circumstances during 
this time, meaning that any reconstruction of this time is necessarily based on conjecture; 
thus there is a sixteen year period when Renaud disappears completely from the 
chronicles.24
During his imprisonment, Renaud’s wife Constance died, meaning that on his release, 
Renaud was obliged to move onto the political scene of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, having 
lost any claim to Antioch. Almost immediately in 1176/571 he received the hand of 
Stephanie, the heiress of Oultrejourdain, and so gained a lordship on the front-line in the war 
with the Muslims, who had Salah al-DIn as their leader.246 From the massive fortresses of 
Kerak and Shawbak, Renaud embarked on a series of belligerent attacks against the Islamic 
territories surrounding his own. Possibly the most audacious of these occurred in 1183/578, 
when he built a series of pre-fabricated ships in his territory, dragged them over the Sinai 
Desert to Ayla with the help of local Bedouin, assembled them there and launched them 
onto the Red Sea. Some of his followers stayed near Ayla and besieged the fort there and the 
nearby Isle des Grayes, while the rest sailed down the Red Sea, attacking merchant and 
pilgrim shipping, as well as coastal towns, before being intercepted near Medina.246 The 
crusader force was said to have got to within a day’s march of the town before they were
247caught, and most, if  not all, were captured and subsequently killed. Renaud escaped and 
made his way back to Latin territory, but the damage -  both material and psychological -
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which had been wrought on the Muslims, great as it was, had been done. After a period of 
relative peace, Renaud attacked a Muslim caravan -  his favourite quarry for easy booty -  
which was crossing his territory during a period of truce in 1187/583. Some chronicles 
report that when reminded of the truce he had made, Renaud replied by insulting 
Muhammad. After this Salah al-Dm made an oath to personally kill Renaud when he had the
248opportunity."
During this period of time Renaud had also been heavily involved in the politics of 
Jerusalem, particularly in the factional dispute over the sucession to the kingship following 
the death of Baldwin IV, which occurred during the mid-1180s/late 570s -  early 580s. In 
this, he was on the opposing side of the dispute from most of the chroniclers, and the 
hostility to Renaud which is believed to occur in some of the chronicles is considered a 
reflection of this.249 In July of 1187/Jumada I 583, Renaud was one of the main protagonists 
in the debates over how to handle Salah al-Din’s threat in the build-up to Hattln; whether to 
fight the Muslim army or to try to avoid confrontation. He was one o f a section of the
250nobility of the kingdom who were keen to fight, and their views won through. This 
decision, however, was to prove fateful, as the crusader army was destroyed in the battle, 
and Renaud was captured, along with most of the other nobility of the crusader states. In an 
episode which is narrated at length and with great glee in the Islamic sources, Salah al-DIn 
fulfils his oath to kill Renaud, an accomplishment with which both he and the Islamic 
chroniclers are very pleased.251
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Chapter 1 -  The Image of Il-GhazI in the Christian Sources:
U-Ghazi in Walter the Chancellor’s ‘The Antiochene Wars’:
Walter the Chancellor’s vivid and extraordinary text known as The Antiochene 
Wars'252 is by far the most useful for studying the presentation of Tl-Ghazi in a Latin 
mindset. It is useful not only because of the sheer volume of detailed information provided 
by Walter about Tl-Ghazi, but also because it is clear that Walter himself was amongst those 
captured by Tl-Ghazi after the Battle of Balat in 1119/513, and so was an eyewitness to a
253significant proportion of the events he describes. However useful this eyewitness 
information is, it seems almost certain from Walter’s account that he himself was tortured 
by 11-Ghazi’s troops after the defeat of Balat, at the emir’s orders, and this had a large effect 
on his judgement of the situation.
Walter’s chronicle is in two parts. The subject of Book I is what he regarded as the 
First War, the occasion of the attack on northern Syria by Bursuq, the atabeg of Mosul, in 
1115/509, when the crusader army of Antioch combined with those of regional Muslim 
rulers, including Il-Ghazi, to defeat Bursuq’s army. The subject of the much longer Book II 
is the Second War, covering the events of 1119/512-3, when Tl-Ghazi defeated the army of 
Antioch at the Battle of Balat, after which he ravaged the area of northern Syria between 
Aleppo and Antioch, before his aggression was checked by a crusader relief force led by the 
King of Jerusalem at the battle of Tell Danith, also in 1119/513.
259
“ Walter the Chancellor, A History o f  the Antiochene Wars, tr. S. B. Edgington & T. S. Asbridge, Ashgate, 
Aldershot, 1999
WC, p. 114 implies Walter was present at the battle, and his vivid descriptions of the aftermath reinforce 
this.
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The Image ofll-Ghazi in Book I:
In the account of the first war fought between the Antiochenes and the Muslim powers 
to the east, Tl-Ghazi is described as simply ‘emir of the Turcomans’254, a neutral assessment 
which will be in contrast to his portrayal later in the second book. He is also mentioned as 
part of a group of Muslim rulers from Syria who made an alliance with Roger of Antioch in 
1115/509. This treaty is described as ‘a pretended peace’, and one which was made because 
these Muslims were as afraid of the Christians as they were of the Persians.255 Il-GhazI is 
one of a number of small rulers who could not face the might of the Sultan’s army alone, so 
needed outside help -  he is not viewed as a strong ruler. After this treaty was signed, 
however, it is not mentioned again, and Walter shows Roger as facing the army of Bursuq 
alone.256 This silence with regard to the treaty may be because he did not want to show the 
Christians as fighting with Muslims, or because the Christians received no help from their 
allies. The latter is unlikely. If Roger had been betrayed and left to fight alone by his allies 
then Walter would surely have reported this, yet he does not. Instead, the inference has to be 
that the treaty was not ignored by the Muslims of North Syria, but instead that either they 
did help Roger in some way, or they were not able to. The lack of direct criticism of II- 
Ghazi or any other Muslim ruler at this stage implies that they did nothing wrong in 
Walter’s eyes and so are not attacked in his work at this point.257
In Book I, Il-GhazI is seen simply as another Muslim ruler whom the Franks had to 
engage with for the sake of practicality and survival. He is seen as neither good or bad, nor 
friend or enemy, but a local ruler whose limited power could have been useful if channelled
254 WC, p.87.
255 WC, p.88.
256 WC, p. 90.
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The reason why Il-GhazI did not fight alongside Roger is suggested by the writings of the Armenian 
Matthew of Edessa. He states that after Bursuq marched into Northern Syria, the Muslim and Christian allies 
came together to fight him. At that, Bursuq feigned a retreat, leading to the dispersal of the allies who believed 
he was returning to Mosul. After this he returned to the lands of Antioch and ravaged them. Therefore, the 
reasons for Il-Ghazi’s non-appearance are apparent; he honoured the treaty, yet was fooled, along with the 
other leaders, by Bursuq’s tactics, and it was for this reason he is not criticised by Walter the Chancellor.
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in the right direction. His fight was for survival against the powerful rulers around him, 
whatever their religion. His difference from the crusaders is not highlighted at this point, 
apart from being a Muslim. Instead, it is the Muslims who threatened the crusaders, the 
troops of Bursuq, who are highlighted as an ‘other’.
The Image of Il-Ghazi in Book II -
The portrayal of Il-Ghazl in Book II is in stark contrast to that of Book I. From being a 
petty local ruler looking after his own interests amongst the factional and dynastic 
squabbles of northern Syria, fighting to defend his territory, Il-Ghazi suddenly becomes a 
monster, a powerful tyrant whose objective is to destroy both the crusader states and 
Christianity in general. He is cruel, malicious, and evil -  the personification of the very 
reasons why the Crusades were happening -  and the swift, sharp break between the two 
parts of the narrative heightens the effect.
Il-Ghazi is right at the forefront of Walter’s account in the second book, and his deeds 
are always regarded by the chronicler as driven by his desire to destroy the Christians, which 
itself was caused by the evil which was present in him, or even part of him. Il-Ghazi is given 
many epithets which reflect his role as the evil one, such as ‘minister of death258, and 
‘wicked’.259
Yet Walter knows that his readership will not simply accept his word for this, and so 
he supplies clear examples of the evilness of Il-Ghazi in the narrative, at two main points. 
The first of these is the account of the behaviour of Il-Ghazi in the vivid description of the 
torture of prisoners after the Battle of Balat. Here, Walter leaves no doubt as to the 
viciousness of the treatment of the prisoners:
25!iWC, p. 133.
259 w r n
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‘led to execution, the badly wounded and the others, they fell at the hands of the 
heathen not only with their heads cut off but they even suffered agonising death with the 
skin flayed from the living and half-severed head. Also the rest, knowing they were to be 
tortured, spent that night in outrage and dread’.260
This is just one of a number of examples Walter gives of the torture that was suffered 
by the prisoners during this time, torture which Walter believes went beyond the bounds of 
normal behaviour in war261, and he leaves us in no doubt as to who was the instigator of 
these actions -  it was Il-Ghazi. Not only was he the instigator of these atrocities, he is 
shown as not being satisfied with them, but trying to think up other, more vicious 
devices.262 He also took great delight in the torture, as is clear from the chronicle:
‘this wicked man was delighted by their torments and he laughed at them as if he were 
refreshed by some food to fuel his cruelty...they (Il-GhazTs soldiers) could...tear the 
prisoners to pieces and delight the unholy one’.263
There is constant repetition throughout of comments that Il-Ghazi is evil, and new 
activities appear consistently, carried out by the Turkish emir, which Walter uses as 
examples of this evil. Therefore, Il-Ghazi would ‘savour to the full in every possible way a 
universal sacrifice of destruction for the increase of his enjoyment’264, so that ‘the enormity 
of his cruelty would prevail in all things’.265 He is also reported to have used psychological 
warfare to hurt the prisoners, bringing water in front of them while they were suffering
260 WC, p. 132.
26' WC,p. 166.
WC, p. 134, and also in the introduction, p. 65.
263 WC, p. 134.
264 WC, p. 134.
2fo WC, p. 135.
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badly from thirst, then allowing his men to drink it, offering the Christians only ‘the muddy 
dregs’.266
The second occasion on which Il-Ghazl’s evil persona is clearly demonstrated by 
Walter is in the aftermath of the defeat of the Turks by the army of the kingdom of 
Jerusalem at the battle of Tell Danith. After this defeat, the prisoners who remained at 
Aleppo from those captured at Balat were, according to Walter, subjected to more torture in 
front of large crowds at the hands ofll-Ghazi, after he had spent the night in a drinking bout 
caused by self-pity. The chronicler gives many examples of the tortures suffered, such as 
‘some of them were hanged by ropes from a post, with their heads turned downwards and 
their feet upwards, and exposed to constant blows of arrows...some were buried...up to the 
chin in a pit in the ground, as the hands of wicked ones brandished spears...(and) several of 
them, indeed, were thrown with every single limb cut off into the squares and districts’.267 
After these tortures were inflicted, Walter relates how those who remained were sent back 
to their prisons, where they
‘were worn down...(by tortures which were) amazing and astounding to describe and 
put down in words...(and which) I think it is better for me to keep quiet about the kind and 
quantity of their tortures than express them, lest Christians bring the same to bear against 
Christians and turn them into accustomed usage’.268
This last part particularly would have horrified the Latins reading Walter’s account. 
As violence was a normal part of life in Latin European society at the time, for a chronicler 
to have insinuated that there were tortures as yet unused in their areas would have
~66 WC, pp. 1 3 3 -4 .
267 WC, p. 163.
~68 WC, pp. 165-6.
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underlined for those reading the severities of the torments the prisoners suffered at II- 
Ghazi’s hands. That the very brutal torments in use in Europe were not as severe as those 
utilised by Il-Ghazi would have served to emphasise further how evil the Turkish ruler was 
to the Latins reading the chronicle.269
There are, therefore, many times in The Antiochene Wars where its author shows that 
he believed that Il-Ghazi was a figure of evil. The reason for this was, for the most part, the 
tortures and afflictions he wrought on the Christian prisoners. However, these were merely 
symptoms of the real cause of his evil nature as described by the chronicle -  that of his role 
as persecutor of Christians and Christianity -  an Antichrist figure. It is in the interpretation 
of and reasoning for the events described that Walter shows this, stating, for example, that 
Il-Ghazi ‘was ardently intent on the destruction of the Christians’.270 The chronicler then 
shows how the events he refers to witness to the truthfulness of this interpretation which he 
has for them. For example, Walter is intent on showing Il-GhazI as one whose hate for the 
Christians is so strong that he is shown as becoming more hateful towards the end of his 
life, not mellowing as people sometimes do, and as such even when he was ill and dying he 
preferred to fight against them than to rest as his hatred of the Christians was so 
ferocious.271
However, despite Il-Ghazi’s posturing, Walter demonstrates to his readers that those 
who persecute and fight the Christians are fighting God Himself. Consequently, before his 
final defeat ‘as he rode out in arrogance he met the wrath of God’272, who helped cause the 
victory of the Christian king David of Georgia -  it was, therefore, God who caused II- 
Ghazi’s downfall. Another example of God intervening in the chronicle is that Il-Ghazi,
"69 For an explanation o f violence in western society, see M. Bull, ‘Origins’, pp. 15 - 34 in The Oxford History 
o f the Crusades, ed. J. Riley-Smith, Oxford, 1999, particularly the description of European torture on p. 15. 
See also, T. Asbridge, The First Crusade, London, 2004, pp. 3 - 5 .
270 WC, p. 171.
271 WC, p. 171.
272 WC, p .169.
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during his drinking after his defeat at the battle of Tall Dânith, wanted to slay the prisoners 
one by one but was not able to because of ‘God’s agreement to protect them’, so there was 
nothing he could do.273 And on one occasion, which Walter relates to his readers with 
obvious glee, Tl-Ghazl killed the knight Sanson, who Walter claims had been signed with the 
Cross by Christ himself in a dream with 24 others who were also killed. After they had been 
killed, one of the bodies ‘transported itself to another place from the place where it lay’, 
whereupon Il-Ghâzï Tost his powers, foaming with blood which // poured out, he was 
crushed and fell, harshly disfigured’.274 All three of these examples show clearly how Walter 
believed that Il-Ghâzï was evil, because God stepped into the situation to protect the 
Christians from the Turkish ruler.
Finally, Walter has one last method by which he underlines the evil offl-Ghâzî -  he 
assigns that belief to other people. He does this by ascribing the belief to other Christians in 
order to lend weight to his claims. In the speech of King David of Georgia, just before the 
king defeats Il-Ghâzï in battle, Walter writes that David said: ‘we shall easily overcome not 
only the countless attendants of demons (the Turks, including Il-Ghâzï), we shall indeed 
overcome even the demons themselves’.277 As Walter was not present, it is certain that the 
speech of King David as the chronicler describes it was completely invented -  both the 
timescale and the medieval Latin predilection for invented speeches276 attest to this -  and so 
the words which are placed into the king’s mouth are those which Walter himself believed 
and which he wanted his audience to believe as well by using a broad range of characters to 
deliver his opinions. At this point, Walter also makes a delicate though deliberate 
comparison between Il-Ghâzï and David, the latter being referred to as ‘so great a king, a
273 WC, p. 165.
~74 WC, pp. 1 6 6 -8 .
775 WC, p. 169.
~16 See P. Ainsworth, ‘Contemporary and “Eyewitness” History’, p. 270, and P. Ainsworth, ‘Legendary 
History: Historia and Fabnla\ p. 389, both in Historiography in the Middle Âges, ed. D.M. Deliyannis, Leiden,
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true and perfect Christian’.277 One main reason for this reference to David as a perfect 
Christian is to highlight the imperfection ofll-Ghazi.
Perhaps the most striking example of others believing Tl-Ghazi was evil is that Walter 
writes that Tl-Ghazi’s own subjects in Aleppo rejoice, though privately, when they believe 
he is dead.27X It is to be expected that his Christian enemies would rejoice if they thought he 
was dead, but the fact that his own people rejoiced when they thought he was dead shows 
the extent to which Tl-Ghazi was reviled by his own people, according to Walter the 
Chancellor. This does, however, reveal a problem with the text which will be examined in 
detail later; that while at this point Walter suggests that the population of Aleppo did not 
like Tl-Ghazi, yet at other times they rejoiced at his behaviour to the crusader prisoners.
Despite this problem, the reported rejoicing of the people of Aleppo is one of several 
different devices used in the chronicle to demonstrate the accuracy of Walter’s Christian 
belief that Tl-Ghazi was an extremely evil man. However, the chronicler then goes a step 
further, and attempts to show that, despite being shown as an evil man in the opinion of 
Walter, the Christians in general, and God, Tl-Ghazi’s actions were in fact the actions of a 
good Muslim. Edgington and Asbridge correctly identified that at one occasion Walter 
deliberately contrasts the negative view of Tl-Ghazi in Latin eyes with how he was seen by 
the Muslims, in which he is shown as upholding Muslim law, by being referred to by one of 
his soldiers as ‘star of the law’.279 Yet it is probable that Walter meant the comparison to go 
further, and he was demonstrating the difference between what he saw as the law of 
Christianity, which was good, and that of Islam, which he saw as encouraging such activity 
as Tl-Ghazi carried out. Thus, all Islam, and those who followed this law, including Tl-Ghazi,
277 WC, p. 169.
•>78 _  ^
WC, p. 157. Walter writes that their joy was caused because Il-Ghazi had deprived them of their 
possessions, or had been ransomed by him.
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was evil, while those who fought against it were good and were carrying out God’s will. 
Thus, actions such as Crusades were entirely justified, and by definition good.
The main theme of the evilness of Il-Ghazi brings to the fore the second theme of his 
image in The Antiochene Wars, which is that because of his evil, the emir became the 
victim of divine retribution. It has already been demonstrated how his evil deeds caused him 
to be battling God Himself2*0, and the implications of this can be fully explored.
The theme of divine retribution is particularly strong during the account of the end of 
Il-Ghazi, as is Walter’s interpretation of what this means. This theme forms the final part of 
Walter’s chronicle, and is mainly linked to Il-Ghazi’s battle against the Georgian King, 
David II, and a subsequent battle against a combined crusader army, which would be his 
last. As David is regarded by Walter as a perfect Christian, it was natural that it should be
he who was God’s instrument of justice.2*1 Walter’s judgement on Il-Ghazi’s attack on King
282David is clear to see: ‘as he rode out in arrogance he met the wrath of God’ , which caused 
his army to be routed and himself put to flight. Although it might be expected that the 
wrath of God would mean that Il-Ghazi would die on the field with his men, he did escape, a 
fact which Walter ascribed to the will of God, though he was ‘half-dead, unarmed and 
famished’2*3, to be defeated again and then die in ignominious fashion soon after. Il-GhazI’s 
death is the climax to Walter’s chronicle, a death which is vividly described by the author to 
show God’s victory and Il-Ghazi going to hell:
See above, pp. 78 -  79.
WC, p .168 - 70, and introduction, p. 65.
282 WC, p .169.
283 WC, p. 170.
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‘his filthy soul issued forth from his anus along with a flux of dung from his belly, and 
it was dragged away by the claws of infernal scorpions to tumble into the halls of deepest 
hell, which are full of dreadful fires burning without end’.2X4
Walter’s description ofll-G hazi’s divine punishment was ‘probably the primary reason
285why he continued his account to 1122 (516)’ , being a climax to the narrative of the
struggles between the Christians and the Muslims which, in the end, the Christians won 
because God was on their side. The end of the chronicle is a reflection of Walter’s beliefs: in 
the narrative, as in life, God and his supporters will triumph in the end over the forces of 
evil, no matter how strong they may seem to be.
Although this death happens right at the end of the chronicle, the build-up starts 
sometime before, during the scene of the fate of prisoners who were to be killed after II- 
Ghazi’s drunken lamentations following the battle of Tell Danith. At this time ‘by the 
power and a miracle of the Lord’ the decapitated body of one prisoner was transported ‘to 
another place’286, with the result that Il-Ghazi had a fit which stopped him killing any 
others, and a recurrence of which led to his own death. During this fit, Il-Ghazi Tost his 
powers, foaming with blood which poured out, he was crushed and fell, harshly disfigured by 
a savage kind of passion so that, I tell you, his mouth seemed to form a horrible shapeless 
mass with his ears and his ears with his nostrils’.287 This is the first direct intervention of 
God in the account, and from this point onwards, Il-Ghazi was doomed. God appears several 
times more, on each occasion helping the crusaders and thwarting Il-GhazTs evil intentions, 
before meting out a punishment to the Turk, each time more severely, until he finally met 
the ultimate divine retribution in the form of death.
284 WC, p. 171.8̂5'  Introduction to WC, p. 65.
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The conception of Il-Ghazi as a figure of evil, and the consequences for him of this evil 
in the form of divine retribution are the two main themes which make up the main image of 
Il-Ghazi in Book Two of The Antiochene Wars. However, there are several other aspects of 
Il-Ghazl’s character which are described by Walter the Chancellor. Firstly, Walter describes 
Il-Ghazi as a drunkard.288 There are several occasions on which Il-Ghazi is shown as drunk, 
including a famous incident where it is said he was ill for 15 days because of the amount of 
alcohol he had consumed.289 He also is shown drinking while the prisoners from Balat were 
about to be executed.290 This theme is underplayed by Asbridge and Edgington in the 
introduction to their edition291, yet it is an extremely important part of the narrative. It can 
be seen as the cause of much of the evil about which Walter has been so scathing, as many 
of his most brutal acts take place after he has been drinking. This is especially so during the 
drinking bout after his defeat at Tell Danith. At this time, he accepted advice from 
Tughtegin, the ruler of Damascus, that it would be more sensible and profitable for the 
prisoners to be kept alive, yet he then sent for the prisoners and his executioners as his 
drinking went on.292 Thus as his drinking increased, so his capacity for logic disappeared to 
be replaced by sadistic rage, and so ‘the more the infidel’s drunkenness raged, the more the 
perversity of their tortures increased’.293 This link between drinking and evil action occurs 
throughout the narrative, and wherever it is mentioned that Il-Ghazi was drinking, it is also 
mentioned that he became cruel because of it. Thus, Walter writes that ‘under the influence
288 WC, p. 138: ‘he was keen on drink’ -  for a Muslim, this is an especially damaging accusation.•>g9
This may have been an exaggeration on the author’s part. WC, p. 168; Introduction, p. 65. However, it is 
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may have suffered thus. Usama b. Munqidh, An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period o f  the 
Crusades, ed. & tr. P. Hitti, New York, 2000, p. 149.
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of drunkenness he wanted to ruin them’294, that the prisoners ‘were brought before the 
infidel in his exuberance from horrific drinking’295, and, after his victory over the army of 
the Principality of Antioch, he decided that instead of attacking and possibly capturing that 
city, which would have given him a famous victory, he sent his troops on expeditions for 
booty in the country, because ‘he was keen on drink’.296
Secondly, Il-Ghazi is shown to be cowardly -  he is said to have been ‘frightened by the 
flight and destruction which had happened to them (Il-Ghazi and Tughtegm)’.297 He is also 
regarded as arrogant, which causes him to believe that he is invincible: when he saw how big 
his own force was before the battle with King David he became arrogant298because of its 
size, yet this arrogance was defeated by the wrath of God.299 There is clearly a link here 
between the arrogance of Il-Ghazi and his eventual defeat; that arrogance is something 
which the divine takes very seriously and the consequences for which is divine retribution, 
forms of which have been seen earlier.300 Furthermore, Il-Ghazi’s arrogance was not quelled 
by his defeat at the hands of God, but rather is multiplied. After his defeat to King David, he 
did not accept his defeat, and go back to his territory as he might have been expected to do, 
but instead kept trying to capture the city of Zardana.301 Walter is keen to weigh the 
arrogance of Il-Ghazi with the attitude of Christian King David, who ‘most humbly waited’ 
for the attack, putting his strength not in himself but in God, in the form of the Holy Cross, 
the benefits and results of which are clear from the outcome of the battle.302
294 WC, p. 165.
295 WC, p. 164.
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Il-Ghazt is also presented as untrustworthy, which is certainly part of his evil 
character, but Walter writes about it in different situations so it can be placed in a different 
category. The prime example of this is his deception towards the townspeople of Zardana in 
1119/513, to whom he offered safe passage in return for their surrender, but then once the 
inhabitants had accepted this offer, he ordered his troops to kill the townspeople once they 
were inside the city.303
Perhaps the most interesting view which Walter has ofll-Ghazi, however, is that the 
Turkish ruler was a good Muslim. There are several places where this happens: a Muslim 
crowd described him as being ‘the star of the law’304, and when he was considering whether 
to kill a seneschal, the ‘Patriarch’ of Damascus believed he should, as it would be an ‘act of 
respect for our law’.305 As suggested previously306, the reason for this attitude on Walter’s 
part is that he wishes to demonstrate to his reader the inherent wrongness of Islam, and to 
achieve this he presents an individual of the evil persona ofll-Ghazi as being that of a model 
Muslim.
It is clear, therefore, that throughout Book II of The Antiochene Wars 11-Ghazi is a 
figure of hatred, one who, generally speaking, has all the aspects of an evil man. This, 
however, makes it somewhat surprising that there are a number of occasions when Walter’s 
portrayal ofll-Ghazi reflected some good in his character. For example, during his siege of 
Art ah in 1119/513, he negotiated a settlement with the town’s bishop which involved giving 
the townspeople safe passage with escorts. These escorts then robbed them, but 11-Ghazi 
sent back the priestly vestments to them after he had recovered them from the escorting 
troops.307 Asbridge and Edgington have noted that 11-Ghazi ‘may not have organised this
3113 WC, Introduction, p. 64; WC, p. 149.
304 WC, p. 159.
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robbery’, but this does not go far enough - it seems certain that he did not organise it, as 
there would have been no reason for him to have sent the garments back to their owners if 
he had done. Though he may have kept some material possessions which were plundered, 
that did not mean that he organised the episode; it is more likely that he simply profited
T AO__________________________________________________________________________________ _
from a moment of good fortune. On this occasion, Walter comments that Il-Ghazi ‘partly 
kept this promise (of safe passage) and partly broke it’309, which for Walter to be 
commenting on Il-Ghazi, ranks as praise.
Another example of this is the episode at Sarmada in 1119/513, which Il-Ghazi 
besieged after his victory at the Field of Blood. On this occasion, the Frankish knight 
commanding the defence, Renaud of Mazoir, had no choice but to surrender himself to the 
Turkish leader in order to avoid potential death by starvation. Il-Ghazi swore an oath to 
protect him for a month, after which he would be freed, to which Renaud had to 
acquiesce.310 It is highly likely that this was kept to, and that no harm befell Renaud, 
because, as Asbridge and Edgington have discovered, he was witness to a charter signed in 
1122/515-6.311
Finally, there are Il-GhazTs actions towards Robert Fitz-Fulk, who had been captured 
during the Battle of the Field of Blood. During this time, the Aleppan crowd gathered 
around the crusader, wanting to enjoy themselves, ‘by torturing (him so) they could tear him 
limb from limb’.312 Il-Ghazi, however, refused his permission for them to do so, which does 
not fit comfortably with the image Walter has attempted to portray throughout Book II of 
his narrative. It is possible that Il-GhazI knew that Robert was a leper and he may not have
308 For the opinion of Asbridge and Edgington, see WC, Introduction, p. 64.
309 WC, p. 136.
310 WC, p. 129.
311 Introduction to WC, p.64.
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313 _ _wanted his troops to contract the disease. However, ifll-Ghazi had wanted him dead he 
could have achieved his aim without risking catching leprosy, but he does not, instead 
sending him to Tughtegln. Thus, he saved from death a crusader whom he didn’t have to 
spare.
Therefore, despite Walter’s obvious loathing for 11-Ghàzï, there were occasions when 
events occur which mean the chronicler cannot avoid presenting the Turkish ruler as being 
something other than the monster he is determined Tl-Ghazi should be, even though he does 
attempt to diminish the impact by not praising these actions, instead letting them pass 
without comment. The implication of this is that there were aspects to Il-Ghazi’s character 
which were good, and therefore the chronicle should be properly evaluated to judge whether 
Walter the Chancellor’s interpretation is accurate, or whether there could be other 
explanations.
A Critique of Walter’s Interpretation:
In order to reach a satisfactory conclusion regarding Walter’s account, it is necessary 
to examine the evidence to see whether it is consistent, and to see whether there are other 
ways of interpreting the facts which contradict the chronicler’s interpretation. This results 
in a number of problems.
Firstly, and most clearly, Walter’s evidence is not consistent throughout the narrative. 
In Book I his comments on Il-GhazI are simply neutral, while in Book II they are extremely 
negative. The cause of this was Walter’s capture and probable torture by Il-Ghâzï’s men 
between the time of his writing Books I and II, which can be explained by Walter’s hatred of 
Il-Ghâzi after being tortured at his orders.314
See WC, note 241, p. 160.
See the introduction to WC, p. 8.314
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However, while Walter criticises Il-Ghazi constantly throughout Book II, interpreting 
all of his actions as being nefarious, the narrative account does not necessarily support 
Walter’s claims, and for almost every hostile interpretation the chronicler gives, there is 
another explanation which is possible. Some examples of this follow.
During the Turks’ celebrations following their victory at the Battle of Balat, Walter 
reports that ll-Ghaz”i ordered that the wounded prisoners be killed.315 Walter is scathing in 
his attack on this. However, this action is no different, perhaps less vicious, than the actions 
of Salah al-DIn after the battle of Hattin in 1187/583, when he ordered the execution of all 
the Templars he had captured316, or those of Richard I after the siege of Acre in 1 191/587317, 
and those of the crusaders after the capture of Jerusalem in 1099/492.31 x Il-Ghazi ordered 
that only the wounded should be executed, while on these other occasions, a massacre was 
ordered for all, or a large number, of those who had been captured. Thus not only was a 
massacre after a military confrontation not unheard of, that which Il-Ghazi carried out was 
less violent than many others. Walter’s revulsion presumably comes from being an 
eyewitness to the massacre, and so it must have had a large impact on his psyche and his 
subsequent attitude. From a practical perspective, having to look after hundreds, possibly 
thousands, of prisoners was extremely difficult. One of the explanations given for Richard’s 
actions in massacring Muslim prisoners was that they would have been a burden to him.319 
Il-Ghazi may have been dealing with the prisoners in simply the easiest way he could.
Immediately following this accusation, Walter claims that Il-Ghazi brought out some 
water, and that he was cruel because he allowed his own troops to drink the water first, then
WC, p. 132.
316 Al-Kämil, vol. X, p. 27.317 See Ambroise, The Crusade o f  Richai'd the Lionheart, ed. & tr. M. J. Hubert, New York, 1941, p. 228; 
Continuation, p. 108; Al-Kämil, Vol. X, pp. 99 -  100.
Jl8 Raymond d’Aguilers, Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem, ed. J. Hill & L. Hill, Philadelphia, 1968, 
p. 150.
’19 J. Gillingham, Richard I, Yale University Press, 1999, pp. 169 -  170.
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the Christians were allowed to have ‘the muddy dregs’.320 In the confusion that follows, 
though, it becomes evident that Walter does not know for sure that the muddy dregs were 
all that was left, as the prisoners’ lack of discipline precluded the chronicler from getting 
close to the water to confirm this.321 Ifll-Ghazi had wanted the prisoners to be tortured by 
their thirst then surely he would have allowed his troops to drink in front of them, without 
allowing the crusaders to have any. A more considered view of this scene is that Il-Ghazi 
wanted to look after his troops first, as any commander would, before attending to the needs 
of the prisoners. Il-Ghazi wanted to keep them alive, so offered them a drink. The scene only 
went wrong when some of the prisoners disobeyed commands meant to keep order, and all 
rushed forward. An out-of-control mob of prisoners was not something which Il-Ghazi, or 
any commander, would have wanted, so a violent confrontation was the natural outcome. 
The criticism in this circumstance seems to be more the result of Walter’s own experience 
than the reality of the situation. The Turks were thirsty, as were the crusaders, so they 
drank. Walter, though did not care for the Turks, so their thirst did not matter to him, only 
his own. So when the Turks started drinking, it may have seemed that they were only doing 
it to increase the torment of their prisoners, while in reality Il-Ghazi was doing what any 
good commander would, by looking after the welfare of his own troops.
An interesting view on the situation can be obtained by comparing how Walter 
compares Il-GhazI with Tughtegin, the ruler of Damascus, while describing the fate of 
Robert Fitz-Fulk.322 After the rhetoric has been stripped away, Tughtegln’s actions are 
much more violent and shocking than those ofll-Ghazi. When Tughtegln saw Robert, he 
‘put on an exaggerated expression, with a bestial grin, and with a piercing gaze he goggled
J;"WC, pp. 133-4.
321 The crusaders ignored 11-GhazTs orders that they should come forward two by two to drink, and rushed 
forward to get some water. As a result, the Turks killed many of them. WC, pp. 133 -  134.
322 WC, p. 1 5 9 -  162.
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at that knight’.323 It was Tughtegm, not 11-Ghazi, who actually killed the crusader, and he is 
said to have made a drinking cup out of Robert’s head.324 Then he requested permission 
from Il-Ghazl to enter the prison at Aleppo to go to the crusaders ‘so that when he had 
beheaded all who were in that prison with his own hand he could revel in the bloodshed 
instead of taking a bath and be restored to youth like an eagle’.325 Tughtegm therefore 
comes across as a vicious monster who delights in the suffering of his prisoners326. 
Furthermore, in a description which compares Il-Ghazl and Tughtegin, albeit not 
deliberately, the behaviour of Tughtegin seems much worse than that ofll-Ghazi after the 
rhetoric has been removed. Walter tries to convince his readership that Il-Ghazl behaved in a 
manner which was designed to inflict maximum humiliation on Robert Fitz-Fulk, but he 
does not actually do anything of the sort -  he simply seems to have accepted from 
Tughtegin a sum of sixty thousand bezants, which may have been ransom money. 
Tughtegin, however, killed his former friend and made his skull into a drinking cup, yet, 
shocking as this behaviour is, Tughtegin does not get the same vitriolic treatment as II- 
GhazI does.327 Although much of what Walter reports occurred out of his vision, and so we 
cannot be sure of its accuracy, the image is important here, and Tughtegln’s actions in the 
chronicle are much worse than those of Il-Ghazl, yet it is the latter who is explicitly 
criticised by Walter.
There are plenty of other examples of this, such as when Tughtegm wants to kill all 
the Franks being held at Aleppo, but it is Il-Ghazi who stops him, saying it would not be 
prudent as it would bring problems for them. Instead, he considers the possibility of
323 WC, p. 160.
324 W C,p. 161.
325 WC, p. 162.
326 _Tughtegln’s behaviour is all the more disturbing when it is remembered that according to Usama b. 
Munqidh, Robert was a friend of Tughtegin. See Usama b. Munqidh, Kitab al-I'tibar, tr. P.K. Hitti as An Arab- 
Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period o f  the Crusades, New York, 2000 p. 149.
3-7 WC, pp. 161 -  2.
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exchanging the prisoners, either for other prisoners, or for the castle of ‘Azaz which he 
wants.32* However, Il-Ghazi does not get praised for this action; instead, Walter constantly 
reminds the reader how evil Il-Ghazi is through his use of harsh adjectives throughout the 
narrative. Furthermore, Il-Ghazi then orders that the nobles and certain other prisoners 
should be ransomed, and the ransom money used to defend his lands.329 This action squares 
with the idea that Il-Ghazi understands the importance of prisoners, but not with Walter’s 
image of him as a bloodthirsty tyrant.
Thus, it is clear that Il-Ghazi’s motivations were not all based on the bloodlust of a 
lunatic, as Walter would have us believe. Furthermore, despite the vitriol Walter uses to 
describe the torture, he also seems to suggest that this was normal -  ‘kings, princes and 
other powerful people of the world, and even powerless men of the same faith as these men 
were themselves (i.e. Muslims), inflict many different punishments on their prisoners to
330extort money when they capture them justly and when they capture them unjustly’. The 
editors have here underlined both how Walter acknowledges this, and also how he 
acknowledges that Christians do the same, thereby lessening the effect, or at least the 
coherence, of the arguments that Il-Ghazi is evil because of his use of torture.331
It is clear that Walter the Chancellor’s opinion of Il-Ghazi as expressed in The 
Antiochene Wars does not sit well with his account of the events themselves. His vitriol 
against Il-Ghaz1 is too strong, and his interpretation of events does not make sense in 
themselves -  other explanations which show Il-Ghazi as an ordinary ruler are more 
plausible.
3̂8WC, pp. 162 -  3. For the reasons he wants this castle, see p. 162, note 247.
329 WC, p. 168.
330 WC, p. 166.
331 Introduction to WC, p. 63.
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Conclusion:
Walter’s presentation ofll-Ghazl as the ‘other’ should be interpreted in the light of his 
purposes in writing -  to explain the defeat at the Field of Blood in terms of a need for 
spiritual purity, and to show that once spiritual purity is attained, God will grant victory. 
When highlighting the spiritual purity of the ordinary soldiers such as Samson or the pious 
faith in God of King David, Walter’s idea of the ‘us’ is in sharp contrast to his presentation 
ofll-Ghazl, who is the opposite of all that is good amongst the Christians. However, this 
does not adequately explain the vitriolic abuse Walter hurls at 11-Ghazl throughout Book II, 
especially as Il-Ghazi’s actions do not seem to have been any worse than those of 
Tughtegln. The reason for this is the psychological effect Walter’s imprisonment had on 
him. Thus, while Il-Ghazl was a useful tool for Walter because he was a clear contrast to the 
‘us’, a clear ‘other’, the strength of the criticism of him within the narrative was caused by 
something much more personal to the chronicler.
Jl-Ghazl in William o f  Tyre’s Chronicle:
William of Tyre’s work is the major chronicle for the history of the Latin East, and is 
extremely useful for the overall perspective it gives on the crusader states -  which includes 
periods covered by no other chronicles332 - ,  the obvious intelligence and wisdom of the 
author which finds its expression in the highly developed historiography in the chronicle, as 
well as the fact that he was the archbishop of Tyre at the time of the composition, thus both 
having access to important people and being present at important events. However, when 
looking at the image ofll-Ghazl in the chronicle, it is significant that William was not alive 
during the events he describes surrounding Il-Ghazl, and did not live as an adult in the Holy
3 3 9
'  Specifically, the years 1127/521, when the First Crusade chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres’ ends, until the 
point at which it ends, in 1184/580. Edbury and Rowe, pp 1 -  2.
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Land until 1160/555, after he had been educated in Europe. Thus, his account is based on 
other chronicles, which almost certainly include The Antiochene Wars, and the memories of 
those who were present. The chronicle thus becomes a synthesis of many people’s opinions, 
all of which have been taken by William of Tyre and moulded to fit the interpretation which 
suited him.
William shows Tl-Ghazi primarily as simply being a very strong leader, referred to as ‘a 
powerful infidel prince’, and ‘lord of that wretched and perfidious race, the Turkomans’.333 
As such, he is presented as being a real threat to the Latins, both through his military 
strength, and the manpower he could draw on if he really was the lord of the Turkomans.
William’s portrayal of his personality, however, is more complicated, and certainly not 
as simple as Walter the Chancellor would have his audience believe. William attributes to 11- 
Ghazi a shrewdness which serves him well in his operations. His tactics work well and his 
intelligence seems to be correct, which is illustrated during the account of Il-Ghazl’s attack 
on al-Atharib, which was successful because Il-GhazI had good intelligence about the 
crusaders and because he utilised siege techniques well.334 This is a feature which occurs 
throughout the narrative when referring to Il-Ghazi’s military manoeuvres -  that they were 
well planned, and well executed. The only times when he loses battles it does seem to be 
because of ill-fortune, such as at the battle of Tell Danith, he had split his army into three 
groups, and it was only luck that meant King Baldwin II of Jerusalem ‘chanced to fall in
  335with one of these’, which caused the defeat offl-Ghazi’s army.
Therefore, Il-GhazI is viewed by William of Tyre as being an excellent military 
commander, yet with this quality come others that are not as praiseworthy. There are 
several occasions on which William shows him as arrogant; when he had captured a number
333 WT Vol. I, p. 528.
334 WT Vol. I, p. 532.
335 WT Vol. I, p.531.
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of places, he became ‘convinced that no one could resist him’ so ‘he treated the entire 
region according to his own pleasure’.336 The basis of his confidence was in his strength in 
numbers, while the reliance of the Christians was humbly on God -  ‘a far more reliable and 
unfailing hope’.337 Here, William deliberately compares the attitude of the two opponents, 
where one based their emphasis on worldly strength, the other on heavenly. This does, 
however, rather lose its effect during the battle itself, as he comments that both sides fought 
‘with scornful disregard of the laws of humanity’.338 Thus both the crusaders and the Turks, 
and by inference their leadership, used very brutal tactics to try to defeat their enemy.
This brutal streak Il-GhazI possessed is seen elsewhere in William of Tyre’s work, not 
simply when dealing with his enemies, but to anyone, including his own men. For example, 
he forced his troops to work all night to prepare for battle ‘under threat of death’.339 The 
chronicler also implies that Il-Ghazi’s instructions were that all the Latins should be killed 
in the surprise attack on the Latin camp.340 Perhaps one of the most shocking episodes was 
at Sarmada, where Il-GhazI forced the people inside to surrender, but that ‘scarcely a 
man...escaped to tell their tale’.341 The implication here is that they were all killed after 
they had surrendered, although it passes without a clear statement to this effect from the 
chronicler.
As well as this, and despite comments that imply 11-Ghazl was a good military leader, 
it seems that he was not such a good soldier, being instead cowardly, to the extent that he 
‘abandoned his troops to their death’ when he perceived they were losing the battle.342
WT Vol. I, p. 531.
337 WT Vol. I, p. 532.
331< WT Vol. I, p. 533.
339 WT Vol. I, p. 532.
34(1 WT Vol. I, p. 532.
341 WT Vol. I, p. 531.
342 WT Vol. I, p. 534.
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Finally, in an echo of Walter the Chancellor’s theme, William of Tyre shows how Il- 
Ghazi is very anti-Christian. He is described as being ‘a determined and unwearied 
persecutor of the Christian faith and name...like a gnawing worm he was ever seeking 
whom he might injure’.343 However, in the end, God was against him, as ‘the hand of God 
had touched Il-Ghazi with apoplexy’, and when he died ‘doomed to suffer the eternal fires, 
is said to have breathed forth his wretched spirit’.344 These themes are very much like those 
of The Antiochene Wars, and it is a very real possibility that William of Tyre used Walter’s 
chronicle as his basis for this part, especially as this last comment is almost exactly the 
same as that used by Walter the Chancellor to describe Il-Ghazi’s soul leaving his body.345
William of Tyre is not as forthright in his views of Il-Ghazi in his chronicle as Walter 
the Chancellor is, being more restrained in his judgements and avoiding vitriolic comments. 
Instead, William’s chronicle is more measured, being a historical account of events, 
coloured by his own worldview, which is that the Muslims are strong, but they are not of 
God and so are against Him. As a Muslim leader, Il-Ghazi fits into this worldview perfectly. 
He is a powerful leader with good military skills, but he has a number of vices which 
William regards as sins, being arrogant, cowardly and brutal -  probably gained from reading 
Walter the Chancellor’s account -  as well as being very anti-Christian and therefore 
bringing the wrath of God on himself. Thus, the conclusion of William of Tyre’s comments 
on Il-Ghazi has to be that no matter how strong he is, he is fighting God, who he cannot 
possibly defeat.
343 WT Vol. I, p. 536.
344 WT Vol. I, p. 537.
WC, p. 171: ‘his filthy soul issued forth from his anus along with a flux of dung from his belly, and it was 
dragged away by the claws of infernal scorpions to tumble into the halls o f deepest hell, which are full of 
dreadful fires burning without end’.
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Il-Ghazi in Eastern Christian Sources:
The appearance of Il-Ghazi in the chronicles of the Eastern Christian groups, 
particularly the Syrian Christians, provides a useful comparison to the Latin sources when 
examining the image of the ‘other’. The chronicles in which he appears are not those of a 
group of recent arrivals in the Levant, as the crusaders were, but they are those of 
communities who had existed for hundreds of years and who had long experience of Islam 
and Muslims. They are particularly useful because the writers were either eyewitnesses or 
seem to have known eyewitnesses, asIl-Ghazi’s territories lay in and around those in which 
the writers themselves lived, and the chroniclers were relating events which had happened in 
the near past. The writings do not have the same type of emotional intensity of the 
crusading narratives, as they were written by native Christians, and the authors do not 
generally regard the battles the crusaders were fighting as part of a holy war -  although that 
is not to say they are without emotion.
The Anonymous Syriac Chronicle:
One of the most important of these is the work referred to as The Anonymous Syriac 
Chronicle, which deals with the events of 1119/512-3 both before and after the Battle of 
Balat. Like the Latin chroniclers, the writer of the Anonymous Syriac Chronicle states 11- 
Ghazi’s position, that he ‘had become powerful and was uplifted because he ruled his own 
land, that of his brother Suqman’s sons, and that of his uncle’s son Daud, as far as Assyria, 
Armenia and the land of the Iberians [Georgians], His kin ruled over all Armenia’.346
However, despite this power in worldly terms, Il-Ghazi is seen as nothing more than 
someone whom God used to display His thoughts or judgements, a puppet on the universal 
stage. The chronicler states that the result of the battle of the field of Blood came about not
j46 Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, pp. 88-9.
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because 11-Ghazi won the confrontation, but rather that God was angry with the crusaders 
because of their sins and so allowed them to be defeated.347 Similarly, when Il-Ghazl lost at 
the second battle of Tell Danith, it was because God was no longer angry with the crusaders, 
so that He could exercise His right to defeat His enemies.34*
The most interesting comment that the chronicler makes is one which appears in no 
other source, yet may explain a lot about what happened in the years 1118-9/511-3. The 
chronicler states that the cause of the 1119/512-3 events was the invasion ofll-G hazi’s land 
by the deputy of Baldwin of Edessa, Galeran of Birta, which ‘was the cause of evil’.349 If 
this is correct, it means that far from being an unprovoked, or at least unexplained, 
aggressor, which seems to be the image from the Latin chronicles, Il-Ghazl was instead 
trying to gain revenge for a crusader attack on his territory, much as he had done when the 
Sultan’s army invaded several years before. In this interpretation, the battle of the Field of 
Blood was caused not by 11-Ghazi, but instead the spiralling situation in northern Syria was 
caused by the Latins themselves.
However, the brevity of the appearance of Il-Ghazl in the chronicle leaves little 
opportunity for any personality to develop, meaning he is just a shadowy figure outside the 
Christian religion whom God uses to punish those Christians who deserved it.
Matthew of Edessa:
Another Eastern Christian account which mentions Tl-Ghazi is the Chronicle of 
Matthew of Edessa, and this is particularly important for historians because Matthew was a
Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, p. 88.
’ Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, pp. 89 - 90.
349 Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, p. 87: ‘He (Galeran of Birta) collected all the soldiers he could and attacked 
the camps o f the Turkmen in the plains o f Mt. Hisma east o f Edessa and in the land o f Ghazi son of Ortuq 
when they were not expecting it. He captured five hundred men, women, and children, twelve hundred horses, 
a hundred thousand cattle, camels, and goats, and killed many fighting men. He brought the captives to 
Edessa. This was in March, 1426 (1119/DhuT Hijja 512); it was the cause of evil’.
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contemporary or near-contemporary of the events he was describing, and because his home 
town of Edessa was geographically close to the events in which Il-Ghazi took part. 
Furthermore, Il-Ghazi did not directly threaten Edessa at any time so he is not subject to the 
unrestrained ire of Walter the Chancellor, who was personally threatened by the emir.
There is no doubt that whatever else he may be, Matthew views Il-Ghazi as being a 
very powerful ruler. He was ‘the great Persian emir Il-Ghazi’350, and Matthew states that he 
was regarded by the Turks themselves as ‘the supreme commander of the Turkish forces’.351 
These statements are reinforced by the size of the army which Il-Ghazi was said to have 
been capable of gathering together because of his position -  in 1119/513 he is said to have 
gathered a force of 80,000 men for what would be the Battle of Balat352, and then in 
1121/514-5 he collected an army of over 150,000 men. These figures are certainly 
exaggerated, but they give the impression that 11-Ghazi had tremendous power and influence 
at his disposal.
However, despite his powerful political position, Matthew implies that as a soldier, Il- 
Ghazi was not a good one. Despite all his military expeditions over a period of around nine 
years, Il-Ghazi did not manage to record one ‘proper’ victory. The chronicler does state that 
he was part of a force which won on two occasions, though these were down to the actions 
of others rather than his own skill. One of these was in 1115/509, when Matthew records 
that Il-Ghazi combined his forces with those of his nephew Balak, ruler of ‘Ana and al-
t  • 353Haditha, to defeat al-Bursuqi, in ‘a formidable battle, putting him to flight’ , although on 
this occasion it was Balak, more than Il-Ghazi, who was the mastermind of this victory, and 
Il-Ghazi simply took a lot of the credit for it.354 The other victory was at the Field of Blood,
35(1 Matthew of Edessa, p. 218.
351
_ Matthew of Edessa, p. 223.
3,2 Matthew of Edessa, p.223.
353
Matthew of Edessa, pp. 215 - 6.
324 Matthew of Edessa, pp. 2 1 5 -6 .
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yet even here it was not really his victory, as he only won due to the fact that Prince Roger 
of Antioch was even more hopeless and arrogant than he was. Matthew states that ‘since the 
count of Antioch Roger was an arrogant and prideful man, having full confidence in his 
strength, he neglected to take any precautions...[and] was contemptuous of the Turkish 
forces’, which led to his defeat.355 Thus, on the two occasions when Il-GhazI won military 
victories, it was not because of anything he had done.
As well as not being a capable soldier, Matthew presents 11-Ghazl as being positively 
ineffectual. There are numerous examples of this throughout the chronicle. The emir had an 
enormous army, but still was not able to do any harm to the city of Antioch, being able only 
to ravage areas east of the Euphrates which were not fortified.356 On the occasions he met a 
strong army, he lost, being ‘shattered by the king of the Franks’3'’7, and, despite having an 
army of over 150,000, he still managed to lose a battle against King David of Georgia 
extremely heavily, so he ‘returned humiliated...barely escaping with [his life] and with only 
one hundred men remaining out of every thousand’.358
Yet although Matthew’s chronicle is clear that Il-Ghazl was a bad military leader, he 
would nevertheless gain prisoners because he would attack defenceless areas, and the 
chronicler gives a picture of the fate of these people. He states that ‘the emir seized 
fortresses, farming villages and monasteries and also slaughtered everyone, including old 
people and children’359, and after his victory at the Field of Blood, ‘the Turks ravaged all the 
country from the Euphrates to the Mediterranean Sea, bringing bloodshed and enslavement 
to all the districts’360, while in 1120-1/514, he Ted into captivity all the men and women 
from Tell Bashir right up to Kesoun. Moreover, he inexorably massacred everyone and even
353 Matthew of Edessa, pp. 223.
336 Matthew of Edessa, pp. 223.
■̂ 57
Matthew of Edessa, pp. 224.
Matthew of Edessa, pp. 227 - 8.
339 Matthew of Edessa, pp. 223.
360 Matthew of Edessa, pp. 224.
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had a tremendous number of children roasted over fires’.361 Il-Ghazi is therefore presented as 
an evil man.
Thus, the image ofll-GhazI in Matthew of Edessa’s chronicle is not a positive one. 
While he is certainly powerful, he gained his power through underhand tactics, by taking 
advantage of others’ skill and terrorising defenceless people. There is no redeeming feature 
in the image of Il-Ghazi, and it can only be inferred from the chronicle that he is a very evil 
man.
Michael the Syrian:
The final Eastern Christian chronicle which mentions Il-Ghazi is that of Michael the 
Syrian. The main trait ofll-G hazi’s character in Michael’s chronicle is that he was a ruler 
who wanted to obtain and maintain his independence as much as possible. This is clear 
throughout the chronicle in his reactions to the numerous events which occur around him 
and his territory. This occurs from the very start, as his first appearance in the chronicle the 
occasion in which he is part of a coalition brought together to defend the Artuqids against 
the army of the Sultan of Baghdad. As a ruler in the Jazlra, Il-Ghazi should have been under 
the authority of the Sultan, but his actions here show that he did not want to be, and his 
entry into an alliance against the Sultan is part of that.362 This action was repeated on 
several other occasions, such as the time when the son of the Sultan complained to his father 
about Il-Ghazi’s behaviour. This behaviour was presumably damaging what the Sultan 
regarded as the interests of the wider community, and therefore he again is acting for his 
own benefit, not that of his supposed overlord.363
Matthew of Edessa, pp. 226
’62 Michael the Syrian, p. 193.
363 Michael the Syrian, p. 217.
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Il-Ghazi also deliberately went against the specific orders of the Sultan regarding his 
own position in the Islamic world; after he was captured by the lord of Hims, he was freed 
on condition that his son would be a hostage, to guarantee Tl-Ghazi’s future behaviour. 
Instead of meekly submitting to this arrangement the Sultan had created, as soon as he was 
freed Il-Ghazi gathered a number of troops and marched back to Hims to free his son. He is 
presented as feeling not answerable to anyone, not even the Sultan himself.364
On occasion, Il-Ghazi went even further in his efforts to gain his freedom, as on 
occasion he even makes treaties with the Franks, who he is supposed, religiously speaking, 
to be fighting, such as in the year 1 1 15/508.366 It is not reported that these alliances ever 
resulted in a joint military operation between them, but the treaty is important because of 
what it highlights; that he was prepared to go against his co-religionists for the sake of his 
territorial ambitions. Not only did Il-Ghazi make this treaty, he did act on it to a degree, in 
the only way he could, when the Sultan sent an army against the Franks, which recorded as 
having happened in the year 1114-5/508. On this occasion he was asked to provide troops to 
help with the attack on the Franks, which he had to do, as he was under the authority of the 
Sultan, yet he also had made a treaty with the Franks. As a result of this, he sent only three 
hundred troops, and warned the Franks that the Sultan’s army was coming. Thus he tried to 
keep a balance between both sides, although the Sultan was, unsurprisingly, not happy, and 
ordered the kidnap of Il-Ghazi’s son. The Artuqid ruler, therefore, lost a great deal because 
of his attempts to gain some independence by allying with the Franks.
The result of this episode is another example of Il-Ghazi’s attempts to become more 
independent -  he deliberately went after the army of the Sultan, commanded by the son of 
the Sultan, and fought them in order to get back his own son. It is clear that Il-Ghazi was
_ Michael the Syrian, p. 217.
365 The year 1114/507-8, Michael the Syrian, p. 217.
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thinking only of the prestige of himself and the affront caused to his family by this and so he 
was prepared to run the risk of incurring the wrath of the Sultan to protect his position.
From the above description, it would seem that Il-Ghazi was desperately trying to 
distance himself from his supposed leader, the Sultan, which resulted in him allying with 
that man’s enemies. This, however, is not the case all the time, as there are occasions on 
which the emir of Mardln fights the Franks.366 The reasons given for this vary - on some 
occasions it is even claimed to be because it was done to impress the Sultan367 - though the 
chronology implies that this was before his treaty with the Franks, perhaps when he had not 
decided to assert his independence.
As well as his independent spirit, there are a number of other facets to the image of 11- 
Ghazi in Michael the Syrian’s chronicle. Firstly, 11-Ghazi is definitely a powerful character. 
His ability to survive the wrath of the Sultan with no real damage either personally or to his 
territory shows this, and is clearly demonstrated by the chronicler, who reports that Il-Ghazi 
was offered the town of Aleppo by its lord ‘parce que les Francs l’avaient affaiblie’368 -  the 
implication is that Il-Ghazi was the only one who was believed to be strong enough to 
protect the town, and was much stronger than its previous ruler. His ability to gather what 
seemed like innumerable Turks for the battle of Balat/Field of Blood reveals the strength of 
Il-Ghazi in the wider Turkish community of the Jazira at the time369, and he was also able to 
crush a revolt in Aleppo in a way which is seems to have been very easy for the emir.370
Secondly, he does seem to be rather an opportunistic character -  it is reported that he 
managed to capture the town of Naslbin just after a battle when it seems to have been
” Michael the Syrian, p. 215.
367 Michael the Syrian, p. 215 -Il-G hàzî and Jàwalî ‘rassemblèrent des troupes et montèrent contre les Francs, 
afin de se faire un nom auprès du grand sultan’.
368 Michael the Syrian, p. 217.
369 Michael the Syrian, p. 217.
j7° Michael the Syrian, p. 218.
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undefended, having been previously looted by another army371, and he did not capture 
Aleppo by force, but instead it was simply given to him by the previous lord of the town.372 
He also went on raiding expeditions against lands which were poorly defended, looting and 
pillaging, and becoming more confident as he found scant resistance from the local rulers.373
Yet Il-Ghazi does also seem to be a militarily intelligent leader, as he is described as 
having used clever ambush tactics in his victory over Roger of Antioch374, and he used the 
same tactics, initially successfully, against King Baldwin II of Jerusalem when he arrived to 
avenge the previous defeat.375 While this tactic was useful and successful, it does not reflect 
on Il-Ghazi as well as it might, as he only seems to use that method of attack -  he does not 
have a backup plan. Thus, when Baldwin II realised what was happening to the rear of his 
army after being ambushed, he was able to adjust his tactics accordingly, thus defeating the 
Turk.
Another aspect to Il-Ghâzî’s character as revealed in Michael the Syrian’s chronicle is 
that he was a drunkard. While this is part of his character in other chronicles, it is only 
mentioned once, on the occasion of his capture by the unnamed lord of Hims. After the 
sultan sent threats to Il-Ghazi, one of the Sultan’s more loyal subjects, Jokermish, decided 
to carry out stronger action against the wayward emir, and fell on his city. He found him 
inebriated from drink and easily overpowered him, so that Il-Ghazi’s penchant for drink led 
him to lose his freedom.376 Finally, the behaviour of his troops can also be used to judge II- 
GhâzTs character, as they were under his control. Thus, the reports of massacres carried out
371 Michael the Syrian, p. 193.
372 Michael the Syrian, p. 217.
373 A typical example o f this is just after his defeat to Baldwin II of Jerusalem, when he invaded first Edessan 
and then Antiochene territory. Michael the Syrian, p. 205.
374 The Battle of the Field of Blood/Balât. Michael the Syrian, p. 204.
375 ' — -rMichael the Syrian, p. 205. The chronicler describes how Il-Ghazi used the same tactics against the 
rearguard of Baldwin’s army that he had against Roger’s, and that he initially was winning. However, when 
Baldwin realised what was happening to his army, he brought the rest of the army to bear on the ambushing 
Turks, who were destroyed, then turned on the rest of the Turkish army, who fled in panic. They had no 
response to the frontal attack by the crusader king and suffered ‘une grande défaite’.
’7fl Michael the Syrian, p. 217.
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by the troops do not reflect well on Il-Ghazi, as they suggest that he did not mind their
377behaviour.
The image of Il-Ghazi in the chronicle of Michael the Syrian is very different to many 
of the other Christian chronicles. He is seen much more as a personality in his own right, 
instead of the Antichrist figure of Walter the Chancellor or the cowardly ruler described by 
Matthew of Edessa. Il-Ghazi is presented as a strong, powerful ruler who is determined to 
carve out and preserve a territory for himself and his family in northern Syria, and who has 
the ability to do so. The opportunistic attacks on certain cities have to be contrasted with 
his ability to preserve himself from the wrath of the sultan, while his vices of drinking and 
massacring are put to the background. This reflects part of Michael’s method of writing -  an 
objective style that did not condemn simply because someone was a Muslim. Moosa has 
shown that the Syrians had, by that time, lost their initial trust in the Franks because of 
their behaviour towards the native Christian population, and this had resulted in a mindset 
among the Syrians that anyone who protected them was to be praised and admired.37* 
Michael the Syrian’s account may, therefore, be a reflection of this.
377 See, for example, Michael the Syrian, p. 205.
M. Moosa, ‘The Crusades: An Eastern Perspective, With Emphasis on Syriac Sources’, in Muslim World93 
(2003), pp. 249 -  290, esp. pp. 258 -  262.
Chapter 2 -  The Image o f Il-Ghazi in Arabic Sources
Jl-Ghazl in Ibn al-Athlr’s ‘Al-Kamil f i ’l-ta ’rikh ’ (The Complete History):
Both the vast extent and the style of Ibn al-Athir’s chronicle mean that there is much 
scope for the development of the prosopography within it and the study of the same, 
particularly in comparison to the other chronicles being examined, and this is reflected in II- 
Ghazi’s image, which is carefully developed throughout the chronicle, giving the reader a 
strong sense of how the author wanted to portray the Turkish emir. The clearest example of 
the development ofll-GhazI as a character comes in the presentation of his power, which is 
divided into three stages in the chronicle.
Il-Ghazi is, at least initially, seen as a small fish in the big pond of northern Syrian and 
Jaziran politics. He is the son of Artuq, a petty Turkish ruler379, but that is the only 
advantage he has. He is mentioned at various points in the chronicle during the account of 
the early stages of his life, before the year 495/1101-2, but he is always under the command 
of others, including Ridwan380, Tutush381, and Sa‘d al-Dawla Glihara’In.382 Il-Ghazi is not 
even the stronger of the two sons of Artuq; it was to his brother Suqman, and not to Il- 
Ghazi himself, that Jerusalem was given by Taj al-Dawla Tutush -  he is not even mentioned 
in the account of the assignation of the city.383 He does appear later in the same paragraph, 
though, at the time of its capture by the Egyptians, but the tone here is that U-Ghazi was 
definitely the subordinate of his brother. In this first stage, he is an unimportant figure,
Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, pp. 391 & 433.
380 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, p. 391.
381 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, p. 391.
382 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, p 433
383 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, p. 424.
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whose only influence came ultimately from being his father’s son, not anything he himself 
had achieved.
There is, however, a suggestion of his future power. On numerous occasions the writer 
states that Il-Ghazi was part of a retinue of Turks who came together for a certain purpose. 
The difference between Il-Ghazi and all the other Turks is that he is the only one mentioned 
by name384, which implies that either he was the most important of the group at that time, 
or that he was to become important later. These instances all occur during Il-Ghazi’s first 
appearances in the chronicle, and, taking into consideration the passages mentioned above 
which imply he was weak, the inference has to be that his name appearing in the chronicle, 
in contrast to the anonymity of the others, is caused less by his power and strength at the 
time than by the authority he would gain later in his life. So while initially he is seen as a 
weak Turkish warrior, not even being an emir, there is a hint that he will become important 
later.
This situation is in stark contrast to later in the chronicle, when the power Il-Ghazi 
had acquired is clearly there to see. The first indication of this is during the year 509/1115-6, 
when he, along with certain other emirs, rebelled against the Sultan himself. On this 
occasion he was not strong enough to resist the Sultan’s army alone, instead opting to form 
an alliance with others, but he had created a position where he was free from the rule of the 
Sultan.385 As his life continued, this strength, highlighted by his independence, continued to 
grow. This is underlined by his actions against the Franks, especially during victory at 
Balat/the Field of Blood in 513/1119. Yet it is surprising that he was able to launch an 
attack at all. He was still in dispute with the Sultan over his position, and so had to be wary 
of any attempt to rein him in militarily by the Sultan. Despite this, he was still able to plan a
See, for example, Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, pp. 391 & 433.
385 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, p. 607 -  8.
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military incursion into Antiochene territory, without evident fear of the Sultan.3X6 At the 
battle itself, his strength as a leader is clearly seen. The number of troops he assembled is 
said to have been 20 ,000 , he evidently knew the land, was well-informed about the 
movements of Roger’s forces, and was able to rout the Frankish forces.3X7 He also won a
i 388second victory soon after against other Frankish forces , thus cementing his reputation and 
completing his transformation from weak offspring of a regional dynast to celebrated hero 
of the jihad.
The transformation between the first and last phases in his power seems to have 
happened between the occasion of his installation as shihna of Baghdad and his first steps 
towards independence as ruler of Mardin. This covers the period between the years 
495/1101-2 and 509/1115-6, and between these times there is a period when Il-Ghazi was 
becoming stronger, yet was still not self-sufficient, and is still clearly subordinate to others. 
During this time, however, he developed some of the strategies which strengthened his 
position at the time, and which would lead to the great power he had after this, which are 
described above.
In the year 496/1102-3, shortly after his installation as Baghdad’s shihna, Il-Ghazi 
makes his first treaty recorded by Ibn al-Athir, which was to become part of the pattern for 
his life.3X9 This treaty was made with his brother Suqman and with Sadaqa, an emir based in 
southern Iraq and one who would often be an ally of Il-Ghazi, against his rival for the 
position of shilma, Gumiishtegln al-Qaysan.390 This treaty enabled Il-Ghazi, with the help of 
his allies, to maintain his position in Baghdad, despite initially having been chased from the
386 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, pp. 634 -  5.
387 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, pp. 6 4 2 -3 .
388 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, p. 643.
389 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, pp. 482 -  4.
370 The dispute over who was to have the position of shihna of Baghdad was caused by the virtual state of civil 
war into which the Seljuk sultanate had fallen in the 490s and 500s (1090s and 1100s). There were two rivals 
for the position of Sultan, Muhammad and his brother Berkyaruq. Il-Ghazi was Muhammad’s appointment as 
shihna, while Gtimushtegin was the choice of Berkyaruq.
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city by Gumushtegln. It was, therefore, the first time 11-Ghazi used an alliance as a tactic, 
and it achieved what was desired. This was to be a tactic 11-Ghazi was to use many times 
later in his life.391
During this time, 11-Ghazi had also grown strong enough to use others to do his work 
for him, although with mixed results. In the year 498/1104-5, when there were problems 
with brigandage on the Khurasan road, he used his nephew Balak to quell the disturbances, 
which he did successfully.392 However, another attempt, in the year 499/1105-6, to use 
someone else to carry out his wishes was not so successful. At this time, he caused Ridwan, 
ruler of Aleppo, who was leading a Muslim army, and whose primary objective had been to 
attack the crusaders, to attempt to capture the city of Naslbin, which belonged to 
Jokermish.393 This, however, was unsuccessful after Ridwan became annoyed with 11-Ghazi 
for unexplained reasons, and 11-Ghazl was captured outside the walls of Naslbin and 
imprisoned for a time in its citadel, before being freed by the command of the Sultan. Using 
others to do his work for him was to remain one of the main methods 11-Ghazi had of 
operating when his power had grown -  for example, he used Tughtegin to assist in his attack 
on Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man in the year 514/1 120-1.394
Thus, there appear to be three stages in the strength of 11-Ghazi in the chronicle. The 
first stage is that he is a weak man playing at being a strongman, yet overshadowed by his 
brother and overpowered by more established emirs. This then changes in 495/1101-2 when 
he becomes the shihna of Baghdad, during which time his power and influence grow, 
although he still lacks great strength, being demonstrably weaker than others around him on
' Al-Kämil, Vol. VIII, pp. 607 -  8.
392 Al-Kämil, Vol. VIII, p. 513.
m  Il-Ghäzi was still in the employ of Sultan Muhammad at this point, and Jokermish had, as Ibn al-Athir 
reports, recently been unsuccessfully besieged by Muhammad after a dispute with the sultan. This suggestion 
by Il-Ghäzi may have been an attempt to ingratiate himself further with Muhammad. Al-Kämil, Vol. VIII, pp. 
5 2 1 -3 .
394 Al-Kämil, Vol. VIII, pp. 603 -  4.
108
a number of occasions. Finally, he becomes hugely powerful, gaining total independence for 
himself and the ability to run his own affairs, even managing to resist the great power of the 
Sultan in Baghdad, and his death comes at the height of his strength.
As well as his power and the development of it, Ibn al-Atlnr’s chronicle highlights a 
number of other aspects of the personality ofll-Ghazi. Firstly, he was not above making 
treaties or agreements with his supposed enemies, demonstrating a certain moral 
manouvreability when it suited. The first account of this comes in the account of the loss of 
Jerusalem to the Egyptian Fatimids in 489/1096, when 11-Ghazi, under his brother Suqman, 
made terms with the Egyptians even though they were from the Isma‘lli branch of Islam and 
were not Sunnis, as were the Artuqids.395 A different man may well have fought on against 
his enemies, but 11-Ghazi was not above coming to terms. Although it may well have been 
Suqman who made the agreement, as he was the senior of the two, there is no evidence that 
11-Ghazi was against it. Later in his life, he went even further, as he personally made several 
treaties with the Franks. He made one treaty with the ruler of Antioch in the year 508/1114- 
5 in order to gain his protection396, a further one with Roger of Antioch in 5 09/1 1 15-6397, 
and another one with the Franks who were near his lands398 a little later, in the year 
512/1118-9 -  though this last treaty seems to have been in order to gain time to organise his 
troops against them, in what would be the battle at Balat/the Field of Blood. However, it is 
not possible to get away from the fact that the ostensibly Sunni Muslim 11-Ghazi made 
treaties with the Isma‘ili Fatimids and the Latin crusaders. Although the idea of making 
treaties with non-Muslims is acceptable in Islamic law, under certain conditions, Ibn al- 
Athlr’s chronicle shows that 11-Ghazi broke these conditions, especially as the treaties with 
the Franks in the years 508/1114-5 and 509/1115-6 were with the Christians of Antioch
395 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, p. 424.
396 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, p. 603.
397 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, p. 608.
39s Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, p. 634.
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against the Sultan and Caliph in Baghdad, the leaders of the suima. While this passes 
without comment from the chronicler, it is clear that 11-Ghazi was going against Islamic law 
in order to help himself -  not the actions of a good Muslim, but those of a leader trying to 
carve out an independent kingdom.399
There are indications, however, that his leadership was extremely good, and would 
help him to achieve his aim. The fact that he was made the shihna of Baghdad by the Sultan 
Muhammad in the first place is testimony to that400, as it shows that the Sultan had great 
faith in him. That this belief was borne out in practice is shown by the sensible policies he 
used on a number of occasions during his period of rule. One such time is the occasion of a 
Turkoman uprising on the Khurasan road near Baghdad -Il-G hazi’s response to this was to 
send his nephew Balak b. Bahram b. Artuq to deal with them, at which Balak is 
successful.401 Although it was not he himself who stopped the rebellion, he did make an 
excellent selection in who to send, and so his leadership here can be easily recognised.
The way he dealt with a threat posed to himself by Sadaqa is also proof of this. At 
this time, 11-Ghazi had changed his allegiance from the Sultan Muhammad to Berkyaruq, by 
having the khutba read out in the name of the latter, much to the ire of Sadaqa, who came 
seeking vengeance. Il-Ghazi’s initial response was to run away, perhaps a cowardly thing to 
do, yet it did gain him time to think of a sensible response -  that Berkyaruq had gained 
possession of Baghdad as part of his ‘fie f, and so it was perfectly proper of him to have the 
khutbah read in Berkyaruq’s name.402 This response saved 11-Ghazi’s position, and possibly 
his life, as he managed to resolve diplomatically a situation which could have had serious 
repercussions for him had he handled it badly.
399 This action went against the precepts o f Islamic concepts of jihad, although there are many examples of 
other Muslim leaders doing similar, most famously Zengi, and even Salah al-DIn. For a discussion of the laws 
of jihad, see M. Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law o f  Islam, Johns Hopkins, 1955.
400 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, p. 462.
401 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, p. 513.in')
Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, p. 494.
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He also used his position to help other rulers close to him, as shown at the point when 
he interceded on behalf of Dubays b. Sadaqa with the Caliph.403 Although this led to 
nothing, the fact that he tried to help Dubays shows where his priorities were, and that he 
could be relied upon -  at least by some.
Finally, Il-Ghâzî’s skills as a military leader are shown on numerous occasions, most 
clearly identified during the battle of Balât/the Field of Blood. Ibn al-Athlr’s account states 
that the Franks wrote to Il-Ghazi, telling him to wait for them before battle would be 
joined.404 However, the emir decided against this, and instead immediately marched against 
the Franks. The element of surprise which this caused was increased by a secondary tactic -  
that they arrived at the Frankish camp from three directions, having traversed very difficult 
terrain to get there.405 Thus, Il-Ghazl used the element of surprise, in more ways than one, to 
gain his great victory over the Franks. Having defeated the Franks in one battle, Ibn al-Athlr 
then reports that he quickly had another victory over them, and consequently captured the 
forts of al-Athârib and Zardana.406 These victories mark the zenith of Il-Ghâzl’s military 
prowess and consequently his power. It was thus his skill as a military leader which enabled 
his power to grow; he was given a chance and he took it.
Yet, in contrast to this positive presentation, there are numerous examples of this 
vanishing, and of his praiseworthy or strong exploits being replaced by more foolhardy 
activities. This clearest example of this is the occasion when, as Ibn al-Athfr states, there 
took place a ‘violent civil strife between the troops ofll-Ghàzî b. Artuq, shihna of Baghdad, 
and the people of it (Baghdad) ’ .407 In this instance, Ibn al-Athlr reports that the troops of 11-
403 Al-Kâmil, Vol. VIII, p. 671.
404 While the likelihood of such a communication between the two sides can be doubted, it does help the reader 
to understand Ibn al-Athir’s presentation ofll-G hazI
Al-Kâmil, Vol. VIII, p. 6 4 2 -3 .
4116 Al-Kâmil, Vol. VIII, p. 643.
407 Al-Kâmil Vol. VIII, p. 468: j ,
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GhazI killed a boatman who was being slow to do as he was ordered. When the population 
seized the killers to punish them, more troops intervened to rescue the captured troops, but 
they were then stoned by the mob. As a result, Il-GhazI set out to punish the townspeople by 
looting and plundering the city with his army. This then spiralled out of control, with 
further actions by both the townsfolk andll-Ghazi’s troops before the rioting was prevented 
by the intervention of the chief qadi and the head of the Nizamiyya. Although Il-Ghazl did 
not cause the chaos, he did not prevent it, and instead encouraged his troops to go on a 
rampage through the city; thus, he was responsible for their actions. Furthermore, he even 
appears as unable to control his troops during the siege of Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man, when he 
knew his troops would desert if there was no booty, as they were only there for quick 
gain408; thus he let them do as they wished.
There are also several places in which Il-Ghazl is presented as being unpopular, which 
is possibly a consequence of how he behaved towards the local populations or other rulers. 
The actions of his troops towards the people of Baghdad when his soldiers rioted were not 
initially his fault, but as the situation continued, and he became involved in encouraging and 
increasing the actions of his troops, the people of Baghdad turned against him .409 The 
second occasion on which Il-Ghazi’s unpopularity is revealed is during his attempt to 
capture Nasibln. Flere, he was challenged by Ridwan when the latter realised that the best 
course would be to abandon the city, a siege he has only started because of the opportunism 
of Il-Ghazl.41011-GhazI refused to do so, and was thus abandoned by all his former allies and 
captured by the troops of the town and placed in the citadel as a prisoner, to await the return
8 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, pp. 603 -  604.
409 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, p. 468.
4111 See below, p. 115.
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of the city’s ruler, Jokermish.411 Thus, at various points in the narrative, he is reviled by 
both his subjects and his Turkish allies because of his actions.
11-GhazI is also presented as opportunistic in some of his endeavours. In the year 
505/1111-2, when the Sultan’s troops came to the territory of Aleppo, Il-Ghazi tried to 
exploit the situation by using some of his own troops to capture booty from the funeral 
retinue of the emir Sukman al-Qutbi, who had died outside the walls of the city and whose 
coffin was being escorted back to his lands. There is no reason given by Ibn al-Athir as to 
why Il-Ghazi decided on this course of action, including no mention of a political dispute, so 
it must be assumed that the writer sought to show the attack as an opportunistic foray 
against a dead opponent. The fact that even this attempt was repelled and Il-Ghazi’s own 
property was taken highlights both the rashness of the decision and the fact that his power 
was still not very strong at this time, even though the report that he had his own troops 
shows it was growing. Another example of this is the occasion of the siege of Nasibin by 
Ridwan and other emirs. At this time, Ridwan had made preparations to fight the Franks, 
but Il-Ghazi suggested to him that a preferable course of action would be to attack Aleppo, 
then ruled by Jokermish, who was absent. When he had suggested this, the other emirs 
agreed, and the siege was mounted. The siege ultimately failed, and Il-Ghazi was 
subsequently blamed by all for the failure of the siege, and the failure of the original attempt 
at a jihadA[2 What this episode shows is that Il-Ghazi was very opportunistic, as well as 
cowardly, and would not let the ideals of the jihad  come in the way of his ambition. It is true 
that Ibn al-Athir believes that Il-Ghazi wanted the town to go to Ridwan, as he was the 
senior emir, but this is part of his ambition -  to gain more influence by helping others, thus 
becoming stronger and more independent through his opportunism.
411 Ai-Kamil, Vol. VIII, pp. 521 -  3.
4I~ Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, pp. 521 -  2.
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In the latter part of his life, however, Il-Ghaz1 is seen as a good jihad  warrior, a good 
ghazi. His actions against the Franks, though slow in developing through the course of his 
life, are nevertheless seen in the chronicle as being worthwhile. On occasions, in the part of 
the chronicle which describes events after the year 512/1118-9, Il-Ghazi is described as 
making preparations specifically for the Holy War, not just for a general anti-Frankish 
campaign.413 Having carried out the preparations, Il-Ghazi then managed to gain a great 
victory against the Franks. While this is not openly admitted by the author himself, who 
states simply that ‘the victory was his’ ,414 Ibn al-Athir does report the views of others in 
response to this, which are more admiring. After this battle the Caliph al-Mustarshid bi-Tlah 
(r. 512/1118 -  529/1135) sent robes of honour to Il-Ghazi for his attack on the Franks415, 
while the poet al-‘AzImI (d. after 556/1160) wrote verses in praise of Il-Ghazi and his 
victory 416 Therefore, although the author himself does not praise Il-Ghazi, he does admit, 
and even describe how others praised him greatly for his role in fighting the Franks, thus 
creating in his work the image ofll-GhazI as a /'///A/warrior.
The image of Il-Ghazi in Ibn al-Athir is a fascinating one, as it mean that it is possible 
to trace the development of the power of a local emir, and how this was achieved. Il-GhazI 
starts the chronicle as a very weak ruler, a man whose only power comes from being his 
father’s son. However, through the chronicle his power slowly increased, and the means by 
which he achieved power can be inferred -  good political skill with a degree of opportunism. 
Whether Ibn al-Athir believes this to be a good or a bad thing is, however, extremely 
difficult to tell. There are no direct views given by the writer on Il-Ghazi -  unlike his 
pointed views on Renaud -  and so it is tricky to infer a definitive image. What can be said 
for sure, however, is that Ibn al-Athir does not openly criticise Il-Ghazi, and indeed fails to
413 See, for example, Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, pp. 634 & 642.
414 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, p. 654.
415 Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, p. 653.
Lines from the poem are in Al-Kamil, Vol. VIII, p. 643.
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mention what is his biggest vice according to the other chronicles, his penchant for alcohol. 
This suggests that he wished to showIl-Ghazi positively, as he was presented as a champion 
of the jihad,\ in contrast to the lack of jihad  spirit shown by leaders of his own day.
Jl-GhazIin Ibn al-Azraq ’s ‘Ta ’rikh Mayyafariqln ’ (History ofMayyafariciin):
The account of Ibn al-Azraq provides much useful information for the scholar of 
northern Syria and the Jazira during the early twelfth century, as it is one of the few extant 
accounts which is focussed on northern Syria.417 There is a significant portion of the 
chronicle devoted to Il-Ghazi’s time as ruler in the area of Mardln and Mayyafariqin, and in 
this part of the chronicle three main aspects combine to create the image ofll-Ghazi.
The first of these is the political power Il-Ghazi possesses. Right at the beginning of 
the account of the reign of Tl-Ghazi in the Jazira, Ibn al-Azraq notes that he used to be ruler 
of Jerusalem with his brother Suqman.418 Thus, he had been the ruler of the third most holy 
city in the Muslim world. He is then revealed to have been in the service of Sultan 
Muhammad, where he was first muqta‘ of Hulwan419, then he was shihna of Iraq, living in 
Baghdad420, meaning that he had been one of the most powerful men in the polity of the 
‘Abbasid Caliphate. Following that, he then became ruler of Mardln, which was one of the 
most strategically important cities in Diyar Bakr, sometime at the end of the first decade of 
the sixth century/early 1110s, although the text is not clear when exactly, or how .421 His 
power can also be seen during his invasion of Georgia to help the citizens of TifTIs, who had 
appealed to him for help against their ruler, when he was able to gather a large number of
417 Introduction to Ibn al-Azraq, pp. 7-8.
4l1' Ibn al-Azraq, p. 30.
414 Ibn al-Azraq, p. 30
4711 Ibn al-Azraq, pp. 30 -  31.
421 Ibn al-Azraq, pp. 31-3.
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other rulers with him for his expedition.422 The writer here implies that the citizens of Tiffis 
needed to be protected from someone who was terrorising them, and that they chose II- 
GhazI because he was the strongest ruler in the vicinity. Finally, both his power and the 
esteem in which he was held by others is highlighted by his final resting place, which was in 
the Masjid al-Amir, the same place as the great Qilij Arslan423 was buried.424 This was a 
clear indication that he was believed to have been a leader in the same mould as Qilij Arslan 
himself. The combined implications of these factors was that Il-Ghazi was an extremely 
powerful man, and Ibn al-Azraq claims that that fact was recognised by everyone.
Part of the main reason why Il-Ghazi had such power was, in the opinion of the 
chronicler, that he was a good military leader, which is the second part of his image in Ibn 
al-Azraq’s chronicle. There are numerous occasions on which he is seen defeating his 
enemies in battle. For example, having gained Aleppo, he ‘fought the Franks, inflicting a 
decisive defeat on them, plundering their possessions and taking a great number of them 
prisoner’425. This quick victory is couched in terms which shows Il-Ghazi in the best 
possible way -  the defeat of the Franks is shown as a great victory, through the decisiveness 
of the defeat and the huge number of men he captured, and there is no dwelling on the 
weakness of the opposition, making it clear that it was 11-Ghazi’s skill alone which gained 
this victory. Furthermore, he was also able to take over the town of Nasibln, and though this 
is given the briefest of references as an event, the fact that he was able to take over the city, 
which had previously been in the hands of his powerful enemy al-Bursuq, suggests his 
military prowess.426 The fact that he was able to gather a great many leaders together under 
his command for the expedition into Georgia also shows that the people of the Jazlra viewed
422 Ibn al-Azraq, pp. 37-9.
42j Qilij Arslan was the Seljuk ruler of Rum (r. c.1092 -  1107)
4~4 Ibn al-Azraq, pp. 45-6.
423 Ibn al-Azraq, p. 36. This was the Battle of al-Balat/The Field of Blood.
4“6 Ibn al-Azraq, p. 37.
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him as very strong militarily, as well as politically.427 However, he did lose this battle, so his 
military skills were not infallible, while the manner of the charge by which they were beaten 
does imply that it was bad tactics by Il-Ghazi, as King David ‘swooped down on them from 
the mountain while they were at the bottom of it’428, being caught in a trap. However, 
despite this one defeat, the overall tone of the piece is that Il-Ghazi was a very capable 
military leader.
Finally, Ibn al-Azraq also presents Il-Ghazi as a good ruler. He is viewed as being very 
fair to his subjects; for example, on gaining Mayyafariqln, ‘he abolished the athqal429 and 
the aqsat430 and the anzal431 from its (the city’s) houses, for the people were in great 
distress’432, which had been caused by the bad governance which had previously afflicted the 
city. To the people of Mayyafariqin, Il-Ghazi’s rule meant that ‘their hearts became calm 
and the people became secure in their homes’ .433 He is also said to have made the 
surrounding lands safe, as ‘the robbers fled and the villages flourished’, when they had once 
been terrorised and ruined.434 In the words of the chronicler, the reign of Il-Ghazi meant that 
‘Mayyafariqln began to prosper and he ruled the people very well’.41'' This may have been 
one of the reasons why, in the year 515 AH (22 March 1121 -  11 March 1122), he was 
invited by the people of Tiffis to become their ruler after the city had been oppressed by the 
Georgian King David II.436 There is no direct reference here to the situation Il-Ghazi had 
taken advantage of earlier on his reign at Mayyafariqin, but it is clear to see the comparison
427 Accompanying 11-GhazI on this campaign were Sultan Toghril Beg, Dubais b. Sadaqa, and Toghan Arslan, 
together with many of the important men offl-GhazTs state, including qadis and viziers. Ibn al-Azraq, pp. 38- 
9.
42s Ibn al-Azraq, p. 40.
429 - The athqal was an extra tax payed by the general population to support a war effort. Ibn al-Azraq, p. 34, 
note 36.
430 - The aqsat was the practice of paying off a debt in instalments. Ibn al-Azraq, p. 34, note 37.
431 - The anzal was the billeting of troops in the houses of the general population. Ibn al-Azraq, p. 34, note 38.
432 Ibn al-Azraq, pp. 34-5.
4,3 Ibn al-Azraq, p. 35.
434 Ibn al-Azraq, pp. 35-6.
4(3 Ibn al-Azraq, p. 36.
436 Ibn al-Azraq, p. 38.
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that Ibn al-Azraq was surely trying to make.437 The greatness of Tl-GhazTs reign is also 
shown when he died, as ‘the (whole) population of the town (Mayyafariqin) and those 
soldiers who were there went up to the citadel’438, suggesting that the townspeople were 
very upset about the death of their leader, which reflects the image of Il-Ghazi as a great 
civic leader. Although this may well be panegyric on behalf of the author, it does reveal how 
Ibn al-Azraq wished to present Il-Ghazi.
There are three facets to Il-Ghazi in Ibn al-Azraq’s writing, all of which are positive, 
and there are very few negative aspects to him. The reason for this can be seen in the 
purpose Ibn al-Azraq had in writing the chronicle -  to praise the Artuqid dynasty439, of 
which Il-Ghazi was an important member, and the image produced is designed to bring glory 
and fame to him. To ensure this, his achievements are magnified and celebrated, being seen 
as an example of what good leaders should be -  politically powerful, militarily strong, and 
benevolent to his people -  while any negative aspects he may have had are ignored.
Il-Ghazi in the writings o f  Usama bin Mungidh440
The memoirs of Usama bin Munqidh provide a useful counterpoint to other chronicles 
from the period of the Crusades which are extant. Instead of a narrative account of the great 
political and military events of the time, it is a social history, concerned with the everyday 
happenings and the personal experiences of the writer. This means that there are few 
comments on individual rulers, and those that do pass mostly without elaboration or the
Ibn al-Azraq, p. 37.
43s Ibn al-Azraq, p. 45.
439 See above, p. 37.
44(> Usama b. Munqidh, Kitab al-Ftibai; tr. P. K. Hitti as Memoirs o f  an Ai'ab-Syrian Gentleman, Columbia 
University Press, 2000.
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author’s own interpretation of those events. There are, however, a few details about Il-Ghazi 
which can be gleaned from the account.
Firstly, he seems to be a good military leader. He is only mentioned on three occasions 
in the chronicle, but at every time it is in the context of a military victory. The first is when 
Usama bin Munqidh writes that ‘Najm-al-Din Ilghazi ibn-Urtuq (may Allah’s mercy rest on 
his soul) defeated the Franks at al-Balat...and annihilated them. He killed Roger, the lord of 
Antioch, and all his cavalry’ .441 The second is that of the events of 509/1115, when Il-Ghazi, 
Tughtegin, and the Franks joined forces to defeat the army of the sultan442, and the third 
was when ‘Najm-al-DIn Ilghazi ibn-Urtuq (may Allah’s mercy rest upon his soul!) had an 
encounter with Roger at Danith on Thursday, the fifth of Jumada I, in the year 513/119, 
killed him and slaughtered his entire army, of which less than twenty men returned to 
Antioch’ .443 The words used are very strong indicators that Usama believed he was a strong 
leader, not only because he only had victories in the narrative, never a defeat, but also that 
these victories were complete ones -  words such as ‘annihilated’ and ‘slaughtered the entire 
army’ are used in the passages quoted above to underline this; Il-Ghazi was not someone 
who would easily lose a military encounter.
Despite this, however, the way Usama himself feels about Il-Ghazi is rather a 
disjointed one, with little coherence to the image. Usama does use the injunction ‘may 
Allah’s mercy rest upon his soul!’ after the mention of his name twice out of three 
occasions, which is an honour reserved only for particularly important people in the 
narrative; yet he also writes about U-Ghazi’s drinking, the results of which were that ‘he
441 ibid, p. 67. These three events are not presented in chronological order, consequently this is the last event of 
the three to happen, while it is written in the account first.
442 ibid, p. 120.
443 ibid, pp. 148-9. This is a mistake by Usama, as Roger did not die at Tell Danith but at Balat, as mentioned
above. Furthermore, Il-GhazI was defeated at Tell Danith by the army of Jerusalem.
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would feel drunk for twenty days’444, for which no further explanation would be needed for 
his Islamic audience.44' Furthermore, Il-GhazTs 509/1115 treaty with the Franks passes 
without mention by Usama, which is rather strange for a writer who follows his mentions of 
the Franks with invectives such as ‘may Allah’s curse be on them ! ’ .446 He seems to have 
been aware of the situation of Realpolitik which pervaded northern Syria at the time -  that 
in order to safeguard their own position the Muslim rulers had to make alliances with people 
who should have been their enemies.
Thus, there is rather an ambivalent attitude towards 11-Ghazi by Usama bin Munqidh. 
This is due in most part to the relative paucity of references to Il-Ghazi, the lack of a 
political focus for the chronicle, and the conflicting deeds of the Turk mentioned in the 
chronicle. He does do the Islamic world great service by his battles against and defeats of 
the Franks, yet he also makes treaties with them, takes part in drinking bouts and, of course, 
is a Turk, ethnically subordinate to the Arab writer.447 However, it does not seem that the 
chronicler was deliberately trying to present Il-Ghazi in a particular way. The style of the 
account leaves room for nothing else. Instead, he is presented purely as a minor figure in the 
theatre of North Syria; an Islamic fighter, yet one who also breaks Islamic law and 
sometimes makes treaties with the crusaders. An ambivalent image is all that Il-Ghazi could 
have had.
As drinking alcohol is forbidden in Islamic law, the audience would automatically understand the 
seriousness of the offence.
446 See, for example, Usama b. Munqidh, p. 121.
447 This is not an Islamic ideal, as all races are supposed to be equal. However, the idea that the Arabs were 
chosen by Allah as the vehicle for the divine message to be given to the whole world meant that an underlying 
superiority complex did emerge amongst the Arabs. H. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age o f  the Caliphates, 
London, 1986, p. 94.
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Jl-Ghazl in Ibn al- ‘Adim  ’s ‘Zubdat al-halab fi tarikh Halab ’ (The Cream o f  the M ilk in the
History o f  Aleppo):
The chronicle of Aleppo by Ibn al-‘Adim gives an extremely useful view ofll-GhazI, 
as it is written from the perspective of the citizens whose city was taken over by him. It was 
written over one hundred years after the events, with the result that this time-span carries 
with it the usual advantages, such as hindsight, and problems, such as loss of memory, of a 
gap of this length. The narrowness of the scope of the work also means that Il-Ghazl only 
makes appearance as a main character for the part of his life when he is the ruler of Aleppo; 
for the rest of his life, the information is scanty.
This results in there being two aspects to his character in the chronicle; the first part, 
which tells of the time before he was the ruler of Aleppo, and the second, which tells of the 
years he held sway over that city. His possession of Aleppo came in the year 511/1117-1118, 
and events which occurred before that date are related with much less detail than those 
which happened after.
Il-Ghazl’s presence in the chronicle before the year 511/1117-8 is as that of a player on 
the scene of northern Syria, yet one whose power is not fully explained. Instead, he is only a 
sideshow -  one whose power, strength and influence are indeterminate, yet certain. He is 
show them as part of a group of Muslim rulers who unite to wage jihad  against the 
Franks448, as part of a group of Muslim rulers who unite with the Franks to repel armies sent 
against northern Syria by the Sultan.449 Yet he is also shown, albeit in an earlier situation 
than the previous examples, to have been captured and imprisoned by Duqaq, ruler of 
Damascus, after apparently slandering him; consequently, 11-Ghazi has to be helped by
448 Ibn al-‘Ad!m, Vol. II, p. 154. This passage also states that Il-Ghazi was able to muster ‘a large retinue of 
Turkmen’ -  tT" -  thus suggesting that he did have a considerable amount of power, which he
was able to use in gathering together large numbers of soldiers.
449 Ibn al-‘Adim, Vol. II, pp. 174 & 179.
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others 450 These are the only appearances of Il-Ghazi in Ibn al-‘AdIm’s chronicle prior to his 
becoming ruler of Aleppo; because he was not directly involved in the city which mattered 
to the chronicler, Aleppo, he does not figure in the account. What can be seen, however, 
even in the brief appearance of Il-Ghazi before his acquisition of Aleppo, is the increase in 
his power over a number of years -  from being captured by a rival and needing help in being 
released, he and his troops are utilised by the Muslim forces fighting the Franks, before 
feeling strong enough to ignore his overlords’ commands and ally with the Franks and others 
against them. Thus, a definite increase in his power can be seen throughout the chronicle, 
and by the time he takes over Aleppo, he has become one of the most powerful figures in 
northern Syria and the Jazira.
It is during the time of Il-Ghazi’s rule over Aleppo that his character is developed 
more fully. Although there are many aspects to his character which Ibn al-‘Adim’s chronicle 
elucidates, the overwhelmingly central one is that Il-Ghazi was either an incompetent and or 
an unskilled military leader. This is seen throughout his time at Aleppo, but is most clearly 
demonstrated at the Battle of Balat/the Field of Blood in 513/1119. While other chronicles 
suggest that this was 11-Ghazi’s greatest victory, Ibn al-‘AdIm does not see it as such at all. 
Instead, had Il-Ghazi had his way, the battle would never have happened. It was his soldiers 
who, in an almost mutinous act, demanded that they should fight the crusaders immediately, 
while Il-GhazI wanted to wait for Tughtegin, quite possibly because he did not trust his own 
ability or troops.451 Furthermore, it is not he who is shown to have inspired the troops to 
victory, but instead the qadi AbuT-Fadl, who is seen to have encouraged the troops to their 
famous victory.422 Finally, Il-Ghazi does not lead the Muslim army into, nor does he even
4'° Ibn al-'Adim, Vol. II, p. 124. This did, however, happen in the year 489/1096, while the two previous 
examples occurred in the years 504/1111, 509/1115-6 and 511/1117. It seems that Il-Ghazi gained power after 
his capture, as there is no hint during the episode with Duqaq that he had any power.
Ibn al-‘Adim, Vol. II, p. 188.
4:12 Ibn al-‘Ad!m, Vol. II, p. 188.
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appear to take part in the battle, as he is not mentioned at all. Instead, the man who was the 
architect of the Muslim victory was Tughan Arslan, a military commander in the army, as it 
was he who led the charge, and he is the only fighter mentioned by name.453 In this 
chronicle, Il-GhazTs famous victory is painted as a farce -  a battle in which he did not wish 
to take part, which only happened because the army was impatient, and a battle in which he 
does seem to have taken little or no part, even though at the end he takes the credit by 
sitting in Roger of Antioch’s tent and dividing up the booty.454
This, though, is not the only time when Il-Ghazl’s military incompetence is revealed. 
Immediately after the victory at Balat, Il-Ghazi is said to have been fully able to capture 
Antioch had he advanced on it, but instead chose not to do so, advancing instead on Artah 
and Zardana.455 This is an example of bad decision-making by Il-Ghazi, which is a theme 
running throughout the chronicle. When he gathered a large army together to attack the 
Franks in the year 514/1120, Il-Ghazi had no plan whatsoever -  he seems simply to have led 
them around Antiochene territory for a few days, not knowing what to do or making any 
decisions, before the army got annoyed with him, and Tughtegln had to help him out.456 The 
final military act of Il-Ghazi highlights this again, and explains why Il-Ghazi operated in 
this way. In the year 516/1122, he had once again come up against the Franks while he was 
besieging Zardana, and he knew he could not defeat them, so he ran from them; yet as they 
reached him again he brought his troops back to Zardana to continue the siege. This 
advancing and retreating with the crusaders seems to have gone on some time, and 
highlights that Il-Ghazi knew he could not defeat them .457
' J Ibn al-‘AdIm, Vol. II, p. 189.
434 Ibn al-‘Adim, Vol. II, p. 190.
433 Ibn al-‘AdIm, Vol. II, p. 191
436 Ibn al-‘Adim, Vol. II, p. 195.
437 Ibn al-‘AdIm, Vol. II, p. 205.
123
As well as this, Il-Ghazi seems to have had the underlying awareness that he was not a 
good military commander, as he avoided confrontation wherever he could, and he constantly 
needed to be helped by others to get out of the troublesome situations he was in. 
Immediately after the battle at Balat, Baldwin of Jerusalem came to help the crusaders in 
northern Syria, and instead of fighting, Il-Ghazi avoided it.426 He only decided to fight 
Baldwin later, when he was side-by-side with Tughtegin and Tughan Arslan459, either 
because he was cowardly, or knew that he was too weak to win alone. This episode is 
repeated almost exactly the next year (514/1120), when the crusaders were defeated, and 
had to sign a peace treaty with Il-Ghazi, giving up lots of territory. However, it is not Il- 
GhazI but Tughtegin who is the architect of this victory; Il-Ghazi is simply the one who 
takes the credit and the glory for it .460 The climax to this is in the year 516/1122, when 
again Il-Ghazi is faced by an army of Franks. On this occasion, he asks them to come down 
into the valley to fight, but they refuse and he, seemingly not knowing what to do, goes to 
Tughtegin for help against them, almost as a child would go to his older brother when faced 
by a stronger opponent that he knew he could not beat.461
This part of his image is underlined by Ibn al-‘AdIm’s report that on occasions Il- 
Ghazi was simply incapable of fighting the Franks, such as the time when all he could do 
was simply let them raid his lands at will462, before signing a humiliating peace treaty with 
them463, or, on his last skirmish with them near Zardana, he simply kept running away to 
stop them attacking him .464
Ibn al-'Adlm, Vol. II, p. 190. 
4M) Ibn al-'Adlm, Vol. II, p. 192.
460 Ibn al-'Adim, Vol. II, p. 196
4<l1 Ibn al-'Adim, Vol. II, p. 204.
462 Ibn al-'Adlm, Vol. II, p. 197
463 Ibn al-'Adim, Vol. II, p. 199.
464 Ibn al-'Adim, Vol. II, p. 205.
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Militarily, therefore, Tl-Ghazi is not a good leader. Not only did Ibn al-‘Adim describe 
him as hopeless, weak and afraid, but there are no redeeming features to his leadership. He is 
simply incapable. Yet this is not the only negative aspect to Tl-Ghazi which the chronicler 
shows -  there are a number of others.
Firstly, Tl-Ghazi’s political power was also limited, and this is highlighted by events in 
Aleppo during his rule. Although he did not cause them, he was unable to solve the social 
problems which were plaguing Aleppo at the time, and which a strong leader would have 
been more able to deal w ith .465 His rule over the city was not enough to stop the city’s army 
from joining up with the crusaders and attacking Balis, which was another of Tl-Ghazi’s 
power bases. Thus, instead of joining together to fight the crusaders -  or any other outside 
threat, Tl-Ghazi’s own people join with the Franks to fight nearby towns; certainly not the 
circumstances in which a strong leader would have found himself.466 Even the rebellion by 
his son in the year 5 1 5/1 12 1 467, while not unusual, does suggest weakness in Tl-Ghazi as a 
leader.
Secondly, Tl-Ghazi was opportunistic. Ibn al-‘Ad"im may have been showing that the 
reason Tl-Ghazi managed to become so powerful, in spite of the military ineptitude which he 
also describes, is because of this. His seizure of Aleppo is the clearest example of this -  he 
had not attempted to gain the town militarily beforehand, but as soon as it was offered to 
him -  seemingly because he was the best of a bad lot -  he took it .468 This is underlined 
further by his attitude when he took possession of the town; because there was no money, 
the town was in a bad state and the people and soldiers of the town were not easy to handle, 
he left as soon as he could469, and soon after put his son in charge of it470. Not only did he
4<b Ibn al-‘Adim, Vol. II, p. 180.
4<m Ibn al-'Adlm, Vol. II, p. 180.
467 Ibn al-‘Adim, Vol. II, pp. 198 -  202.
46l< Ibn al-‘Acfim, Vol. II, p. 179.
469 Ibn al-‘Adim, Vol. II, p. 180.
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have this attitude to the town, but he also did not want to help the people who lived there. 
When the Antiochenes invaded and devastated Aleppan territory in 513/1119, he did not 
move to confront them, but instead invaded their territory471, possibly to force them to 
retreat. While this is another example of Il-Ghazl’s military cowardice, it also shows that he 
was not willing to risk battle to protect his subjects. A very similar situation occurred in the 
year 516/1122, when again he did nothing to stop Frankish invasions.472 He only seems to 
have wanted the town for what he could get from it, and he would not have taken any risks 
to capture or protect it -  only when it was handed to him on a plate did he accept.
As well as his treatment of Aleppo and its inhabitants being opportunistic, his 
treatment of others was as well. In the aftermath of the victory at Balat/the Field of Blood, 
Il-GhazI uses the prisoners which were taken as pawns in order to extract money from them. 
The ones who could ransom themselves were allowed to, in order to boost 11-Ghazi’s coffers, 
but those who could not were executed, as they were of no worth to him .473
Finally, the manner of Il-Ghazi’s death suggests that he was not a great leader. 
Although there is no reason to doubt Ibn al-‘Adim’s account of the manner of Il-Ghazi’s 
death, the tone of the passage suggests that it was a rather inglorious end for a rather 
inglorious person, as he developed stomach troubles which were initially thought solved, but 
then reappeared to cause his death.474 The lack of mourning or listing of achievements, or 
praise of any kind, highlights Ibn al-‘Adim’s attitude further.
However, as in other chronicles, there are not only parts of Il-Ghazi’s character which 
are despised. There are some, though few, examples of admirable qualities in him. When the
470 Ibn al-‘Ad!m, Vol. II, p. 198.
471 Ibn al-'Adlm, Vol. II, p. 187.
472 Ibn al-‘AdIm, Vol. II, p. 197 -  198.
473 Ibn al-‘Adim, Vol. II, p. 193. Even this was rather foolish from a military standpoint, as next year 
(514/1120) the crusaders who had ransomed themselves organised themselves into an army to ravage 11- 
Ghazi’s territory, and the tone is that this was in revenge for what had happened to them: the humiliation of 
defeat and the loss of money from ransoming themselves. Ibn al-Adim, Vol. II, p. 195.
474 Ibn al-'Adlm, Vol. II, pp. 205 -  206.
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people of Aleppo complained to him about a tax which they believed was unfair, he 
investigated the situation and rectified it, by revoking the tax. That this was an extremely 
popular can be seen in the reaction of the city crowds, who engraved his decree on a large 
piece of wood which was then nailed to the door of the great mosque.475 As well as this, he 
managed to swiftly and cleanly deal with the revolt of his son Sulayman, executing most of 
those responsible while sparing his son, before marrying the daughter of the famous Aleppan 
ruler Ridwan, thus clearly and cleverly establishing a political link between him and his 
fairly popular predecessor.476
Despite all his faults, 11-Ghazi seem to have been liked by the population of Aleppo, at 
least initially, as Ibn al-‘AdIm writes that after the battle with the Franks at Zardana in 513, 
when the people thought he was dead, they were very sad, but when they realised he was 
still alive, they rejoiced.477 Finally, although Ibn al-‘AdIm paints 11-Ghazl as being powerful 
neither politically nor militarily, there are some small caveats to that. When Il-GhazI 
wanted to, he could gather huge numbers of troops together despite his inability to use them 
well478, which shows he did have influence in his own lands and beyond. Furthermore, 
Baldwin of Jerusalem was very concerned about 11-GhazTs power, to the extent that he 
believed he could try to attack Tripoli or even Jerusalem itself.479 Although highly unlikely, 
Ibn al-‘Adim does suggest that this was how strong the Latins believed 11-Ghazi was, 
perhaps taking his cue from people like Walter the Chancellor, who, as has been seen, 
showed 11-Ghazi as hugely powerful and a threat to Christendom in general.
In the chronicle of Ibn al-‘Acfim, 11-Ghazi is not an impressive figure. Although he had 
steadily built up his power base in northern Syria, this was a process which is beyond the
477 Ibn al-'Adlm, Vol. II, pp. 196.
476 Ibn al-'Adlm, Vol. II, pp. 198 -  203.
47/ Ibn al-‘AdIm, Vol. II, p. 192.
47x Ibn aI-‘Adim, Vol. II, pp. 186 & 195.
479 Ibn al-‘Adim, Vol. II, p. 204.
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remit of the work. As soon as fl-Ghazi becomes ruler of Aleppo, however, he is the main 
figure in the chronicle, and his successes and many failures are highlighted. He is 
incompetent militarily and politically, and he was opportunistic. The reasons he is shown in 
such hopeless terms surely lies in the reasons for Ibn al-‘AdIm writing. Ibn al-‘Adim’s father 
had been a qadi in the Zengid administration of Aleppo, and his family more widely had 
been in important positions over many years.480 As it was Zengl, founder of the Zengid 
dynasty, who had captured the town in 522/1128, it is likely that Ibn al-‘AdIm was 
deliberately attempting to present Artuqid rule in Aleppo as hopeless in order to justify the 
Zengid takeover of the town, and the position of his overlord.
11-Ghazl in Ibn al-Qalanisi’s ‘Dhayl ta ’rikh Dimashq’ (Continuation o f  the History o f  
Damascus):
As has been alluded to above, Ibn al-Qalanisi’s Dhayl ta ’rikh Dimashq is unlike many
481of the other extant chronicles which have come down to us. It is an annalistic account in 
its purest form, not a historical work in the style of Ibn al-Athir, meaning that the figures 
that appear in the chronicle are sketchy, rather like ghosts or shadows, having an ethereal 
quality but no substance to them. Consequently, the image ofll-Ghazi in the chronicle is 
affected by this. Furthermore, as the chronicle itself is focussed on Damascus, the events of 
the territories under the control ofll-Ghazi are of secondary importance.482 Thus, there is 
considerable difficulty in understanding how Ibn al-Qalanisi wished to represent 11-Ghazi.
Despite this, there are a number of aspects to the image of Tl-Ghazi which can be 
inferred. Firstly, he is most certainly an extremely powerful figure in the account; he is
4X0 F. Gabrieli, 'The Arabic Historiography of the Crusades’, in Historians o f  the Middle East, ed. B. Lewis &
/ P.M. Holt, London, 1962, p . l l l .
4X1 See above, pp. 37 - 38.487" See Gibb’s Introduction to IQ, p. 11; Amedroz p. 3.
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called one of the two ‘most prominent chieftains in Syrian affairs’, along with his brother 
Suqman in the chronicle, in Gibb’s introduction.483 This power is demonstrated in practical 
terms as he is shown to be prominent in the power politics of northern Syria at the time, 
such as making an alliance with Duqaq of Damascus and Yaghl-Siyan of Antioch against 
Suqman of Marcfin and Ridwan of Aleppo484, being part of an anti-Frankish alliance which 
laid siege to Edessa in 505/111 0485, and being politically strong enough to arrange an 
alliance among the various north Syrian factions against the crusaders in 512/1118-1119.486
Secondly, 11-Ghazl seems to have become powerful in spite of himself. On the 
occasions of Il-Ghazl’s takeover of a city, his handling of the situation reveals a distinct 
lack of understanding of the circumstances or any leadership qualities. For example, in the 
year 511/May 1117—April 1118, he is seen to have taken possession of Aleppo, and the 
running of its affairs. This lasted only one month, however, before he withdrew and left his
  _  _  487
son Husam al-Din Timurtash in charge, ‘his plans having miscarried’. His attempt to 
destroy the Georgian army is also presented as a failure of his leadership qualities -  he had 
them on the run, but he was somehow outwitted, leading to his defeat, as well as his own 
failure to protect Tiflls, which was captured by the Georgians.488 Furthermore, his -  and his 
brother’s -  loss of Jerusalem to the Fatimids in 491/1098 is presented as an easy victory for 
the Egyptians, and his failure to protect Islam’s third holiest city seems a sign of 
weakness.489 His weakness is further underlined when Ibn al-Qalanisl reports that he was
483 IQ, p. 25.
, 484 IQ, pp 3 0 -3 1 .
485 IQ, p. 101.
486 IQ, p. 158.
487 IQ, p. 157.
488 IQ, p. 164. ‘The army of the Georgians fled in terror, and the Muslims pressed upon them and besieged 
them in the Durub; but the Georgians turned on the Muslims, and having put them to flight, killed large 
numbers of them. Thereafter they advanced on the city of Tiflis and captured it by the sword, and puts its 
inhabitants to death’.
489 IQ, p. 45. The text reads: ‘When they (Suqman and 11-Ghazl) refused his (Egyptian leader’s) demand (to 
surrender), he opened an attack on the town, and having set up mangonels against it, which effected a breach 
in the wall, he captured it and received the surrender of the Sanctuary of David from Suqman.’ The victory
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captured by the troops of the emir Jawall and had to pay his own ransom through an annual 
tribute, which could imply that nobody else wanted to pay for him to be released.4911
Finally, and possibly linked to, or even a cause of, the weakness shown above, Il-Ghazi 
is presented as a drunkard, as he is in other Arabic chronicles. In an account of a siege by II- 
GhazI on the town of Hims, in the year 508/June 1114 -  May 1115, the chronicler writes 
‘when Il-GhazI drank wine and it got the better of him, he habitually remained for several 
days in a state of intoxication’491, the clear implication being that this was something which 
happened often; the traditional Turkish ways not totally abandoned by these relatively new 
Muslims. Having found out that Il-GhazI was in such a state at one point in the siege, the 
lord of Flims, Khir-Khan, launched an attack on his camp, and, with no-one able to take 
charge, was able not only to overcome it but also to capture Il-Ghazi himself. This scene is a 
good example of how Il-Ghazi is regarded in the chronicle. Superficially, he seems to be 
powerful -  he is besieging an enemy camp -  but he does not have the power to carry it 
through, and by his own fault he is captured and imprisoned, having made himself 
vulnerable through his drinking. He was only released after the intervention of the atabeg 
Zahir al-DIn wrote to Khlr Khan expressing his displeasure at what he had done to Il-Ghazl.
As well as this, however, he does have some qualities which are admired by Ibn al- 
Qalanisi. The foremost of these is his strength in the jihad. He is seen to have invited the 
Turkomen tribes of his region to join in the struggle, then to join them into an army by 
destroying ‘the factions of infidelity and error’ .492 Thus, he was not only carrying out his 
religious duty militarily by prosecuting the Holy War, but he is also seen to be a model of
seems as if  it was quick, easy, and straightforward, and the fact that it was Suqman who received its surrender 
demonstrated that he was regarded as the more important of the two brothers, though this is because his 
powerbase had not been built up sufficiently at this point in the chronicle to the extent that it later had.
490 IQ, p. 80.
491 IQ, p. 149. The passage continues ‘...w ithout recovering his senses sufficiently to take control or to be 
consulted on any matter or decision’.
492 IQ, pp. 1 5 8 -9 .
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Islamic orthodoxy by preventing possibly heretical ideas and factions. This is just before the 
Battle of Balát, the occasion on which the Muslim forces defeated the crusaders of Antioch 
in 513/1119, the aftermath of which is so vividly described by Walter the Chancellor.
He is also seen as a leader who cared about those under his rule. Ibn al-Qalanisi praises 
Il-Ghazl highly because of his treatment of the citizens of Aleppo. He is reported to have 
‘abolished the tolls levied on the people of Aleppo, together with the duties on natural 
products and other contributions, and had rescinded the oppressive innovations and 
objectionable imposts introduced by the evildoers’ .493 Not only was this move ‘received 
with gratitude, praise, appreciation, and blessings’ by the populace who benefited from this, 
but also that Tl-Ghazi is again regarded as a protector of Islamic orthodoxy. The epithet 
given to those who had installed these levies -  ‘evildoers’ -  suggests that the levies are 
regarded as anti-Islamic, and so anyone who abolished them, as fl-Ghazi did, would be a 
source of Islamic purity.
The image of Il-Ghazi in Ibn al-Qalanisi is one of a person who tried hard to be a great 
leader, but his character had flaws which meant he could not achieve this. He has one 
quality which the annalist obviously admires -  he was a champion of Islam, as he tried to 
prosecute the jihad ' while his social reforms in Aleppo follow ideas of Islamic orthodoxy. He 
was also a powerful individual, a situation which can be admired, but the way he obtained 
and used that power was not, as he is not shown to have actually captured his territories, 
while failures in the sieges he attempted to undertake show his leadership skills to be 
questionable, at least in that type of warfare. Finally, the describing of Tl-Ghazi’s penchant 
for alcohol shows that to the chronicler, this breaking of Islamic law was not something to 
be applauded. Although Ibn al-Qalánisi is silent on the topic, as an annalist this was his 
prerogative -  to his exclusively Muslim audience, the description of this Islamic warrior
IQ, p. 162.493
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failing due to drunkenness would have been a powerful enough image on its own regarding 
his inability to be a truly great jihadist. As such, Il-Ghazi seems like a tragic figure -  a man 
who has become powerful, although his attempts to lead are thwarted by his own inability, 
despite his attitude being, generally, one which is presented positively.
Chapter 3 -  The Image of Renaud of Châtillon in the Arabic Sources
Renaud in Ibn al-Atlnr’s Al-Kam il fl'I-ta ilkh
Ibn al-Athlr is generally regarded by scholars as a master of the historical art, one who 
seamlessly brings together many sources, creating a work which is broad in scope and -  
comparatively -  restrained in judgement. He is also, fairly unusually, able to interpret 
events, not just record them .494 Despite this ability, when writing of Renaud, all these 
aspects disappear.
From the very start Ibn al-Athlr is unequivocal in the language he uses to sum up 
Renaud, leaving the audience in no doubt as to his view of the crusader. On the first 
occasion he is mentioned, the crusader is referred to as ‘one of the most devilish of the 
Franks, and one of the most demonic, and had the strongest hostility to the Muslims’495, and 
is subsequently referred to as ‘one of the greatest of the Franks, and one of the most wicked 
of them, and the most violent of them in hostility to the Muslims, and the one who caused 
the greatest harm to them ’ .496 These two comments come in the first three appearances of 
Renaud of Chatillon in Ibn al-Athlr’s chronicle Al-Kamil f i ’l-ta ’nkh , and as such they serve 
both as an introduction to the reader of Renaud’s perceived character and as an explanation 
for his subsequent behaviour; he was strong and evil. Yet it is the narrative accounts of 
events which reveal most about the chronicler’s viewpoint, as they both explain and expand 
on these early comments.
494 C. Hillenbrand, ‘Sources in Arabic’, in Byzantines and Crusaders in Non-Greek Sources, ed. M. Whitby, 
Proceedings o f the British Academy 132, Oxford, 2007, p. 316.
495 Al-Kämil, vol. IX, p. 452:
¡jalaLui ¡¿y
496 Al-Kämil, vol. X, p. 18:
'¿jljiC- 1 j  I
There are only a few occasions on which Renaud enters the chronicle, but when he 
does Ibn al-Athlr highlights the behaviour which is both a cause and result of how he is 
described above, and both points are underlined on every occasion Renaud appears in the 
narrative. The first example of this is when Renaud launched an attack towards the Arabian 
city of Tayma’ in 576/1 181, which Ibn al-Athir reports was ultimately aimed at Medina.497 
The Muslim response to this threat was to send ‘Izz al-Dln Farrukhshah, military 
commander in Damascus, with the army of that city, to deal with it. Despite having the 
whole resources of Damascus and its environs at his disposal, Farrukhshah did not directly 
attack Renaud, but instead threatened Kerak to lure him away, even though the crusader 
was near Tayma’, in Islamic territories around two hundred miles from his territory, and so 
should have been easy prey. This suggests that Farrukshah was too worried about the 
strength of Renaud to confront him openly, and the extent of the threat he was to Muslim 
territories. The sense of Renaud’s strength is heightened even further in the narrative after 
this event, when Ibn al-Athir reports that Renaud threatened the hajj caravans passing by his 
territories, and it is once again the Muslim reaction to this which demonstrates the threat 
which Renaud was believed to pose. Ibn al-Athir writes that in 583/1187:
‘Salah al-DIn wrote to all the lands calling upon the people to the jihad, and he wrote 
to Mosul and the region of the Jazira and Irbil and other places from the lands of the East, 
and to Egypt and all the lands of Syria, calling them to the jihad’.49x
The scale of Salah al-DIn’s response, calling on people from all his territories, shows 
just how much of a threat Renaud was perceived to be, the reason for which is seen in the
Al-Kamil, vol. IX, p. 452.
49K Al-Kamil, vol. X, p. 20:
 ̂ ^ ''A  /' 3^  -4 * j . .-i .c
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chronicler’s earlier comment that Renaud ‘caused the greatest harm to them (the 
Muslims) ’ .499
While this underlines his military power, Renaud is also shown to have great political 
strength within the Kingdom of Jerusalem -  he is presented as the person who persuaded the 
rest of the nobility of Jerusalem to fight the Muslims, at what would be the Battle of Hattln. 
The discussion which will decide the fate of the crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem provides a 
wealth of information on Islamic ideas when it is viewed through the perspective of an 
Islamic writer who was not, of course, present at the event he describes. In this scene, Ibn al- 
Athlr invents a long speech by Count Raymond of Tripoli, who argues against attacking the 
Muslims. The reasoning he gives in the speech is sound; he argues that the Muslim army at 
the time was more powerful than before, that Salah al-Dln would not be able to hold 
Tiberias if  he captured it, and soon he would have to disperse his army anyway as the 
ordinary soldiers would be wanting to return home. Furthermore, he also points out that 
Tiberias is part of his own territory, indicating that it was his problem and that his view 
should be taken very seriously.500 Responding to this, Renaud is seen to be engaged in full 
bluster. His reply is:
‘You have tried to scare (us) of the Muslims, and there is no doubt that you are with 
them and you sympathise with them -  if  not, you would not have spoken thus; and as for 
what you said, that they are large in number, a large load of fuel for hellfire will not harm
it ’ .501
The nobility of Jerusalem settled on the course suggested by Renaud, implying that the 
powerful anti-Islamic sentiments which Renaud held reflect the attitude of the majority of
499 Al-Kamil, vol. X, p. 18.
500 Al-Kamil, vol. X, p. 23
501 Al-Kamil, vol. X, p. 23:
<■ S t i l l  j i i  L a i j  t l l l A  C l i i S  L a  y i j  t i L i  ¿ L a  ( j A  i— L j j  V l l l  C l l lL a i  ¿S
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Jerusalem’s nobility instead of the more Islamophile mentality of the count of Tripoli. As 
such, Renaud becomes the de facto leader of the crusaders, as his voice is the one which 
represents the majority opinion and his argument the one which wins through; thus, he is the 
most powerful of the crusaders.
As well as his power and consequent threat to the Muslims, the other main theme 
which comes out in Ibn al-Athir is that Renaud is evil, which is demonstrated in a number of 
ways. The first is his treacherousness, displayed most clearly by his breaking of treaties. 
This occurs for the first time in the chronicle at the time of Renaud’s attack on a caravan in 
the year 582/1186-7. This occurred after Renaud was forced to ask for a treaty with Salah 
al-DIn, who had been harassing him. Ibn al-Athir reports that as a result of this treaty, 
‘caravans could come and go from Syria to Egypt and from Egypt to Syria’, through 
Renaud’s land, without fear of harassment.502 The tone of the passage is that this treaty 
suited both sides, as it would have meant that both sides could protect their own people and 
property and carry on their productive trade. However, a short time later (‘this [same] 
year’), a large, rich caravan passed through Renaud’s land, and the crusader broke the treaty 
by attacking the caravan and seizing goods and men, and throwing them into prison. Ibn al- 
Athlr’s claim that Renaud ‘betrayed them ’ 503 shows how the chronicler views his actions.
The other occasion on which he highlights Renaud’s perceived treachery is in the 
account of Salah al-DIn’s address to Renaud just before killing the crusader. Ibn al-Athir 
writes that Salah al-DIn ‘rebuked him for his sins, and enumerated to him his treacheries, 
and he rose towards him himself and struck his neck’, i.e. killed him .504 That Renaud’s
502 AI-Kamil, vol. X, p. 18:
fU ll J ]  ¿JAJ  <, ̂ x^A  L̂ulll ¿JA
503 Al-Kamil, vol. X, p. 18:
5(14 Al-Kamil, vol. X, p. 26:
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treacheries were many is clear from the use of the term ‘enumerated’ .505 Additionally, Salah
f
al-Dln’s list of Renaud’s faults ends with the comment on Renaud’s treacheries; coming at 
the end, just before Renaud’s death, suggests that his treacheries were his worst crime, as if 
his treacheries were the cause of his death, as the tension and his reported crimes build up. It 
is also likely that Renaud’s ‘sins’, which are mentioned first by Ibn al-Athilr, were his 
treacheries, which are mentioned afterwards. It was a feature of medieval Arabic 
historiographical writing that certain important points would be underlined through the use 
of repetition, and it seems that Ibn al-Athlr is doing so on this occasion, implying that sin 
and treachery were the same thing in the case of Renaud by placing them next to each other 
in his chronicle. While Salah al-Dln does comment that it was Renaud’s attack on Mecca 
and Medina and his insult of Muhammad which caused him to kill Renaud, Ibn al-Athlr 
seems to be suggesting that while these were the direct cause of his death, these were 
merely manifestations of the real reason he died; his evil treachery.
Another way in which the image of Renaud as evil is elucidated in Ibn al-Athir’s 
chronicle is through his arrogance. Though not specifically mentioned by the author himself, 
it is again Renaud’s actions in the chronicle which leads to this conclusion. This is clear
f
from his treatment of the Muslim pilgrim caravan which passed through his territories in the 
year 582/1187. The account states that Renaud ‘betrayed them and seized all of them and 
captured goods and their animals and their weapons and he threw into prison (those) of them 
who he had captured ’ .506 The lack of explanation in the passage or presentation of
The Arabic term "W*j <-r1 used here is vague in its precise meaning. It is possible that this means that 
Salah al-Din himself killed Renaud -  that the implication is that he cut off Renaud’s head; but it could also 
imply that Salah al-Din merely struck the first blow, and others finished the job. It is possible that Ibn al-Athlr 
is being deliberately vague, perhaps to absolve Salah al-Dln from blame over killing a prisoner himself. 
However, it is clear he did order Renaud’s death, meaning that he is ultimately responsible.
505 The Arabic word is which can also mean ‘count’, and ‘calculate’, all of which carry the implication 
that there were many treacheries.
:,°6 Al-Kamil, vol. X, pp. 18 -  19:
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possibilities for why Renaud did as he did gives a feeling that he simply acted as he wished, 
with no concern for the consequences and with the idea that no power would be able to 
punish him. This feeling is increased by his retort to Salah al-Dln’s written response, which 
was to demand that Renaud release the prisoners and booty. Renaud ‘persisted in refusing’, 
the inference being that he felt himself to be untouchable, even by the strongest warrior of 
Islam.507
Furthermore, the arrogance which Ibn al-Athlr wants to show Renaud possessed is also 
to be seen in the account of the meeting between the crusader leaders just before Flattln. In 
this scene, one part of Renaud’s speech betrays an arrogance which the author would have 
the reader believe is ingrained in the crusader. This comes when Renaud is responding to the 
claim by Raymond of Tripoli that the Muslim army was very strong.508 Writing for an 
Islamic audience, Ibn al-Athlr uses a form of dramatic irony to show the arrogance of the 
crusader -  Renaud believes that the Muslims would go to hell, when of course both the 
chronicler and his audience know that it is the infidel crusaders who would end up in the 
fires of hell by the end of the day.
Yet the act which highlights Renaud’s evil most clearly, is the occasion of Renaud’s 
raid down the Red Sea in 578/1183. The chronicler does not specifically comment on this 
event, as its presence alone in the chronicle would be enough to underline to his Islamic 
readership that Renaud is an evil, sacrilegious man. There would have been no need to point 
out to his Islamic audience the implication, or the scale, of the offence. It was bad enough 
that the Franks had defiled Jerusalem through their presence and disregard for its sacred 
status; but that a crusader should actually attempt to attack the holiest place in Islam, the 
Ka‘ba itself in Mecca, would have been unquantifiably shocking. The strength of feeling
5117 Al-Kamil, vol. X, p. 19:
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about the violation and those who perpetrated it can be seen in the fate of those who were 
captured: ‘some of them were taken to Mina to be ritually slaughtered (i.e. have their 
throats cut) there as punishment to (those) who alarmed the sanctuary of Allah the Sublime 
and the sanctuary of his prophet’ .509 The sacrificial nature of the killings reflects the fact 
that the Muslims believed Renaud and his troops had polluted sacred space, and the only 
way to cleanse it was to spill their blood.510 It is this moment, more than any, which 
highlights the evil in Renaud for the Muslims, and which Ibn al-Athlr uses to highlight the 
same thing.
However, despite all these negative aspects to Renaud’s character which Ibn al-Athlr 
clearly despised, there are hints in the text that Renaud did possess qualities which can be 
admired. The first of this is his intelligence. Though not explicitly praised, or even stated, in 
the account, it is clear from the description of Renaud’s tactics in the chronicle that these 
were the actions of a highly intelligent man. There are several places in the chronicle where 
this shines through. For example, his attack on the holy cities of the Flijaz, while highly 
shocking, also showed his understanding of Islamic thought. He had threatened the very 
heart of the Islamic world, something that no non-Muslim had done before, thus showing his 
appreciation of the place it held in Islamic thought. It could be argued that this was a foolish 
thing to do from a military and diplomatic viewpoint, as it would mean that the wrath of the 
Muslim world would be brought down on either him if the Franks were lucky, or on all the 
crusading states themselves if they were not. However, if  this is ignored -  as Renaud seems 
to have been doing -  and his aims examined, it is obvious that this was indeed a very 
intelligent move -  he seems to have been trying to hurt the Muslims, and Salah al-Dm, as 
much as possible, and an attack on Mecca and Medina would do just that. A further
509 Al-Kamil, vol. IX, pp. 468 -  9:
ksLkl j  ^  ..s* \
510 For a brief overview of the importance of Frankish pollution and Islamic purity in the period of the 
Crusades see Hillenbrand, Crusades, pp. 293 -  297.
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demonstration of his intelligence comes in a description of Renaud’s military manoeuvres 
when harassing Muslim pilgrim traffic. His actions in doing this again underline his 
understanding of the Islamic mindset. It was the duty of Salah al-Dm himself as ruler of 
Syria and Egypt to ensure the safety of the pilgrims in those lands. By consistently 
attacking the pilgrims, Renaud was undermining Salah al-Dln’s claim to be worthy of rule, 
which could have led to others challenging for the leadership, thereby weakening opposition 
to the crusader states and consequently buying time for the Franks.
Furthermore, it is clear in the chronicle that Renaud himself was a very powerful man, 
as demonstrated by his ability to thwart Salah al-Dln’s plans and by his offensive raids. 
While there is no clear statement by Ibn al-Athlr to the effect that he admired Renaud 
because of his power, political strength was something which was seen as laudable in the 
medieval Islamic world.711 Thus, despite the open hostility in Ibn al-Athlr’s comments on 
Renaud, a grudging appreciation does filter through to the reader.
Evaluation of Ibn al-Athlr:
The writings of Ibn al-Athlr are determined to show Renaud as an extremely evil, 
calculating individual. He was a man whose actions were designed to cause harm to Islam, 
and the threat he posed was increased by his great power and intelligence. While power and 
intelligence were admired in Islamic thought, the problem with Renaud’s is that these 
qualities were channelled against Islam, and were therefore negative in Ibn al-Athlr’s eye 
rather than positive.
However, when judging the chronicle as a whole it is important to note that several 
important aspects of Renaud’s life are ignored, aspects which would change the complexion 
of how he is viewed. While this would not be surprising in some of the medieval Arabic
511 See A. Al-Azmeh, Muslim Kingship, London, 1997.
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chronicles, Ibn al-Athir is generally held up as an example of an historian who tried to 
understand why things happened. With Renaud, however, he fails to do this. There are three 
main ways in which this manifests itself.
Firstly, the author fails to mention the vital factor of Renaud’s strategic position. 
Barber has convincingly argued that the main reason for the Muslim antipathy towards 
Renaud was not anything special about the actions themselves, but the fact that it was he 
who was in the best possible position to cause harm to the Muslims. A similarly belligerent 
crusader whose territory lay, say, on the coast near Acre or Jaffa would not have had the 
ability to cause as much chaos to the Muslims, as there were no Muslims passing regularly 
through his territory, and it would not have been easy to collect a force to invade Muslim 
lands, especially with the king of Jerusalem close at hand to keep him in line. Renaud had no 
such restrictions, as his land was regularly crossed by pilgrims and caravans, and the king 
was not in a position -  physically at least -  to stop him; thus it was his situation as much as 
his beliefs that caused such harm to the Muslims.712 The position of Kerak and Shawbak so 
strongly dominated the surrounding area that the strategic potential of Renaud’s territory is 
not even in question. Thus, the question arises of why this is not mentioned. It is likely that, 
as with other medieval writers, Ibn al-Athlr ignored this because it did not fit with the main 
theme of his narrative with regard to Renaud; that he was evil and constantly tiying to hurt 
the Muslims. Having put the arguments in religious and moral terms, it would jar 
significantly if he was then to explain rather more earthly subjects like the strategic
712 See M. Barber, ‘Frontier Warfare in the Latin Kingdom o f  Jerusalem: The Campaigns o f  Jacob’s Ford, 1178 
-  1179’, in ‘The Crusades and their Sources: Essays Presented to B. Hamilton’, ed. J. France & W. Zajac, 
Aldershot, 1998. Barber does, however, significantly underplay the political and religious reasons for the 
Islamic hatred of Renaud. His territorial position was important, but it would have meant nothing without his 
political will and religious motivation to carry them out.
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positioning of crusader castles and the impact they had on the nearby Muslims. It was much 
easier to ignore this than have it disrupt the flow of the narrative and his ideas.513
Secondly, Ibn al-Athlr does not judge Renaud’s behaviour, or the man himself, in a 
similar way to how he judges other crusader leaders. To elucidate this, the question over 
whether or not Renaud or his deeds were any worse than other crusade leaders who are 
praised by Ibn al-Athlr must be addressed. A good example of this is Richard I, of whom Ibn 
al-Athlr comments: ‘He was the man of his time for boldness, cunning, endurance, and 
perseverance. The Muslims were tested by catastrophes because of him, the like of which 
had never before befallen them ’ .514 To examine the reason for this lack of consistency, the 
actions of the two leaders must be examined alongside each other. Renaud appears in the 
chronicle as a man who attacked and tried to attack Muslim cities, such as ‘Aydhab during 
his Red Sea raid, and Medina which he attempted to attack as part of the same attack. 
Renaud also broke treaties, such as the time in which he attacked a Muslim pilgrim caravan 
during a time of peace; he is said to have insulted Islam and Muhammad; and he is crit icised 
for failing to comply with Salah al-Dln’s demands. There are, therefore, a number of deeds 
which Renaud carried out which riled the author.
In the case of Richard, it is clear that the English king also did many of the same deeds 
which Renaud did. He attacked Muslim cities, such as the occasion of his capture of Acre515, 
the majority of which the Muslims held before he arrived. Richard has also been criticised 
by various commentators for his actions when he killed three thousand prisoners after Salah 
al-Dln was late agreeing to the terms of an agreed treaty, which have been seen as Richard
313 - As well as this, there are other reasons, particularly that, being primarily a religious scholar, Ibn al-Athir 
both did not understand and was not interested in such earthly considerations, being much more concerned 
with religious explanations for events.
514 Al-Kamil, Vol. X, p. 95:
513 Al-Kamil, Vol. X, pp. 95 -  8.
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breaking his treaty, just as Renaud was accused of doing.516 Finally, Richard also did not 
agree to some of Salah al-Dm’s demands, and yet he is treated quite differently from the 
lord of Kerak. The only difference between the two is that Richard is not reported to have 
attacked the holy cities of Islam as Renaud is reported to have done.
Finally, Ibn al-Atlfir’s account is very critical of the breaking of treaties by crusaders, 
yet he does not criticise his own side for breaking the treaties themselves. In the account of 
the attack by Renaud on the Muslim caravan, a piece which is entitled ‘An account of the 
Treachery of Prince Am at’, the chronicler castigates Renaud for his breach of the treaty 
which would allow Muslim caravans to pass through his lands.517 Yet one line in the text is 
very important -  the claim by the chronicler that Renaud ‘seized all of them and captured 
goods and their animals and their weapons’ .518 The fact that the Muslims were carrying 
weapons was itself an initial violation of the treaty, and so Renaud’s attack could be 
regarded as a ruler asserting his right to punish those who violate treaties -  much as Salah 
al-DIn was claiming to do.519 Yet the fact passes without comment from Ibn al-Athlr, and he 
skips over it without embarrassment, even though it would have been clear to his immediate 
audience that the treaty was broken by the Muslims first.520 Either he was lifting wholesale 
from another source on this occasion, as Gibb has suggested that he did on numerous 
occasions521, and did not feel the need or inclination to change or explain it; or he is 
suggesting that anything is acceptable if it helps Islam to defeat its enemies. It is also
516 Runciman calls the massacre ‘cold-blooded’, while Riley-Smith says it was carried out ‘in a fit of rage’. S.
Runciman, A History o f the Crusades, Vol. Ill, Cambridge, 1954, p. 53; J. Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A Short
History, London, 1987, p. 116.
517 Al-Kamil, vol. X, pp. 18 -  19.
518 Al-Kamil, vol. X, pp. 18 -  19:
319 See J.P. Phillips, The Crusades: 1095 -  1197, Longman, 2002, p. 133, who suggests this.
520 See M. Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law o f Islam, Johns Hopkins, 1955, pp. 220 -  222,who shows that, 
in theory, Muslims had to announce to their enemies that they were abandoning their treaty before taking any 
action. The action of arming the caravan goes against this Islamic proscription.
321 H.A.R. Gibb, ‘The Arabic Sources for the Life of Saladin’, in Speculum 25, 1950, pp. 58 - 74; however, 
Gabrieli states that Ibn al-Athlr was not such a person, and instead was a very thoughtful and intelligent 
individual, although with a clear bias towards the Zengids. F. Gabrieli, Anab Historians o f  the Crusades, 
University o f California Press, Los Angeles, 1969, p. xxvii.
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possible that he is suggesting that the caravan needed to be armed because of what 
happened to them; yet there is no hint of an explanation in the account, which would be 
expected if he were trying to justify the actions of the members of the caravan. The passing 
over of the implication suggests Ibn al-Athlr implies ignorance, irrelevance or 
embarrassment, but there is no justification attempted. Whichever it is, it does make the 
account jar, with a discrepancy between his views on Muslims and Renaud when they did 
the same thing.
Conclusion:
Ibn al-Athlr’s presentation of Renaud as an evil, calculating individual who had great 
strength was not a new phenomenon when writing of crusaders -  other crusade leaders, such 
as Conrad of Montferrat, are also seen as strong yet evil -  the image of Renaud is something 
different. Only he was ‘the most devilish of the Franks’522, and ‘caused the greatest harm to 
them (the Muslims) ’ .523 The reason for this must be something which Renaud alone did, 
outside the conventions of crusader -  Muslim warfare. What this was is obvious. Ibn al- 
Athir claims that Renaud tried to attack Mecca and Medina. It has been argued elsewhere 
that the reported attack on the holy cities was not earned out by Renaud himself, and it is 
unlikely to have been the aim of the raid.524 However, the belief was that Renaud tried to 
attack the Hijaz, and that has produced the image which Ibn al-Athir presents. Amongst the 
crusaders, Renaud is the only one who attempted such a daring attack, the consequence of 
which would be death, so his unique presentation is not surprising.
-  Al-Kamil, Vol. IX, p. 452.
523 Al-Kamil, Vol. X, p. 18.
324 A. Mallett, ‘A Trip Down the Red Sea with Reynald of Chatillon’, in Journal o f the Royal Asiatic Society 
2008, pp. 141 -  153.
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The Image o f  Renaud o f  Chdtillon in Baha ’ al-Din Ibn Shaddad’s ‘Al-Nawadir al-Sultaniyya
wa 7 Malias in al- Yusufiyya:
The chronicle of Baha’ al-Dln has one main purpose; to glorify Salah al-Dln and to 
underline his virtues, reflected in the Arabic title to the piece.525 The motivation for Baha’ 
al-DIn, to eulogise Salah al-Dln, is the basis for everything else in the narrative, including 
the presentation of Renaud. With this in mind, there are three main aspects to the image of 
Renaud which Baha’ al-Dm creates.
Firstly, Renaud is shown as a powerful man. On the first occasion that he is mentioned 
in the account, Baha’ al-Dm states that Renaud was ‘lord of Kerak’, and refers to him as 
‘Prince’, which immediately show his position as an important and powerful individual.526 
This position is underlined at the two other points where Renaud appears in the chronicle. 
The first is during the account of the Muslims’ defeat at Ramla/Montgisard in 573/1177. At 
this battle, Renaud is the commander of the victorious Latin forces, even though, as the 
chronicle correctly points out, he ‘had been recently ransomed at Aleppo, for he had been a 
prisoner there since the time of Nur al-Dm ’ .527 It is not only his position as military leader 
which highlights his power, but his elevation to such a high position so quickly emphasises 
that he had great power, either politically or militarily, or both, as it would take someone 
very important to have spent such a long time in captivity to come out and immediately be 
given such an important command.
On the final appearance of Renaud in the chronicle, at the time of his death after the 
battle of Flattin, his power is underlined still further. He is one of only three Latin nobles 
who were taken into Salah al-Din’s tent when they had been captured, the other two being 
King Guy and the king’s brother. The fact that he is seen in such illustrious company
325 The literal translation from the Arabic is ‘The Sultan-ly Prodigies and the Yusuf-ly Merits’; both Sultan 
and Yusuf refer to Salah al-Din.
326 Balia’ al-Din, p. 37. '
327 ibid, p. 54.
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underlines how important Renaud is, a fact which is lost neither on Salah al-Dln or Baha’ al- 
Din.
However, despite the power which he clearly possesses, the chronicler is careful not to 
ascribe him too much; while in the political territory of the crusader states he is a powerful 
man, his eventual fate reflects that in the wider context of Syrian politics, his power is not 
as strong that of the Muslims, and Salah al-Dln in particular. The first occasion on which 
this theme subtly enters the narrative is at the aforementioned Muslim defeat at Ramla. 
Although Renaud is the commander of the Latin army which triumphs, it is most definitely 
not because of anything which Renaud personally does. Instead, the comment that ‘some of 
the (Muslim) army’~ decided to change the battle formation after lines had been drawn up, 
and were caught in a Frankish charge, shows that it was a huge mistake on the part of the 
Muslim army which led to the defeat, not any brilliance by the crusaders. They, and by 
extension Renaud, were just lucky.529
Following on from this, Renaud is shown as being no match for the might of Salah al- 
Din, and by extension, for Allah. In the Frankish victory at Ramla, it was, ultimately, the 
will of Allah which determined the Muslim defeat. Similarly, the victory at Flattin was an 
expression of the power of Renaud being overwhelmed by the power of Salah al-Din; as 
Renaud’s power is earthly and Salah al-Dln’s comes from the divine, by that day Renaud’s 
power had reached its limit. Baha’ al-DIn writes that ‘God had bestowed a great victory on 
him (Salah al-Dm)’530, that the Sultan was had ‘great delight, expressing his gratitude for 
the favour that God had shown him’531, and that he said to Renaud that ‘God has given me
' 2X Balia’ al-Din, p. 53.
529 ‘The Muslims had drawn up for battle and when the enemy approached, some of our men decided that the 
right wing should cross to the left and the left cross towards the centre, in order that when battle was joined 
they might have at their backs a hill known as Ramla Land. While they were occupied in this manoeuvre, the 
Franks charged them and God decreed their defeat. They suffered a terrible reverse and they had no nearby 
fortress they could take refuge in’. Baha’ al-DIn, p. 54.
530 Balia’ al-Din, p. 74.
"3I Balia’ al-Dln, p. 75.
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victory over you’. The last reference to Renaud in the chronicle is the intense image of Allah 
giving the crusader his last judgement, hurling him into hell, a judgement for which 
Renaud’s earthly power has no response.532
There is, therefore, an explanation of Renaud’s power in the chronicle, which 
demonstrates his power on two levels, earthly and spiritual. With the earthly power, Renaud 
is very strong because of his position as a military and political leader among the Franks. 
However, this power is completely undermined by his strength spiritually, which is non­
existent as he is a great opponent of Allah. In the final analysis, then, despite seeming 
strong, Renaud is actually weak, because his temporal power is based on a house of cards, 
one which was always going to fall when confronted with the power of Allah.
The second part of the image Baha’ al-Dm creates of Renaud is that of his evilness in 
the writer’s eyes. On Renaud’s first appearance in the chronicle, he is described as ‘a 
monstrous infidel and terrible oppressor’533, thus preparing the audience for the rest of the 
narrative, and giving an explanation of why the following events occurred. This point of the 
narrative is the occasion of Renaud’s attack on a Muslim caravan, although the exact year is 
not stated .534 During his account of this attack, Baha’ al-Din leaves the reader in no doubt as 
to how he regards the actions of the infidel who attacked the caravan: ‘He [Renaud] seized 
it treacherously, maltreated and tortured its members and held them in dungeons and close 
confinement’ .535 Although treatment of this kind was not uncommon in warfare of the time, 
it was the violation of the truce which Baha’ al-Din most objected to, and this violation 
revealed Renaud’s treachery. Furthermore, in this account, Renaud’s evilness is increased by
532 Balia’ al-Din, p. 75.
”33 Balia’ al-Dln, p.37.
234 The first half o f the chronicle, in which this account is found, is focussed solely on Salali al-Din, ‘containing 
an account of his birth, his individual characteristics and his personal qualities’ (Balia’ al-Din, p. 15). It is
therefore not in chronological order, and does not contain explanations of the years in which events happened. 
This is probably referring to the attack on a caravan in early 1187, which was one of the primary reasons why 
Salali al-Din launched an all-out offensive on the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the middle of that year. See Ibn al- 
Athir, Al-Kamil, vol. X, pp. 18 -  9.
Baha’ al-Dln, p. 37.
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his reaction when he is reminded of the truce, as he dismissively says ‘Tell your Muhammad 
to release you ’ .536 This is the main demonstration of Renaud’s evil in the chronicle, though 
this is demonstrated again at the scene of his death and judgement. Here, Baha’ al-Din again 
reminds the reader of Renaud’s attack on the caravan, as this was the reason for Salah al- 
Din’s vow to kill him. The truth of this view that Renaud was evil is also demonstrated, as 
after his death ‘God speedily sent his soul to hell-fire’. Thus the judgement of Salah al-Dln 
is the same as that of Allah. Not only this, but Renaud also had the opportunity to accept 
Islam when it was offered to him by Salah al-Dln, but refused it, even when it seemed 
obvious that it was the triumphant religion, highlighting his evil.
In addition to this, Baha’ al-Dm uses a further technique in his attempt to show how 
evil Renaud was. This is to use the reactions of the hero of the narrative, Salah al-Dln, to 
Renaud. Salah al-Dln is presented as someone who sees the evil in the crusader and reacts to 
it. At various points in the narrative, the Sultan vows to kill Renaud because of his acts537, 
refuses to give him the hospitality which would ensure Renaud’s life was safe53X, and will 
not even speak directly to the crusader.539 As the hero of the chronicle, the beliefs of Salah 
al-Dln are to be taken very seriously, and his actions with regard to Renaud demonstrate his 
beliefs. They show that Renaud was an evil man who was not to be trusted, and whose 
actions were those of a man with no sense of chivalry or decorum. They are best summed up 
by the final comment by Salah al-Dln, delivered to the king of Jerusalem after he had killed
Balia’ al-Din, p. 37. See also Hillenbrand, Crusades, p. 344. 
ij7 Baha’ al-Din, pp. 37 & 74.
538 — -T — -t —Balia’ al-Din, p. 75. Here, Balia’ al-DIn explains clearly that it was a deliberate decision on the part o f Salah 
al-Din not to give Renaud a drink, as this would mean he could not kill the crusader.
539 Baha’ al-DTn, p. 75 This may not seem surprising, but it must be remembered that Renaud himself could 
speak Arabic; see Peter o f Blois, p. 52. Balia al-Drn says that Salah al-DIn said to the king through the 
interpreter that Renaud was not protected, rather than just tell Renaud in Arabic directly. This may have been 
because Salah al-Din did not even want to be civil to such a treacherous man by telling him this.
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Renaud: ‘It has not been customary for princes to kill princes, but this man transgressed his 
limits, so he has suffered what he has suffered’ .540
Thirdly, Renaud seems to be an extremely determined man, which is an aspect more 
implied than clearly states, but it can certainly be seen. This can be clearly perceived during 
his attack on the caravan in 582/1187. Renaud wants to get the booty which the caravan has, 
no matter what -  so much so that when the members of the caravan reminded him of the 
truce he had signed, he just ignored it541; nothing gets in the way of his desire for booty. It 
can also be seen in Renaud’s behaviour in the tent, when he grabbed the cup of iced julep 
from the king without permission from his captor. It seems that here, again, he was not 
going to let the niceties of convention prevent him from getting what he wanted. Renaud’s 
determination is a part of what makes him so dangerous, and it would take a man even more 
determined to bring him under control -  Salah al-Dm clearly fitted this description.
The image of Renaud which appears in the writings of Baha’ al-Dln is one which is
based around certain concepts which the writer was attempting to underline about the hero
of his work, Salah al-Din. Salah al-Din is presented as the opposite of Renaud -  the anti-
Renaud -  and the deeds of Renaud are in direct contrast to those of Salah al-Din. Every
comment on the evil of Renaud by the author is indirect praise of the hero, who managed to
defeat this most evil of men, and the strength of Renaud is no match for the strength of the
hero, who was blessed by Allah with the courage, strength and fortitude to defeat such a
powerful enemy. Thus the qualities of Salah al-Din are brought out in the chronicle by how
he reacts to situations -  while Renaud is presented as evil, powerful and determined, he is
merely a shadow, a puppet in a play which the author has constructed in order to give the
limelight to his hero. There is no attempt to understand Renaud as an individual, or his
motives, but present him as an uncomplicated, one-dimensional character, which is much
440 Balia’ al-Dln, p. 75.
341 Balia’ al-Dln, p. 37.
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easier to work with. The image consequently reveals the aims and preoccupations of the 
writer rather than Renaud himself.
The Image o f Renaud o f Chatillon in ‘Imad al-Dln al-IsfahanVs ‘Kitab al-fath al-qussl f i ’l  
fath al-qudsT (The Book o f Eloquent Rhetoric in the Conquest o f Jerusalem):
‘Imad al-Dln’s presentation of Renaud in this chronicle is short, primarily because his 
purpose in writing was to compose a biography of Salah al-Dln, not to deconstruct those 
around the Sultan. Thus, as in other Arabic chronicles, Renaud is a character who appears 
solely at his own death, and even then as a mere ghost of a figure. However, despite this 
brief appearance, the manner of his death and the language used about Renaud implies that 
he has been a major figure in the events of the time.
The main point which ‘Imad al-Dln relates is, like the other chroniclers, that he 
regards Renaud as being an evil man. But the technique he employs to demonstrate his view 
is subtler than Ibn al-Athir’s more pointed criticisms. ‘Imad al-Dln uses Salah al-Dln as the 
mouthpiece for his own perspective that Renaud was evil. The Sultan is the hero of the 
narrative, therefore his opinions and judgements must be correct, and so his view of Renaud 
as evil is one which must also be true.
The first mention of Renaud in the chronicle highlights this. ‘Imad al-Dln reports that 
Salah al-Dln promised to kill Renaud when he could, and while the reasons for this are not 
explicitly given at this point, the image of the Sultan which has been built up over the 
course of the chronicle does suggest there must have been a good reason for it.542 A good 
ruler such as Salah al-Dln would not have sworn death on an individual enemy for no reason, 
and so Renaud must have deserved it. ‘Imad al-Dln then does give the inevitable reason for
542 ‘Imad al-Din, p. 27. If  Salah al-Din, the great leader, had promised to kill someone, it would naturally have 
been for a very good reason. The audience would have known that the most likely reason is because the person 
was evil. Thus a clue is given by the writer to what will happen soon after and why.
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this, as he reports that Salah al-Dm’s words were: ‘How many times have you promised and 
[then] violated your oaths, made commitments that you have infringed, concluded a treaty 
that you have broken, accepted an agreement that you have [then] rejected!’543 This, the 
reason that ‘Imad al-Din presents as the cause of Salah al-Dm’s ire, is one that not only is 
frowned upon in Islamic law544, but one that also seems to go against the vague sense of 
decorum which prevailed between the two sides in military matters at the time. Both of 
these points highlight what ‘Imad al-Din is trying to say about Salah al-DIn. By putting 
Renaud at odds with Islamic law, not only does ‘Imad al-DIn show Renaud as evil, he is also 
achieving the main aim of his narrative -  to present the sultan as a great leader, on this 
occasion by being the upholder of Islamic values. The lack of decorum from Renaud is also 
at odds with the civilised Salah al-Din, whose behaviour towards the king is exemplary.
This is itself part of a technique that continues through the length of Renaud’s 
appearance in the chronicle -  that he and Salah al-Din are subtly, though constantly, 
compared to each other, effectively underlining how different their characteristics are. This 
is one of the reasons for the presentation of Salah al-Dm as a humane, caring individual 
when he was attending to the king.545 The difference in his treatment of the king and of 
Renaud in the tent underlines how different they were in the eyes of both Salah al-Dln and 
by extension the chronicler himself. The king is a seen as a good leader, while Renaud is 
anything but. In the final appearance of Renaud in the chronicle, on the occasion of his
‘Imad al-DIn, p. 27.
’44 The frame of reference in which both Salah al-DIn and ‘Imad al-Dln were working was the Islamic idea of a 
treaty, found in Islamic law. This states that a peace treaty is ‘a valid instrument, the provisions o f which must 
be binding on all’; M. Khadduri, Wai' and Peace in the Law o f  Islam, Johns Hopkins, 1955, p. 203. Thus, the 
breaking of treaties can be seen to be a disgraceful act in Islamic thought, and this is clearly where Salah al- 
Dln’s and ‘Imad al-Dm’s thoughts were too. The only way a treaty could be terminated in Islamic law was by 
mutual consent, and here there is clearly no consent on the side of the Muslims; Khadduri, p. 221. Therefore, it 
is easy to see why Salah al-Din and ‘Imad al-DIn were so angry at Renaud. However, while Salah al-Din was 
clearly trying to take the moral high ground here, there are numerous examples of Muslims breaking treaties, 
from Muhammad right through to Salah al-Dm himself (caravan being armed) - clearly the moral high ground 
is easier to take when on the winning side.
^  While there can be little doubt that Salah al-Dm did treat the king well, ‘Imad al-Dm’s highlighting of this 
is to contrast Renaud with the king.
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death, the scene is very calculated by Salah al-DIn. He had left the crusaders in his tent and 
had ridden on his horse to organise the setting-up of the Muslim camp. Then, when he came 
back, he seems to have gone straight to Renaud and killed him without a word.546 The 
manner in which Salah al-DIn killed Renaud underlines the contempt felt for Renaud by 
Salah al-Dln, and the lack of criticism by the chronicler shows that he did not feel the need 
to criticise the Sultan for his action.'47
According to ‘Imad al-DIn, Renaud was a great though evil man who was killed by 
someone who was a great and good man, reflecting the triumph of good over evil, Islam over 
its enemies. After this, Salah al-DIn explains to the king, and ‘Imad al-DIn to his audience, 
why he killed Renaud -  that his sins had been his undoing and that he deserved what 
happened to him.548 Finally, there can be no doubt that ‘Imad al-DIn saw the death of 
Renaud as justice. The tone of the writing is full of satisfaction and glee as he writes: ‘the 
hand of vengeance extended onto him, grabbed him and pushed him; his head was taken, his 
breath cut, his bases were eradicated’.549 This constant repetition of how Renaud was killed 
serves to underline how pleased ‘Imad al-DIn was with Renaud’s death, and the spiritual 
tone of the account, while not mentioning Allah specifically, does hint at the victory of 
good over an evil man which is a strong theme in the writing overall.
546 ‘He returned to his tent, [and] he took Renaud [‘s life]: holding his sword, he came against him and struck 
him between the shoulder blade and the neck; when he was on the ground he cut off his head; when he took 
him outside [the tent] he dragged him by his feet in front of the king’. ‘Imad al-DIn, p. 28.
547 M. Khadduri, in War and Peace in the Law o f  Islam Johns Hopkins, 1955, shows that the execution of 
prisoners is a legal concept in classical law. He demonstrates that in the Shall’I legal code, o f which Salah al- 
DIn was an adherent, execution ‘should not be done unless dictated by certain reasons, such as the need of 
weakening the enemy, or required by high Muslim interests’, p. 127. Both of these could be applied to the 
historical circumstances in which Salah al-DIn executed Renaud; the death of Renaud would prove a massive 
blow in weakening the crusaders, while the oath Salah al-DIn took could be said to be a high Muslim interest 
which meant Renaud had to be killed. Furthermore, Khadduri quotes the jurist al-Awza‘I, who said that ‘before 
execution the prisoner should be given the opportunity of adopting Islam as an alternative to death’; ‘Imad al- 
DIn does not mention that he did, although it is possible that he did so -  certainly many of the other 
chroniclers wrote that this was the case.
748 ‘Imad al-DIn, p. 27.
549 ‘Imad al-DIn, p. 105.
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In addition to the evil of Renaud, one of the most interesting aspects to his image is 
how he measures up to his fellow crusaders; compared to them, he seems to be a stronger, 
and more important, character. The mass of crusader leaders who were captured were 
brought before the Sultan ‘stumbling in their shackles like drunkards’ -  hardly a dignified 
stance for the nobility of Jerusalem. Although Renaud would have been one of them, he 
seems to have been the only one who was not afraid. While the king trembled with fear in 
his tent, Renaud has a resigned air in the one active part he plays, responding to Salah al- 
Dln’s accusations of treachery with a stoical and resigned ‘such is the custom of kings; I 
have only been following previously taken roads’.550 He seems, therefore, to be the strongest 
of the crusaders, going to his death calmly and without drama. His strength is also shown 
during in a very telling statement of ‘Imad al-DIn -  that ‘the victory was inaugurated by his 
[Renaud’s] death’.551 While a victory was usually started with the defeat of the king, having 
Renaud’s death as the start of the victory reveals that Renaud was the main enemy, not the 
king. Although it was surely not part of his intention, these few lines hint at a different idea 
that the chronicler had, or at least wanted to portray, about Renaud -  that he was the 
strongest of the crusaders, and that he was the real danger to the Muslims because of it. 
This, however, highlights further the standing of Salah al-DIn; he defeated the most 
powerful of the crusaders.
Renaud’s role in ‘Imad al-DIn is as the villain, the anti-hero, a role which he has in all 
the other Arabic chronicles. The difference here, though, is that the spiritual side to the 
struggle is almost completely ignored, and instead it is replaced by a more worldly struggle, 
which is between the hero of the tale, Salah al-DIn, and the evil one, Renaud. That Salah al- 
DIn is victorious over Renaud helps the image which ‘Imad al-DIn wishes to create of him, 
of a true Islamic hero who is victorious over the forces of evil, no matter how strong and
powerful they may be -  and Renaud is the strongest of the crusaders. The difference 
between Renaud and the other crusaders is that Renaud is the most powerful threat, so had 
to be eliminated, while the others were all too weak to pose a threat so Salah al-Din could 
afford to be magnanimous. Once again, therefore, Renaud is a puppet in the hands of 
another, and his image created to fit in with the wider themes ‘Imad al-Din had in mind.
The Image o f  Renaud o f  Chdtillon in Ibn al- ‘A dlm ’s ‘Zubdat al-halab fi ta ’nkh Halab
Ibn al-‘AdIm’s chronicle, being a history of Aleppo, deals mostly with events 
concerning that town. However, events elsewhere are mentioned in passing when they are 
considered to be important enough, and Renaud’s appearance in the chronicle comes in that 
context. The narrative follows the Arabic tradition of annalistic writing, and as such little 
comment is given by the writer. Instead, his opinions need to be carefully inferred from 
what is written.
Ibn al-‘Adrm’s presentation of Renaud does not vaiy greatly from that in the other 
Islamic chronicles; it is, in fact, even more one-dimensional. The central theme in the 
narrative is that Renaud was evil. The report of his attack on the pilgrim caravan was that 
he ‘acted treacherously towards them (the pilgrims), and he seized them and their goods’, 
during a time of treaty.552 When he was challenged on this, he is reported to have said ‘Say 
to Muhammad to release you’.553 Reinforcing these points is the attitude of Salah al-Din to
552 Ibn al-‘Adrm, vol. Ill, p. 96.
553 ibid, p. 96. In this passage, the Arabic word for ‘release’ is ‘nasara’, which contrasts with the word ‘khalasa’ 
used in the earlier chronicle, Mufarrij al-Kuiiib by Ibn Wasil, which is the only difference between the two 
accounts. This may be because the second form o f ‘nasara’, i.e. ‘nassara’, carries the meaning ‘to Christianise’, 
and Ibn al-‘Adim may be suggesting that Renaud wanted to underline the falsehood of Islam, and an effective 
way of doing this would be to have the prophet o f Islam himself tell them that the religion was false. This 
would, of course, have been abhorrent to his Islamic audience. Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij al-kurub fi aklibar Bam 
Ayyub, ed. J. al-Shayyal, 5 Vols, Cairo, 1953 -  1977.
154
Renaud, which is one of contempt. Ibn al-‘Acfim recounts the scene of Renaud’s taking the 
drink from the King of Jerusalem in Salah al-Dln’s tent after they had lost of the Battle of 
Hattin, and in this he is at pains to underline the contempt in which Salah al-Dln holds 
Renaud.554 Salah al-Dln does not speak to Renaud, even though it is believed he could speak 
Arabic555, instead speaking through the interpreter to the king, and he makes it clear that 
Renaud will not receive any hospitality from his captor. Ibn al-‘Adim clearly states why this 
is -  that Salah al-Dln reminded them that if Renaud had taken anything from his captor, he 
would have received protection from him. By doing this, Salah al-Dln was underlining that 
Renaud could not expect anything from him, and the readership would know he was going 
to die. Furthermore, after Salah al-Dln killed Renaud he was thrown out of the tent, 
demonstrating the contempt in which the crusader was held, and possibly also being a visual 
image of Renaud being thrown into hell.556
The appearance of Renaud in the chronicle is brief, and this brevity is reflected 
somewhat in the opinion of Ibn al-‘AdIm. His main point is that Renaud was an evil man, 
worthy only of the contempt that Salah al-Dln gives to him. This contempt seems to be the 
cause of Renaud’s brief appearance; he is not worthy of much attention. Thus, the image of 
Renaud which Ibn al-‘Adim’s chronicle paints is the same as the other Arabic chronicles, 
but its methodology is different. While others, such as Ibn al-Athlr and ‘Imad al-Dln al- 
Isfaham pay him plenty of attention to highlight again and again how evil Renaud was, Ibn 
al-‘Acfim deliberately affords him little attention to underline his contemptibleness, worthy 
only of the short shrift afforded him by Salah al-Dln.
Ibn al-‘Adim, Vol. Ill, pp. 95 -  96.
355 Peter o f Blois, pp. 51 -  52.
536 Hillenbrand, Crusades, p. 345.
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Conclusion:
The image which pervades the Arabic accounts of Renaud of Chatillon is both narrow 
and one-dimensional. He is presented almost exclusively as a man who was both evil and 
powerful. The reason for this seems to be twofold. Firstly, Renaud is the man who was 
believed to have attempted to attack the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina, a 
dreadful deed in Islamic thought and one which should have led to his death. Secondly, the 
image created of Renaud by ‘Imad al-Din and Baha’ al-DIn was created by their purpose in 
writing, which was to eulogise Salah al-Dm, and show how great a leader he was. Thus, the 
man who opposed such as great leader and who caused him such great problems -  and 
Renaud certainly did that -  had to be presented as an evil man, as well as a mighty 
opponent, and be difficult to defeat. Yet defeat him Salah al-DIn did, a man who was by 
definition evil, as he fought against the champion of Islam. Ibn al-Athlr’s writings, and 
those of Ibn al-‘Acfim, were based to a large extent on these eulogies, and so the belief that 
Renaud was a strong, evil man was perpetuated. Thus, Renaud’s image is based on a 
carefully constructed propaganda campaign.
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Chapter 4 -  The Image of Renaud of Chatillon in the Christian Sources
The Image o f  Ren and o f  Chatillon in John Kinnamos’ ‘The Deeds o f  John and Manuel 
Comnenus’:
The main issue which Kinnamos wishes to express to his audience, and, indeed, his 
whole purpose in writing, is the greatness of the emperor, and the power he wielded and 
deserved to wield -  presumably because of his wish to ingratiate himself with the Emperor 
after losing favour at court.557 The way in which this is achieved is to stress the comparative 
weakness of those around him, both allies and enemies, and how their actions both cause 
and reinforce the power the emperor had. Renaud is no different from any others in this 
respect, whether he is seen as friend or enemy; everything revolves around this concept.
Renaud of Chatillon is not an important figure in John Kinnamos’ chronicle, which 
reflects the relative insignificance afforded the crusaders by the Byzantines.55x However, he 
is given plenty of attention in one part of John Kinnamos’ chronicle, where the writer gives 
an account of Renaud’s invasion of Cyprus and the subsequent mission by the emperor 
Manuel Comnenus into Renaud’s territory for retribution. The prince of Antioch is also 
referred to in several other places, yet only in passing.
John Kinnamos’ theme of the deserved power which the emperor had is reflected in 
Renaud’s relations with Manuel; there are several examples of the crusader submitting to 
the power of the emperor. The best example of this is in the description of the entrance of 
the emperor into Antioch in 1157/552. Kinnamos recounts that ‘Reginald and the nobles of 
Antioch (were) running on foot around the imperial horse’559, while Baldwin III of Jerusalem
557 Introduction to John Kinnamos, pp. 1 — 11.
558 See S. Runciman, ‘The Visit o f King Amalric I to Constantinople in 1171’, in Outremer: Studies in the 
history o f  the Crusading Kingdom o f  Jerusalem, ed. B.Z. Kedar, H.E. Mayer, & R.C. Smail, Jerusalem, 1982, 
pp. 153 -  158, which demonstrates the lack of interest even in the King of Jerusalem among the Byzantines.
559 John Kinnamos, p. 143.
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rode a considerable distance behind the emperor, leaving the whole watching city in no 
doubt as to where the real power lay. Renaud’s subordination is underlined by the fact that 
in early 1160/555 Manuel Comnenus gathered together a large army from all his vassals to 
form a force against the Seljuq Turks in central and eastern Anatolia, and John Kinnamos’ 
list of those leaders who were summoned to the emperor starts with Renaud.560 Even when 
Renaud was effectively estranged from Manuel after his attack on Cyprus, he still was aware 
of both the political and military situation; that he was subordinate to the emperor in the 
feudal structure and in military strength, which is why he put on a performance such as he 
did rather than run away or fight. Renaud is presented as very much aware of his position in 
the wider scheme of things.
As Renaud is clearly subordinate to his overlords -  the Emperor and the King of 
Jerusalem -  in the account, it could be expected that he would take steps to ingratiate 
himself with them. This, however, is not the case. Renaud seems to go out of his way to 
annoy his overlords, and John Kinnamos is not reticent about saying so. The most obvious 
example of this is the attack on Cyprus in 1156/551. The reason that John Kinnamos gives is 
that ‘the emperor did not accord him (Renaud) what he wanted’, i.e. money.561 As a result of 
this, Renaud invaded Cyprus ‘in piratical fashion’562, carried from the island ‘an abundance 
of wealth’ and also captured the governor.563 It is clear that Renaud’s actions are not those 
of a good vassal, and the inference which results is that Renaud was greedy, impatient, 
ungrateful and stupid. The lack of comment by John Kinnamos on this subject in no way 
diminishes the effect of this -  indeed, it almost heightens it as the reader can easily see the 
situation without the necessity of the writer pointing it out. Not only did Renaud not please
560 John Kinnamos, p. 151.
561 John Kinnamos, p. 136. William of Tyre does not dispute that Renaud wanted money, but gives an 
explanation to the tone which John Kinnamos gives, which is that Renaud was simply being greedy. WT, Vol. 
II, pp. 253 -  4.
~62 John Kinnamos, p. 136.
563 John Kinnamos, p. 137.
his lord in Constantinople, John Kinnamos also implies that his lord in Jerusalem was not 
happy with him either. He records how Baldwin III came to Antioch hoping to take 
possession of it, as Baldwin thought that the populace would welcome him ‘as they had 
been rescued by him self.564 The implication here is that Baldwin did not like Renaud 
enough and so wanted to take his territory away. The surest explanation for this would be 
that for some reason Baldwin himself considered Renaud to be a problematic vassal.
As well as this, Renaud is clearly identified as a bad leader for, and by, his own
subjects, peasant and notable alike. John Kinnamos recounts that Renaud’s capitulation to
Manuel Comnenus’ demands -  that the city was to provide a large military force for the
Byzantines, and that a Greek patriarch was to be installed in the city -  was not popular
among the general population of the town, as it meant that the town’s prestige was badly
damaged. However, Renaud’s attack on Cyprus had put him into a position where he could
not refuse the emperor’s demands; his own rash actions led to a situation which upset his
subjects and lost his city some of its prestige -  not the actions of a great ruler. Instead, it
was left to Baldwin III of Jerusalem to intercede on behalf of the populace, as Renaud had
put himself in an impossible situation.565 It was also the upper reaches of Antiochene
society, at least partly, whom John Kinnamos shows as being hostile to Renaud, and the
disputes the Prince had with these people are also seen to be Renaud’s own fault. This is
demonstrated during the dispute Renaud has with the Latin patriarch of Antioch, before the
arrival of Manuel Comnenus, although the scene starts even before the attack on Cyprus.
John Kinnamos writes that Renaud wanted money, so asked the rich patriarch, who refused.
This was the cause of Renaud stripping him, smearing him with honey and leaving him in
the full sun in the middle of the city. Although the bishop then offered to give Renaud
everything he had, it was clearly a ploy to get out of the situation in which he found himself,
364 John Kinnamos, p. 141.
565 John Kinnamos, pp. 139 -  142.
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as later the Patriarch wrote to the emperor offering to betray Renaud to him if he wanted. 
The emperor refused, though, as ‘he desired to win by war rather than by treachery’.566 It is 
a measure of the annoyance which Renaud had created in the bishop that he, a Latin priest, 
was prepared to hand over a co-religionist to the Greek orthodox emperor. It is clear from 
the chronicle that Renaud created a dangerous enemy when there was no need to have done, 
and someone who may have assisted him was made to forever despise the ruler. John 
Kinnamos is clear, therefore, that Renaud was not a good ruler, either to the general mass of 
the population or to individuals in high society. He seems to have paid no heed to the 
consequences of his actions, nor to how it would reflect on him as a leader. He was, 
therefore, a bad leader as well as problematic as a vassal.
The account of John Kinnamos makes it clear, therefore, that Renaud was unloved by 
the Antiochenes, and regarded as truculent by his lords. Yet despite the amount of 
opponents ranged against him, he was not removed from his position of power. This means, 
therefore, that Renaud is seen as a political survivor, and his methods of survival are laid 
bare in the chronicle. The clearest of these is the scene of Renaud’s grovelling apology to 
Manuel Comnenus, one which is described in full embarrassing detail. The author recounts 
that Renaud:
‘removed the covering from his head, bared his arms up to his elbows, and going 
unshod through the city with a multitude of monks, he appeared before the emperor. A rope 
bound his throat, a sword was borne in his other hand. A splendid dais was raised there; 
Renaud stood far off from the imperial tent, as if not daring to approach, while a crowd of 
monks who were not monks, unshod, with bared heads, approached the emperor; all bending 
the knee wept tears from their eyes and held out their hands. At first the emperor refused,
366 John Kinnamos, p. 139.
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but later, being beseeched, he ordered the prince to advance. Moved by his coming in the 
said fashion, he (Manuel) forgave him his drunken offence’/ 67
The sense which comes through is that Renaud felt desperate. He would not have 
humiliated himself to so great an extent if  he had not felt thus, and his performance was that 
of a man with his last chance. He seems to have used every trick he could think of in 
creating this image, yet even this only just succeeded, as it took some time to persuade the 
emperor to even see him. Having achieved this, though, it did not take long for Renaud to 
gain absolution. Thus, despite being seen as a bad vassal and leader, Renaud still survived 
for seven years as Prince, including this grave threat to his leadership, meaning that, perhaps 
accidentally, Renaud has the image in John Kinnamos’ history as a political survivor, who 
did whatever he had to in order to stay in power.
There are, however, several problems with the story John Kinnamos tells. Firstly, he 
ignores the fact that Renaud wanted money from the emperor which he was owed before he 
attacked Cyprus, and the emperor’s recalcitrance in giving this to him is precisely the reason 
why Renaud attacked. As every other source which mentions this event states that the 
emperor should have paid Renaud money as part of a deal between them to suppress a 
rebellion by the Armenian Thoros, John Kinnamos’ omission must have been because it did 
not fit with his chosen presentation of the emperor. Secondly, the idea that Baldwin III 
wanted to take Renaud’s seat is very unlikely as Antioch was part of the dowry of Renaud 
from his marriage to Constance -  a marriage which Baldwin himself had blessed. Legally it 
would have been very difficult to do so and in reality almost impossible had he wanted to.
The image of Renaud in John Kinnamos is one which was created to glorify the 
emperor for the author’s personal reasons, which is achieved by the undermining of the
367 John Kinnamos, p. 139.
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crusader. This fits exactly with the purpose which the Greek author had for writing the 
history itself, which was to eulogise the emperors and by extension criticise their enemies 
among the Latins.568 Renaud is portrayed as a man who was not a good ruler, to the extent 
that even the ordinary citizens of Antioch could see that. The contrast of the clearly bad 
Renaud with the clearly good Manuel Comnenus implies that the Byzantine emperor would 
be a much better ruler of Antioch than the crusader. The historical precedent for this is that 
during the First Crusade, there had been an agreement that any land which the Byzantines 
had previously held, and that was captured by the crusaders, was to be given back to the 
Greeks.569 Antioch was part of this, but for certain reasons the Byzantines did not receive it; 
John Kinnamos implies that the city would have been much better if  it was under Greek 
control, as the Byzantine emperor was such a good leader. Therefore, as with many other 
chronicles, the writer presents an image of Renaud which was caused by the authors own 
preconceptions about the circumstances of which he wrote.
The Image o f  Renaud o f  Chdtillon in Niketas Choniates ’ ‘O City o f  Byzantium
There is little reference to Renaud in the chronicle of Niketas Choniates. Rather 
strangely, he does not mention the raid on Cyprus by Renaud, or any of his other behaviour 
which caused such consternation among the Greeks. Instead, there is but one mention of the 
Prince of Antioch himself, on the occasion of the visit of Emperor Manuel Comnenus to 
Antioch in 1159/554, when a tournament was arranged. The chronicler states how ‘Prince 
Reginald came forth mounted on a horse whiter than snow, wearing a cloak slit down the 
middle and reaching to his feet and a cap like a sloping tiara, embroidered in gold. Fie was 
escorted by knights, all of whom were mighty warriors tall in stature’.570 Renaud is seen as
' <,s See above, p. 52.
~('l) J. Richard, The Crusades: 1071 -1291, Cambridge, 1999, p. 47.
570 Niketas Choniates, p. 62.
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someone who is rich and powerful, with expensive tastes. The reason for this is based 
around Choniates’ purpose in writing, part of which was to highlight the inferiority of the 
Latins compared to the Greeks and their emperor, which in turn would be used to criticise 
them for their conquest of Constantinople in 1204/600.571 The reason that Renaud is 
presented in such a fine way is to highlight the power and majesty of the Byzantine emperor 
-  though the crusader was so rich and powerful, even he had to bow before the awesome 
sight of Manuel Comnenus. In addition to this, what is omitted from the text is almost more 
interesting than that which is included; particularly, that there is no mention of the attack 
on Cyprus, one of the most important events of the time, and no mention of Renaud’s 
pleading for forgiveness. This is also part of Choniates’ effort to show the strength of the 
emperor. Had he written of this, it could have undermined the emperor’s power and standing 
in the chronicle, as he did not have the power to stop an attack on his own territory. By 
simply not mentioning it, Choniates sidestepped this difficult issue while still allowing the 
emperor to be presented as someone who was close to infallible in all he did. Thus, in 
Choniates’ chronicle, Renaud is simply used as a character through whom the author 
presents his main arguments: that the Latins were not worthy of Constantinople, and that 
the Comnenoi emperors were great rulers.
The Image o f  Renaud o f  Chdtillon in The Continuation o f  the Chronicle o f  M atthew o f
Edessa, by Gregory the Priest:
The appearance of Renaud in the work of Gregory the Priest is brief, because almost
immediately after he is introduced into the narrative, he is captured by Majd al-Dm. Despite
the short period in which he is mentioned in the narrative, the presentation of Renaud in the
text highlights some aspects of his personality from the chronicler’s perspective.
571 See above, pp. 5 2 - 3 .  It is also likely he wished to praise the emperor in order to safeguard his own 
position at court -  see Harris, Byzantium, p. 113.
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Firstly, he is undoubtedly a powerful ruler. Fie appears in the same breath as the king 
of Jerusalem, seeming to be the equal of the king.772 He is also shown as a close ally of the 
Greek emperor , and is presented as the chief power in northern Syria, at least on the 
Christian side.
As the chronicle continues there are a number of anecdotes presented which underline 
how the chronicler regarded Renaud, which together help to highlight the image of the lord 
of Antioch in the writing. Thus, in the years 1157-8/552-3, the king of Jerusalem and 
Renaud were faced with a very difficult situation militarily, caused by Nur al-Din’s 
belligerence, and they did not know what to do. So God caused an illness to fall on Nur al- 
Dln so he could threaten them no longer.574 What this episode shows is that Gregory 
believed that God was clearly on the side of Renaud, as He intervened to help His servant. 
The illness given to Nur al-Dm was a manifestation of divine displeasure, and the passage 
overall is really about the evilness of the Muslim leader, so anyone who opposed him, 
especially on the Christian side, as Renaud did, was on the side of God. Renaud is, therefore, 
being shown as the counterweight to someone else -  the basis of his representation is as the 
antithesis of someone the author wished to discredit.
Another occasion on which Renaud appears in the chronicle is in the years 1155-6/550- 
l 575, when he and the king of Jerusalem were bribed by Nur al-Dln in order that they would 
‘accede to his evil designs’, meaning that they made a peace treaty with him.576 Thus the 
atabeg was able to go to the Christian city of ‘Ayntab and capture it. ‘Ayntab was part of 
the remnants of the county of Edessa and it seems that the criticism of the treaty, and of 
those who made it, was made because the agreement allowed Nur al-DJn to attack Gregory’s
572 Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 271.
573 Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 272 -  ‘the lord of Antioch, whom Manuel had 
appointed as his vicar’.
774 Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 270.
775 Although the date is after that of the event in the preceding paragraph, this is the order in the chronicle.
776 Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p.271.
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co-religionists in this mostly Armenian city. However, the mood of this changes somewhat 
later when it becomes apparent that this was not in the minds of the Latin leaders when they 
made this treaty, as when they realised the consequences of the agreement they broke ‘the 
treaty of peace they had concluded with him and were invading and ravaging his 
territories’. '77 The initial tone of this passage is that it was the fault of the King and Renaud 
that ‘Ayntab was attacked, because they had signed a peace treaty which allowed the atabeg 
to capture Edessan cities, even though they did not realise what Nur al-Dln was planning. 
This is quite critical, because if they had understood the full ramifications of the treaty, they 
would have realised that the treaty did not cover the remnants of the county of Edessa, and 
so Nur al-DIn was free to attack that territory. However, when they saw what was 
happening they immediately broke the peace treaty to prevent the same fate happening to 
other territories, which rehabilitates them somewhat in the account -  they risk the wrath of 
Nur al-DIn to protect other Christian cities.
Following on from this, Gregory gives an account of the infamous attack on Cyprus in 
1156/551, saying that the leaders Renaud and Toros, the Armenian prince, treated the 
inhabitants very badly, especially as they were supposed to be Christians.57X In the scene 
made famous by William of Tyre, both men are forced to apologise to the emperor, though 
unlike in the Latin chronicle, much more space is given to Toros than to Renaud in the 
Armenian account. There does not seem to be any great discord between the Latins and the 
Greeks, just the comment that ‘the king of Jerusalem came, together with the soldiers of 
Christ -  the Templars -  and the lord of Antioch...to apologise for the expedition against 
Cyprus’.'’79 It seems to be a collective apology on behalf of the Latins, who are quickly
~’ 77 Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 271.
' 7ii Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 272: The two rulers ‘treated them (the 
inhabitants) as the infidels would, devastating their towns and villages, depriving them of their homes and 
possessions, and maltreating many of the Greek clergymen, whose noses and ears were cut o ff.
579 Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 273.
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forgiven. For Toros, however, much more is needed to persuade the emperor to forgive him, 
including ‘a large group of Christians (who) gathered before the Greek emperor, entreating 
him with strong pleas to mollify his anger towards Toros’.580 In simple terms, in the English 
translation four lines are devoted to the account of Renaud’s apology, while that of Toros 
takes twenty-six. The reason for the discrepancy between this account and that of William 
of Tyre is that as an Armenian, the fate of Toros was much more important to Gregory than 
that of Renaud, which was important to William of Tyre. Both men also wanted to prove a 
point. While, as will be seen later, the archbishop was not pleased with the behaviour of 
Renaud, Gregory’s comment is that ‘the Greeks harboured a deep hatred against the 
Armenians’581, a comment which seems to be borne out by the behaviour of the Byzantine 
emperor, who easily forgave the Latin Renaud, yet had to be begged and pleaded with and 
bribed to forgive the Armenian Toros. There was, therefore, a political reason behind how 
Renaud is described -  his treatment is used as the rod by which that of the Armenian could 
be measured, and it was found to be deeply unfair.
Following on from this incident, there is an account of the alliance of Christian forces, 
Latin, Greek, and Armenian - including Renaud - against Nur al-Dln in 1158-9/553-4. Their
582forces were ‘invincible’, and these men ‘conceived of an excellent plan’ -  to engage the 
forces of the Muslims in battle and defeat them by overwhelming the enemy through their 
greater numbers. As Renaud was one of them, this seems faint praise in his direction. 
However, the expedition failed to get started, and the blame for this failure is put squarely 
at the feet o f the Greeks, and especially their emperor.583 So here, again, the image of 
Renaud is thrown into relief by comparison with another. Gregory’s clear dislike of the 
Greeks in general leads him to show them as being the cause of the failure, while it was
580 Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 273.
781 Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 273.
382 Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 273.
583 Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, pp. 274-5.
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good Christian soldiers like Renaud who had to deal with the consequences; Renaud is good, 
but only because he was being compared to the Byzantine emperor.
The final occasion on which Renaud appears in the chronicle is that of his capture. At 
this juncture, it is reported that he had with him a fairly large force, one thousand men, and 
during this raid they managed to capture many of the enemy. The force which the Muslim 
commander Majd al-DIn had with him was ten thousand men ‘who had gathered together 
previously’, which makes it seem as if the fact that they were there was purely down to luck 
-  or, in the more spiritual tone at least, God’s will -  and therefore Renaud’s capture was as 
well. The report of the ambush is different from that of William of Tyre, who states that 
Renaud could have escaped but chose to fight because of his own greed.584 Gregory’s 
implication is that there was no chance of escape because they were ambushed, and that 
fighting was the only option. After Renaud was captured Majd al-DIn took him to Aleppo 
where the Muslim heaped ‘all sorts of insults and profanities upon him’.585 This seems as 
though Renaud was the passive recipient of these, while Gregory shows both the barbarism 
of the Muslim and Renaud’s civility can be inferred through these actions. Blame, or even 
explanation, is not given here, just a statement of what happened from the author, which 
seems like passive acceptance of the situation. This may have been caused either because 
Gregory did not care as Renaud was not an Armenian or his master; or, as an Armenian, he 
was used to things going wrong, so had come to the point where he was not surprised any 
more. It may have been obvious to Gregory that it was God’s will for Renaud to be 
captured, but he does not speculate why, unlike William of Tyre or Peter of Blois.586
There are also in this source a number of accounts of Renaud doing potentially bad 
things, yet he is never criticised for it, especially the raid on Cyprus which is criticised
584 WT Vol. II, p. 284.
585 Continuation of Gregoiy the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 279.
586 WT Vol. II, p. 284 -  ‘In punishment for his sins, the prince (Renaud) was forced to expiate in person all the 
crimes which he had committed’.
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harshly by others. It is possible that his position as Prince of Antioch made it too difficult 
for Gregory to attack him for political reasons, but it is more likely that these incidents 
passed without comment from the Armenian because they were carried out against the 
Greeks, who Gregory regarded as being the enemies of the Armenians. Renaud’s attack on 
Cyprus was carried out against the Greeks, enemies of the Armenians who were constantly 
trying to dominate them, while the attacks on Nur al-Din’s territory, even that in which he 
was captured, were good deeds as they were part of a strategy to defend the Armenians 
against the Muslims. Thus, these incidents do not receive the same criticism which William 
of Tyre or John Kinnamos assign to them.
The image of Renaud in the writing of Gregory the Priest is, broadly speaking, a 
positive one. However, this is tempered somewhat by the fact that these passages in which 
he is given faint praise are ones in which he is being compared to another, usually someone 
who has done harm to Gregory’s fellow-Armenians. Nur al-Din’s evilness and the result of 
that is compared to the divine help Renaud receives, the terrible behaviour of the Greek 
emperor is compared to that of the other Christian leaders, including Renaud, and is found 
wanting, while the light treatment Renaud receives at the hands of the Byzantine emperor is 
contrasted with the much firmer line -  with a hint of persecution -  taken with the Armenian 
Thoros. Thus Renaud’s main role in the chronicle is as a highlighter, enabling the author to 
make a judgement about somebody or something else by bringing it into sharp relief through 
Renaud.
Gregory’s writings thus are not very different from those of any other chronicler, in 
the sense that his account reflects what was important to him. The image of Renaud is 
broadly a positive one, because the Latin was, generally, doing what Gregory wanted; 
defending the Armenians, or, at least, not causing them trouble. This was a two-pronged 
invective, against both the Muslims and the Greeks. Furthermore, Renaud is used almost as
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a literary device, whose experiences throw into relief issues and problems which Gregory 
wants to highlight. Renaud is good because he helped Gregory both through his deeds and 
through being a pawn in the narrative.
The Image o f  Renaud o f  Chcitillon in The Chronicle o f  Michael the Syrian:
The main aspect of Renaud’s character which is established by Michael the Syrian is 
that he is very powerful, both as a ruler and as an individual, and has proved himself to be a 
strong military leader throughout his life. His attack on Cyprus is the first occasion on 
which he showed this on a large scale, as he managed to overrun the whole island, pillaging 
it all, and capturing much wealth before leaving for his territory with much booty. That this 
was carried out on an island in the possession of the Byzantines, a very powerful empire 
itself, which had a very powerful ruler at the time, shows Renaud’s own strength.2X7 As well 
as this, he had previously defeated the Armenian general Thoros, with whom he had gone to 
war in order to secure fortified places for the Templars588, who had been the previous 
incumbents of these places before the Greeks had captured them. The victory of Renaud is 
painted as an easy one because of his strength, and Thoros had to surrender and had to give 
Renaud everything he wanted.589
While these events occurred relatively early in his career, he is still seen as being very 
powerful militarily later in his career. Almost immediately after his release from Aleppo, he 
took charge of a Frankish raiding party which destroyed a party of Salah al-Din’s troops in 
the vicinity of Aleppo, after which the Franks invaded and pillaged the land around 
Damascus.'790 Having done this, he then sent troops into Egypt, which forced Salah al-Din to 
retire from Aleppo. This attack was successful, and the Sultan did as the Franks wished and
'*7 Michael the Syrian, p. 315.
588 The ‘Phrer’.
589 Michael the Syrian, p. 314.
590 Michael the Syrian, p. 366.
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retired.591 Thus, Renaud came out of prison and almost immediately defeated part of the 
army of the most powerful Muslim leader, and also forced the same leader into abandoning 
his political ambitions due to the threat Renaud posed to him. It could be inferred, therefore, 
that Michael the Syrian is showing Renaud as the most powerful military ruler in Syria at 
the time, as not even the great Salah al-Dln could stop him.
To underline this fact even further, it seems that even in defeat the chronicler wanted 
to show Renaud as almost undefeatable. When writing of the capture of Renaud by the 
Turks in 1160/555, the chronicler states that Renaud went into Muslim territory with just 
one hundred and twenty cavalrymen and five hundred infantrymen. These forces were then 
overwhelmed by the hugely superior numbers of the Turks, who captured him by an ambush, 
but not before Renaud had ‘accomplished great feats’ in the face of these overwhelming 
odds.592
However, it was not just in a military context that Renaud was powerful, but 
politically as well, and this is highlighted on two main occasions. Firstly, when the 
Byzantine emperor came to northern Syria in 1157/552, it was he, along with the king of 
Jerusalem, who made an accord with him. Here, Renaud is described as ‘king of Antioch’, 
thus lifting his prestige even further. Secondly, he and the king of Jerusalem also managed 
to reconcile the emperor with the Armenian Thoros, with whom he had been in a virtual 
state of war. Thus Renaud is seen as a powerful political figure as well as a powerful 
military one.
This is further implied elsewhere, the clearest example of which occurs when he is 
ransomed from Aleppo. The chronicle reports that Renaud was ransomed for one hundred
591 Michael the Syrian, p. 366. The editor has pointed out that this may be referring to the raid into the Red 
Sea which occurred in 1183/578, although the year in which this attack is said to have occurred by the 
chronicler is 1487 in the Syriac calendar, which corresponds to the year 1176/571. Thus, while it may be a 
chronological mistake by the author, it may also be that there was another raid by Renaud into Egypt, in the 
year 1 176/571. However, as the image is important here, it does not matter which of these options is correct.
392 T1 accomplit de grandes prouesses’. Michael the Syrian, p. 319.
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and twenty thousand dinars -  a princely sum -  while others who were ransomed with him 
were made free for much less -  the Count of Tripoli was ransomed for eighty thousand, and 
Joscelin, titular count of Edessa, was ransomed for just fifty thousand. The amount given to 
secure their respective freedoms shows clearly who was regarded as the most important, by
593both sides.' Furthermore, the chronicler also suggests that some people had been trying to 
secure Renaud’s release for a number of years, as he reports that ‘many / times they had sent 
gold from Constantinople for the latter (Renaud), but he had given for ransom others who 
were delivered and freed’.594 Thus, Renaud is again seen a being one of the most powerful 
and important figures in Syrian politics at the time, and one who was not only tolerated but 
also needed by the inhabitants of the area and other rulers at the time.
As well as this, there are several other traits which present themselves in Michael the 
Syrian’s account of Renaud. Firstly, he was an aggressive individual. This is shown most 
clearly on his first appearance in the chronicle, which occurs at the siege of Ascalon in 
1153/548. While Renaud is not here given his full name, being referred to simply as a man 
‘nommé Renaud’595, it is certainly Renaud of Châtillon as this man was given Antioch after 
the siege, as Renaud of Châtillon was. He is introduced by being referred to as ‘a warlike 
man’596, and his actions bear out this assessment -  it was he who persuaded the king to 
continue the assault on the town when it seems like all was lost for the crusaders, and he 
was proved to be right in doing so, as the crusaders did not abandon the siege, but instead 
pressed on to eventual victory.597 This event underlines a second quality in Renaud which
393 Michael the Syrian, p. 365.
594 ‘plusieurs fois on avait envoyé de l ’or de Constantinople pour ce dernier (Renaud), mais il l ’avait donné 
pour la rançon d’autres qu’il avait déliverés et libérés’. Michael the Syrian, pp. 365 -  366. If  this is accurate, it 
would fill an existing gap which some have claimed exists because nobody wanted Renaud to be freed because 
he was a liability for the crusaders; see S. Runciman, A History o f  the Crusades, Vol. II (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 
357 -  8. It also makes sense that the gold was coming from Constantinople, as the emperor was Renaud’s 
liege-lord, so honour-bound to protect him and try to ransom him if  he could.
395 Michael the Syrian, p. 309.
596 ‘un homme belliqueux’, ibid. p. 309.
597 Michael the Syrian, p. 309.
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Michael the Syrian shows that he had -  his tactical ability. He was, it seems, the only 
crusader who could see a way out of the supposedly lost situation in the siege of Ascalon, 
and his tactical nous led to a famous victory for the crusaders. His actions here evidently 
impressed the king of Jerusalem so much that he gave Renaud the Principality of Antioch as 
his reward598 -  a sure sign that the king trusted that Renaud could do the job well as a 
military ruler, which would use his tactical ability. Finally, Renaud is shown as fighting for 
all Christendom, not just himself or the crusader states. This is most clearly seen in the 
account of Renaud’s attempts to wrest control of the forts of northern Syria from the 
Armenian Thoros and give them to the Templars. When describing this episode, the 
chronicler writes that the Franks wanted the forts to go to the Templars ‘who worked for all 
the Christians’.599 The motive for this campaign against Thoros was not, therefore, a selfish 
action, as it could be regarded, but rather an attempt by a good Christian to help all of 
Christendom by helping those who worked for the good of all Christians -  the Templars. 
Therefore, as well as his great power, Renaud was also someone who had the tactical ability 
to use it to good effect, the appropriate measure of belligerence to use it well, and the 
correct motives in the way he used it -  he does seem to be a great ruler.
There are, however, a number of problems with the content of the chronicle which 
need to be examined. The most important of these is the account of an event which causes 
great consternation in other chronicles, but for which this chronicle is strangely silent -  
Renaud’s attack on Cyprus. Michael does not shy away from giving an account of what 
happened, stating that Renaud attacked the Byzantine island and pillaged the whole of it, 
carrying off religious leaders to ransom them, as well as much movable booty.600 Yet there
59S Michael the Syrian, p. 310. Michael states that Antioch was given to Renaud, presumably as a reward, and 
that he married the heiress as a consequence of this; not that he became the Prince because he married the 
heiress as most other chronicles state.
599 ‘qui travaillaient pour tous Ies Chretiens’. Michael the Syrian, p. 314.
611(1 Michael the Syrian, p. 315.
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is no opinion given on this event, shocking though it was; it is a sanitised version of the 
events, failing to record the accounts of rape and killing which are in other chronicles601, and 
it fails to mention the initial reason for the attack. The reason for this is one of two options; 
either the chronicler did not want to criticise a leader he praises in the rest of his chronicle, 
or it is not part of his style. It is certainly true that it is part of his style -  the annalistic form 
of the chronicle and any sort of opinion, good or bad, testify to that -  but the lack of details 
and of a reason for the raid imply something further; that he did not want to criticise 
Renaud and so deliberately missed these two points out. The possibility exists that the 
chronicler simply did not know, but there were enough other chronicles and witnesses to the 
events to make that highly unlikely. It seems that Michael the Syrian did not want anything 
to get in the way of the image he was producing of Renaud. Another important occasion 
when there is a problem with the account is when the Byzantine emperor comes to North 
Syria.602 Other chronicles all agree that it was in response to Renaud’s raid on Cyprus, and 
that the emperor came to put Renaud in his place. In Michael the Syrian, however, there is 
no mention of this, only that the emperor came, and that he had been angry with Thoros -  
though not why. There is mention of an accord made between Renaud and the emperor, 
though there is no suggestion it was because of anything Renaud had done, especially so as 
the king of Jerusalem was part of the same accord, and he was not part of the attack on 
Cyprus. It seems that, having ignored the reasons for the attack on Cyprus, Michael had to 
ignore those for the emperor’s visit to Syria. Again, the reasons behind it are shrouded as it 
does not fit with the image of Renaud he wanted to present.
The image of Renaud which is created in Michael the Syrian’s chronicle is one which 
is full of praise for Renaud. This is for two main reasons. Firstly, as one of Michael’s main 
preoccupations was the safety of Christendom, anyone who furthered that cause would have
601 See, for example, WT. Vol. II, p. 254.
602 Michael the Syrian, p. 316.
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been praised. Renaud certainly did do that, as he helped capture Ascalon, and was able to 
defeat Salah al-Din on several occasions, triumphs which helped secure the position of the 
Christians in Syria. Furthermore, it may have been Michael’s position which helped form 
the image. As he had been the patriarch of Antioch, and as Renaud had been the Prince of 
that city, it is likely that Michael would have had good knowledge of Renaud’s activities 
around the city and approved of them, thus giving rise to the image in Michael’s writings.
The Image o f  Renaud o f  Chdtillon in the writing o f  William o f  Tyre:
William of Tyre was one of the most brilliant, perceptive, and thorough historians of 
the Middle Ages, described as ‘one of the greatest medieval historians’603, and as such his 
chronicle was used by many other writers as the basis or starting point of their own history. 
Not only did he describe the events themselves, but he also expounded historiographical 
themes which ran through the narrative604 - unusual at the time -  and which are elucidated 
by his intelligent analysis of the situations he described.
It has been demonstrated by scholars that there are two main themes which William 
underlines in the narrative. One is his explanation of how the crusader states fell from the 
height of their power in the 1140s/late 530s to the precarious state into which they had 
descended by the time he was writing, in the late 1170s -  80s/570s -  80s.606 William 
continued by warning of the dangers which would face the Latin East if  they did not solve 
the problems they were facing, problems caused by succession struggles, factionalism, and a 
lack of support from Western Europe. While William wrote, these problems were
603 S. Runciman, A History o f  the Crusades, vol. II, Cambridge, 1952, p. A ll.
604 D.W.T.C. Vessey, ‘William of Tyre and the Art of Historiography’, in Medieval Studies 35, 1973, p. 453; 
Edbury & Rowe, pp. 61 -  166.
605 D.W.T.C. Vessey, ‘William of Tyre and the Art o f Historiography’, pp. 435 & 453-5; Edbury & Rowe, pp. 
151 -  166.
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approaching their zenith, as Salah al-DIn was threatening the crusader states both from 
Syria and Egypt, and this united Muslim front was something which the crusaders had not 
previously faced -  the scale of this threat had never materialised before. Shortly after 
William’s death, it would overpower them.
The second theme running through the chronicle is the effect which the sins of the 
crusaders, and those Christians in Europe, had on the political, religious, and military 
situation in the Latin East.606 This effect was one of the main causes of the position into 
which the Latin East had been pulled; the sins of the Christians were punished by a loss of 
power for the crusader states. Throughout the chronicle, William of Tyre underlines the sins 
of various members of the Latin East -  there are few crusaders who are not criticised at 
some point in the narrative -  and how these sins affected the status of the crusader states.607
Despite this clear understanding of William’s purpose in writing, modem historians 
have tended to overlook these themes when examining William of Tyre’s view of Renaud, 
and concentrate instead on a different theory -  that William was consumed by a hatred of 
him which clouds his judgement and causes him to be very caustic towards the crusader.608 
This supposed revulsion is believed to have been caused by the two being on opposite sides 
of a factional dispute in the kingdom of Jerusalem, which began after the death of Baldwin 
IV, and intensified after the death of Baldwin V two years later and the opportunistic 
seizing of the throne by Guy of Lusignan and his wife Sibylla.609 This factionalism was 
caused by a disagreement firstly over who would be regent for Baldwin V, then who would 
be king when that infant king died. William supported the claim of Maria Comnena, while 
Renaud supported Agnes of Courtenay, and it was, in the end, Renaud’s faction which won
606 Edbury and Rowe, pp. 155 -  166.
'’"7 D.W.T.C. Vessey, ‘William of Tyre and the Art of Historiography’, p. 453; Edbury & Rowe, pp. 155 -  6.
608 See, for example, the entry by A.V. Murray, on William of Tyre in Encyclopaedia o f  the Crusades, ed. A.V. 
Murray, 4 Vols., Oxford, 2006, Vol. IV, pp. 1281 -  1282.
609 J. Phillips, Defenders o f  the H oly Land, Oxford, 1996, pp. 225 — 266, for the background and results of this.
175
through when Agnes’ daughter Sibylla and her husband Guy of Lusignan were crowned 
rulers, although this did occur after William’s death.
This view is, however, not tenable, from a logical perspective at the very least. The 
idea that a historian of such stature as William of Tyre, with his great historical mind and 
perspective, would be prepared to let his usual high standards slip to satisfy a personal 
grudge is unlikely. Instead, as this chapter will attempt to demonstrate, William of Tyre’s 
account of Renaud is instead based on a sound judgement of his actions as far as they relate 
to and affect the main issues he was trying to demonstrate to his readership -  the weakness 
of the crusader states and the effect sins had on them.
The Image of Renaud as Prince of Antioch:
Reading William’s account of the years 1153-1160/548-555, it is understandable how 
historians could have perceived in the chronicle a clear hatred of Renaud on the part of the 
author. There are plenty of occasions on which there is explicit criticism of Renaud. William 
writes about Renaud’s abuse of the Patriarch of Antioch, commenting that Renaud made the 
archbishop ‘sit in the blazing sun throughout a summer’s day, his bare head smeared with 
honey’.610 William is very clear about how he views this behaviour, calling it ‘diabolic 
daring’, ‘an abominable act’, and ‘mad conduct’611, especially, as he pointed out, because 
the deed was carried out against a man who was not only ‘a helpless invalid’, but also ‘a 
successor of Peter, the chief of the apostles’.612 These last comments, which are asides in the 
text, are there simply to remind the reader of the spiritual position of the Patriarch, and 
therefore underline just how shocking Renaud’s behaviour was.
61,1 WT Vol. II, p. 235.
611 WT Vol. II, p. 235. The Latin phrase used here by William of Tyre for ‘diabolic daring’ was ausu diabólico. 
William of Tyre, Clironicon ed. R.B.C. Huygens, in Corpus Christianorum, Coninuatio Medievalis 63A, 
Tumhout, Brepols, p. 809.
612 WT Vol. II, p. 235.
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Renaud’s invasion of Cyprus in 1156/551 elicits much the same response from 
William, who writes that it was:
‘a shameful deed. He sent forth his legions as against an enemy and laid violent hands 
on Cyprus, the neighbouring island which had always been useful and friendly to our realm 
and which had a large population of Christians’.613
The political stupidity of the act is clear from this passage, as William emphasises the 
diplomatic problems it caused for the crusader states614, and the account of how Renaud 
behaved once there shows how sinful he believed the attack was.615 It is clear from the 
account that the problem which arose from Renaud’s invasion of Cyprus was primarily a 
spiritual one, and throughout the chronicle the emphasis on sins and spirituality is 
underlined so much that a link between it and the problems the crusaders were to have is 
obvious. On this occasion, the final comment William makes is a quote from Ovid: ‘Booty 
wickedly acquired brings no good results’616, from which the readership infers that in the 
future they will see serious consequences because of Renaud’s attack on Cyprus.617
The final point at which historians have traditionally seen that William found fault 
with Renaud is for his attack on Muslim territory in 1160/555, which led to his capture and 
imprisonment in Aleppo for the next sixteen years. William is sure to let the reader know 
that the people whom Renaud attacked were fellow-Christians, as he repeats the point to 
underline it, and that they were poor, since they ‘tilled the soil and devoted themselves to
WT Vol. II, p. 253.
6,4 WT Vol. II, p. 276.
615 William writes that Renaud: ‘completely overran the island without meeting any opposition, destroyed 
cities, and wrecked fortresses. He broke into monasteries of men and women alike and shamefully abused nuns 
and tender maidens. Although the precious vestments and the amount of gold carried off were great, yet the 
loss of these was regarded as nothing in comparison with the violence done to chastity’. WT, Vol. II, p. 254.
616 WT. Vol. II, p. 254.
617 There are consequences of this action, and these are seen later during the arrival o f the Byzantine Emperor 
Manuel I Comnenus, when Renaud begs for forgiveness from the Emperor. To secure this, Renaud made an 
elaborate show o f penitence, so much so that ‘all were disgusted and the glory of the Latins was turned to 
shame’. The political significance of this is great, as it meant that the crusader states, and Antioch especially, 
had come under the sway of the Greeks, which, to the Latin archbishop William, would have been a tragedy. 
WT Vol. II, p. 277.
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agriculture’.61* The cries of indignation from William are clear, and the actions of Renaud 
becomes even more foolish after he captured the booty; when the Muslim troops start to 
attack Renaud,
‘the wisest plan was to abandon the booty and hasten home unencumbered, which 
could easily have been done; but instead they preferred to keep the plunder and, if necessary, 
put up a vigorous fight’.619
William leaves the reader in no doubt as to the sensible course of action, but Renaud 
did not take it. Instead, he had to deal with the consequence of his action by spending the 
next sixteen years as a prisoner in the citadel of Aleppo. William’s final comment is that
‘in punishment for his sins, the prince was forced to expiate in person all the crimes 
which he had committed. A captive, bound with the chains of the foe, he was led to Aleppo 
in most ignominious fashion, there to become, with his fellow captives, the sport of the 
infidels’.620
The chronicler’s glee is clear for all to see -  Renaud had, at last, received what he 
deserved.
It is easy to see why historians believe that William of Tyre’s work heavily criticises 
Renaud, as these episodes do cast grave doubts on his motivations and beliefs, and therefore 
his suitability to have any position of power. What is not certain, however, is the 
assumption that William was specifically blaming Renaud as the architect of these actions -  
which is the inference of modem historians. This is because in all of the examples which 
have been mentioned, it is written that Renaud was persuaded into carrying them out by 
people who have his ear. These came to pass either by persuasion to act as he did by direct
6IS WT Vol. II, p. 284.
619 WT Vol. II, p. 284.
62,1 WT Vol. II, p. 284.
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suggestion, or by the reporting of others’ actions to him which caused Renaud’s own rash 
acts. Thus, when Renaud tortured the Latin Patriarch, the main cause for it was that ‘the 
patriarch... often expressed himself very freely, both in public and in private, about Renaud 
and his doings, and...these remarks were reported to the prince by persons who sought to 
increase the hatred between the tw o’.621 The attack on Cyprus was done ‘on the advice of 
evil men, by whom he was too greatly influenced’622, while an embarrassing show of 
repentance to the Byzantine emperor was performed after ‘the prince began to ponder, now 
in his own mind, and again in consultation with intimate friends whom he summoned, as to 
his course of action and how he might satisfactorily atone to his imperial magnificence for 
so great an injury’.623 Finally, the raid into Muslim territory was carried out after he had 
been ‘informed by his scouts., .that there was a land full of flocks and herds... easily exposed 
to pillage’.624 On all these occasions, it was not Renaud but his advisors or ‘friends’ who are 
the people who were to blame for Renaud’s actions, as it is from their suggestions that 
Renaud took his cue. Although the actions were Renaud’s own and so he must share some of 
the blame, he seems more a man led astray by the machinations of others rather than an 
impulsive monster, as he has previously been regarded as being.625
It is to be admitted that there are some occasions when William’s narrative does 
criticise Renaud explicitly. The most noteworthy of these comes at the time he was part of 
the force which besieged Shayzar in 1157/552. It was Renaud himself who, William claims,
621 WT Vol. II, p. 235.
622 WT Vol. II, p. 253.
623 WT Vol. II, p. 276.
624 WT Vol. II, p. 283.
625 This theme of ‘friends’ or advisors causing problems in the crusader states is not confined to William’s 
image of Renaud. Instead, there are other people whom they influence as well, such as Baldwin III. After he 
had made a treaty with some Turkomans in the territory of Banyas, ‘certain wicked men, sons of Belial, who 
had no fear of God before their eyes, approached the king and easily persuaded him to fall in with their evil
schemes’ -  that they break the treaty without warning and attack the nomads. The king Tent a ready ear to the
wicked counsellors and acquiesced in their suggestion’; WT II, p. 255. It is interesting that, although both 
Renaud and Baldwin seem to be guilty of doing the same thing, historians have traditionally cast Renaud as 
the villain of the piece, while Baldwin is not seen in the same light.
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was the reason why the Latin leaders became divided and so did not capture the site even 
though it had been on the verge of falling.626 The problem arose after all the nobles came to 
an agreement that the count-in-waiting, Thierry of Flanders, should do homage to the King 
of Jerusalem. Renaud, however, declared that homage should be done to him, as Shayzar 
was part of his inheritance. This caused deadlock, and the siege had to be abandoned. 
Technically, Renaud was correct in his assessment627, but the tone of the passage is that it 
was Renaud’s fault. While there is no open criticism of him, and instead William claims that 
the dispute happened ‘in punishment for our sins’628, and that after the deal that Thierry 
should do homage solely to the king, ‘Prince Renaud alone raised difficulties’.629 While 
there is some mild ire towards Renaud in this passage, it is nothing when compared to how 
it could have been had William wished to appear openly hostile to the Prince of Antioch. 
Instead, William shows that it was the sins of the whole community which caused this 
problem -  not even stating that it was those of Renaud -  thereby underlining his main 
theme, that the sins of the Christians were causing havoc in the crusader states.
Even on the rare occasions when Renaud is explicitly criticised by William, the 
circumstances surrounding this criticism seem to be more aimed at others than Renaud 
himself. This is most obvious during the account of the marriage of Renaud to Constance of 
Antioch. By marrying the dowager princess, Renaud immediately became one of the most 
powerful individuals in the crusader kingdoms. It was the choice of the princess herself to 
marry Renaud, and to do so she had had to turn down ‘many distinguished nobles’ and as a 
result, ‘many there were...who marvelled that a woman so eminent, so distinguished and 
powerful...should stoop to marry an ordinary knight’.630 William’s opinion about Renaud
626 WT Vol. II, p. 268.
621 J. Phillips, Defenders o f  the H oly Land, Oxford, 1996, p. 280.
628 WT Vol. II, p. 268.
629 WT Vol. II, p. 268.
630 WT Vol. II. p. 224.
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could not be more obvious. He was plucked from the massed ranks of the knightly classes by 
a woman’s fancy, and was not worthy of the office to which he had been called. It was, 
however, the result of the choice of the Princess, not Renaud himself, and Renaud was 
surely only being criticised because William could not openly criticise Constance.631
The belief that William tried to criticise Renaud is further undermined by the lack of 
consistency throughout the chronicle. Just before this marriage is mentioned, William 
recounts the episode of the successful siege of Ascalon by the forces of the Kingdom of 
Jerusalem in 1153/548. In it, he gives a list of the lay princes present at the victory, and 
alongside luminaries such as Hugh of Ibelin, Philip of Nablus and Gerard of Sidon, all of 
whom were very powerful figures, he notes the presence of Renaud of Chatillon. The name 
of this knight in a list of such influential figures in the Kingdom passes without comment, 
so it must be assumed that, contrary to William’s later protestation, Renaud was indeed a 
powerful figure632, and that his comments otherwise are a veiled criticism of Constance.
The belief of some historians633 that William possessed a personal hatred of Renaud, 
clear in this part of the chronicle, is erroneous. It is correct that his actions are criticised, but 
this is tempered by the fact that the criticisms are carried out in the wider historiographical 
trends in William’s chronicle -  alluded to above -  and because the chronicler also underlines 
that Renaud was given bad advice by others. Consequently, the implication is that the much 
greater sins of these people contributed more to the plight of the crusader states than 
Renaud’s actions in following their advice. Thus Renaud, far from being the cause of these 
problems, seems like a victim of the forces around him which he is incapable of controlling.
631 Constance was the niece of Queen Melisende of Jerusalem, a woman who seems to have been extremely 
important to William of Tyre, for she was still held in high regard by the nobility at the time he was writing, 
some thirty years later, and she was also the main dynastic link between the heroic nobles of the First Crusade 
and the people of William’s time (See Edbury & Rowe, pp. 80 -  3). He certainly is keen in the chronicle to 
praise her for her actions. It would have been difficult for him to criticise Constance’s actions openly, while 
still being true to his ideas.
632 J. Philips, Defenders o f  the Holy Land, Oxford, 1996, p. 126.
6j3 See A.V. Murray on William o f Tyre in Encyclopaedia o f the Crusades, ed. A.V. Murray, 4 Vols., Oxford, 
2006, Vol. IV, pp. 1281 -  1282.
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The Image of Renaud as Lord of Oultrejourdain:
The part of William’s chronicle which deals with Renaud’s life after he was released 
from the citadel of Aleppo and became lord of Oultrejonrdain underlines even further that 
Renaud is not picked out for particular criticism by William. Renaud appears five times 
during this part of the chronicle, and there is little suggestion of any criticism, and far less 
any direct assault on Renaud.634 The first of these is during the time when Renaud is made 
regent of the kingdom. In a statement which is the complete opposite of that which may be 
expected, William writes that ‘Renaud, formerly the prince of Antioch, (was made) regent 
of the realm and commander in chief of the army.. .Renaud was a man of proved loyalty and 
remarkable steadfastness’.635 This is a truly remarkable statement that the archbishop makes 
if his attitude to Renaud was hostile, as most historians believe. William reports that 
Renaud worked ‘with great ardour’ to secure the betrothal of his stepson Humphrey III to 
Isabelle, the half-sister of Baldwin IV, thus ensuring a favourable marriage for him, and the 
tone of the passage makes him seem a generous, well-meaning individual, and the fact that 
the King was agreeable to the proposal underlines that Renaud was certainly not regarded 
badly by the establishment in Jerusalem.636 Renaud also appears as one of a group of 
notables who went to Antioch with the patriarch of Jerusalem to attempt to find a remedy 
to the problems which had broken out in the city because of what William regarded as the 
evil of Prince Bohemond, who had taken a mistress. William regarded this as being an
634 This is more important when it is noted that there are only seven references in total to Renaud, and the 
other two comments simply state that Renaud was ransomed by his friend. WT Vol. II, p. 414, and that he was 
one of a number oflords who engaged in battle with Salah al-DIn, in 1177/572-3. WT Vol. II, p. 430.
635 WT Vol. II, p. 418.
636 WT Vol. II, pp. 4 5 1 -2 .
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extremely important mission, and, although he is not mentioned again, the 
acknowledgement that Renaud was part of it does imply that he was a trustworthy, highly- 
respected individual.637 As well as this remark, in William’s account of the deeds of Renaud 
the blame for the breaking of a truce in 1181/576 firmly placed on Salah al-Din, and in a 
scene which is almost exactly the reverse of those found in Arabic chronicles, it is Salah al- 
Dln who captures and imprisons Christian pilgrims.63K If William was as determined to 
denigrate Renaud in his chronicle as it has been believed, then it would have been a good 
opportunity to do so. Renaud is also mentioned as part of a crusader force which assembled 
to attack Salah al-Dm, and in this he is named simply as a baron of the realm. During the 
account of the battle, William wrote that ‘contention arose among the nobles’; yet he does 
not blame Renaud -  instead it is Guy of Lusignan, the count of Jaffa, who was explicitly 
blamed. If William had been trying to criticise Renaud he could have done so here, as 
Renaud was one of Guy’s allies. Yet he does not, instead choosing to only criticise Guy.639 
The final episode in the chronicle in which Renaud appears is during an attack by Salah al- 
Din’s forces on Kerak, in the year 1 183/5 78.640 In this episode, the defensive measures 
which Renaud undertook are condemned by the chronicler -  they are described as ‘rash’, and 
that they led to the loss of all the possessions of all the surrounding villagers, who came into
637 WT Vol. II, pp. 454 -  7. William implies that the taking of a mistress by the Prince o f Antioch had led to 
the atrophy of all clerical operations with the exception of baptism, and makes it clear that this risked the 
crusader states themselves, as God would abandon them and so they would be defeated by their enemies.
638 \ y j  y 0p n , p 467-8: ‘a certain ship with fifteen hundred pilgrims on board, driven by adverse winds, was 
wrecked at Damietta in the kingdom of Egypt. However, the shipwrecked people felt confident that they 
would be saved, for it was known that Saladin had made a truce and temporary peace with the Christians, both 
on land and sea.But the law of fate that befell them was far different from that required by the law of treaties. 
For Saladin, overcome by his desire for spoils, was reluctant to allow so many Christians to depart freely from 
his land, as he was bound to do by the terms of the agreement. He accordingly threw them all into prison and 
ordered their goods to be confiscated for his own use. He then sent a messenger to the king and, in direct 
defiance of the terms of the treaty, made demands upon him with which it was practially impossible to 
comply. He added as an ultimatum that, unless all these demands were met in accordance with his wishes, he 
would retain the aforesaid ship as compensation for himself and would, moreover, abrogate the pact which had 
been concluded between them’
639 WT, Vol. II, p. 497.
640 WT Vol. II, pp. 499 -  500.
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the castle, thus becoming ‘a burden rather than a help to the besieged’.641 However, 
William’s thoughts on the matter as expressed here are, again, very interesting, as they still 
do not corroborate what the viewpoint of earlier historians has been. There is no denying 
that Renaud is criticised by William for how he handled the situation, but if the archbishop 
had been trying to demonise him, then this would have been a good opportunity for him to 
do so. The fact that he criticises Renaud’s action without condemning the crusader himself 
-  in other words, he criticises the actions, not the man -  demonstrates that he was not 
deliberately trying to denigrate Renaud; his actions, yes, but not the man himself.
The image of Renaud during his time as lord of Oultrejourdain is certainly not one of 
hostility. There is mild criticism of some of his deeds, but the majority of his comments 
show Renaud in a neutral or positive way. He is regarded as a powerful individual who is 
trustworthy, and who had the needs of the crusader states foremost in his mind -  even 
though the methods he used may not have been appreciated by William.
Conclusion:
William of Tyre did not intend to show Renaud of Chatillon as an evil man who was 
out to ruin the crusader states so he could settle a personal score with the crusader. 
Although William underlines that Renaud’s actions before his imprisonment were sins, he 
also demonstrates that they were caused not by Renaud himself, but by the intention of 
others, and it is this fact which reflects the reason William was writing. William was 
commenting on the broader issues at play in the kingdom, in which Renaud was merely one 
player. The focus of William’s chronicle is what Renaud’s actions reveal about the 
conditions and relationships in the crusader states more widely. The way they are presented, 
however, does change between the two parts of the chronicle. During the period of Renaud
641 WT Vol. II, p. 500.
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as Prince of Antioch, his actions were clear examples of the sins which were destroying the 
crusader states. His assault on the patriarch revealed divisions in the Christian community 
which should not have existed, and his attack on Cyprus occurred because he did not receive 
payment from the Byzantine Emperor as quickly as he had wanted. As it was an attack on 
an island ‘which had always been useful and friendly to our realm and which had a large 
population of Christians’642, it was doubly damaging to the crusaders’ cause, affecting their 
relations not only with the powerful Byzantine Emperor, but also with the native Christians 
they had supposedly come to help. It also showed that some of the crusaders, of which 
Renaud was a prime example, were motivated more by money than the Christian principles 
they were expected to follow and honour. Furthermore, the detail William goes into about 
the violence carried out by Renaud’s troops, especially against the monasteries and nuns, 
gives added strength to his charges to the damage the attack caused spiritually.643 This 
continues throughout the narrative, with every foolish action of Renaud being shown as a 
divisive force which threatened the unity of the crusading enterprise, but blamed not on 
Renaud himself, but the machinations of others.
During his lordship of Oultrejourdain, Renaud’s actions are presented in a different 
way. Instead of being one of the main reasons for the divisions in the crusader states, 
Renaud is instead a man who was working hard to heal divisions which had occurred. Thus, 
he is chosen as the representative of the nobility of Jerusalem during the visit of the bishop 
of Jerusalem to Antioch, which was undertaken as an attempt to reconcile the Prince of that 
city to the clergy, who had taken exception to his extra-marital activities.644 He worked hard
(,4i WT Vol. II, p. 253.
643 ‘He...completely overran the island without meeting any opposition, destroyed cities, and wrecked 
fortresses. He broke into monasteries of men and women alike and shamefully abused nuns and tender 
maidens. Although... the amount of gold and silver which he carried off were great, yet the loss of these was 
nothing in comparison with the violence done to chastity.’ WT Vol. II, p. 254.
644 WT Vol. II, p. 456.
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to ensure a good marriage for his step-son645, and, in the most striking comment, he is 
described as steadfast and loyal in his service of the kingdom of Jerusalem when he was 
made regent.646
Renaud, therefore, holds two places in the narrative of William of Tyre. During his 
time as Prince of Antioch, Renaud was one of a number of powerful individuals whose 
behaviour is a cause of concern for the chronicler. It is he -  encouraged by others -  who 
caused problems for the crusader states and their mission, and his imprisonment was a 
blessing for all involved. However, on his release, Renaud became that which William 
wanted to see -  a man whose first priority was to protect and help the crusader states. 
Although Renaud’s methods were not always agreeable to William, he still saw the good 
works Renaud performed. Far from being openly critical of Renaud, William recognised that 
Renaud’s life had been redeemed -  he had been saved from his selfish life to become a force 
for good in the crusader states -  everything William wanted to see happening.
The Image o f  Renaud o f  Chatillon in the Lyons ‘Eracles ’ text:
Although the title of this chronicle suggests it is a continuation of William of Tyre’s 
general history, the main purpose of it is to be a narrative of the Third Crusade, as it focuses 
both on the events leading up to and the passage of that event. Thus, unlike William of 
Tyre’s chronicle, it has a definite central focus, and is more like the many First Crusade 
narratives than the history it purports to continue. The image of Renaud in both chronicles 
reflects this difference. William of Tyre criticises Renaud’s personality for the period when 
he was the Prince of Antioch, in terms that highlight the sway which others held over him 
and his inability to resist temptation, which caused the problems William is so keen to 
highlight. This Eracles text, however, blames him more in terms of his actions -  Renaud is a
645 WT Vol. II, p. 452.
646 WT Vol. II, p. 418.
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man whose actions are reprehensible, but he has chosen to carry them out, rather than being 
coerced into doing so by his associates. There is, of course, some crossover between the two, 
but generally speaking this is an accurate assessment.
The figure of Renaud appears only in three scenes in the chronicle, but they are three 
critical occasions in the narrative and in the history of the crusader states, and the decisions 
taken at these times prove to be crucial in their fate. The first of these is during the 
disagreement over who would be crowned ruler of Jerusalem after the death of Baldwin V, 
which was caused by, and which furthered, the factional strife which swept through the 
crusader states in the 1180s/580s.647 The argument here was centred around who would 
succeed Baldwin V, and the choice was between those who supported the rule of the regent, 
Raymond III of Tripoli, and those who supported the rights of Baldwin V’s mother, Sibylla, 
and her husband, Guy of Lusignan. This strife was to continue after a conclusion had been 
reached, and the author makes it clear that this was strife which could have been avoided if 
the population generally, and especially those powerful men who supported Sibylla and Guy 
-  of whom Renaud was an important individual -  had kept their promises. The chronicler 
states: ‘They had all forgotten the oath that they had sworn to the count of Tripoli (to 
support him), and because of this it went ill for them later’.648 It is obvious that this last 
point refers to the defeat at Hattin, and it may be implying that the internal political 
situation caused by this division led to the crusader defeat, or it may be that there is a more 
spiritual cause for it -  that this was a sin and that they were punished for it -  or it could be 
both.649 Whichever is the case, Renaud was heavily involved in causing this. It was he, along
647 For analysis of this factional strife and its causes, see J. Phillips, The Crusades, London, 2002 p. 126; J. 
Richard, The Crusades, 1071 -  1291, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 199 -  205; P.W. Edbury, ‘Propaganda and Faction 
in the Kingdom of Jerusalem: The Background to Hattin’, in Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth-Century Syria, 
ed. M. Shatzmiller, Leiden, 1993, pp. 171 - 187; Fl.E. Mayer, The Crusades, tr. J. B. Gillingham, Oxford, 1972, 
pp. 128 -  130.
64x Continuation, p. 25
649 Later in the chronicle, during the account of the Battle of Hattin, the chronicle states that it was the 
divisions between the Poitevins -  the newcomers -  and the ‘Poleins’ -  second or third generation settlers -
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with the patriarch and the Master of the Temple, who are reported to have deliberately 
ignored the oath he had taken to the Count of Tripoli6'̂ 0, an action which was 
‘treacherous’.651 It was Renaud himself who took Sibylla to be crowned and was 
instrumental in persuading the crowd to accept her.652 The results of his treachery can be 
seen after the coronation, when he is presented as having become very powerful at the 
court.653 It can be observed that the author is interested in presenting Renaud not only as a 
man who has treacherously broken his oath and thereby caused strife within the kingdom; 
the last point implies why he did so. The position of power he gained from his actions 
demonstrates that the chronicler believes Renaud acted as he did because he put his own 
ambition before the good of the crusader states, the crusading ideal, and Christendom.
The second occasion in which Renaud appears is perhaps the most significant. It is the 
account of Renaud’s attack on a caravan early in 1187/583. The account in the chronicle is 
very brief, stating simply that Renaud heard that a caravan would ‘pass by the land of 
Kerak’, and so went and captured everything in it, including Salah al-Dln’s sister.654 As a 
consequence, Salah al-DIn became angiy and insisted to Guy of Lusignan, the king of 
Jerusalem, that he wanted everything returned. The king, however, was unable to make 
Renaud do this. The result was that Salah al-Dln soon afterwards launched a great attack on 
the crusader states, which would lead to the battle at Hattin which would be the beginning 
of the end for the crusades, and which would lead to the loss of Jerusalem. The author 
clearly makes this link, stating ‘the pretext for the loss of the kingdom of Jerusalem was the
which caused the defeat. These lines of divisions were, generally speaking, the same as those who supported 
Guy and Sybilla or the Count of Tripoli. This implies that it was political, rather than spiritual, motivations 
which the author saw as the cause, although it could also be the case that it would be clear to everyone reading 
that this was a sin. See Continuation, pp 45 -  6.
650 Continuation, p. 25
651 Continuation, p. 24
652 Continuation, p. 25
653 Continuation, p. 28. Renaud appears as a figure who is second only to the royal couple in importance, being 
the man Guy uses as the man to whom he entrusts his important tasks.
654 Continuation, p. 29. It is not clear if  the caravan was going to go through Renaud’s territory or not, as ‘by’ 
could imply ‘through’ or ‘near’.
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seizure of this caravan that we have just described’.655 Although the chronicler admits it was 
only a pretext, and not the real reason for the Muslim response -  which can be assumed to 
be Salah al-Dln’s desire to bring Jerusalem back into the Islamic world -  the implication is 
that if Renaud had not attacked the caravan, or had done as the king, his liege-lord, had 
ordered, Salah al-Dln would not have attacked and captured Jerusalem at that time. It is, 
therefore, entirely at the feet of Renaud that blame for the loss of Jerusalem falls in this 
chronicle. The chronicler’s belief that it is Renaud’s fault which is expressed here is 
repeated several times during the course of the chronicle, both to emphasise his guilt in this 
matter and to ensure the reader knew whose fault it was.656
Renaud’s final appearance in the account is during the scenes of the Battle of Hattln, 
and in the events immediately preceding it. He features heavily in the scene before the 
battle, when the nobles of the kingdom argue over what to do about Salah al-Dln’s army, 
which was camped near Tiberias, being instrumental in persuading the king to confront 
them, rather than allow the Muslims to leave. Renaud’s accusations to the count of Tripoli, 
in whose territory Tiberias lay, that he was duplicitous with the Muslims, forced the count 
to agree to move towards the Muslims, albeit reluctantly, while Renaud urged the king not 
to ‘appear a fool in the eyes of the Saracens’.657 As the medieval European readership would 
know the outcome of the impending battle, the author seems to be apportioning blame to 
those who counselled fighting, especially Renaud, as he is the most vocal. Once the 
crusaders’ army had got to Hattln, the king was still not sure whether or not to fight, but 
once again it was Renaud who encouraged him to do so.658 So not only did Renaud advise
655 Continuation, p. 29.
656 Continuation, p. 31: Salah al-DJn told his son ‘to enter the Christians’ territory and challenge them because 
of the caravan that Prince Reynald had seized’; Continuation, p. 33: ‘It (a crusader defeat near Nazareth) had 
come about because of the caravan that Prince Reynald had taken in the land of Kerak, and it was the 
beginning of the loss of the kingdom’.
657 Continuation, p. 37.
658 Continuation, p. 46. ‘When the king saw the torments that were afflicting his army, he called the master of 
the Temple and Prince Reynald and asked their advice. They counselled him to join battle with the Saracens’.
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the king to move towards the Muslims, rather than avoiding a direct confrontation with the 
Muslims, he also persuaded the king to join battle with them, a battle which will lead to an 
ignominious defeat and the loss of Jerusalem -  once again it is clear who the chronicler 
blames for this.
Having seemingly caused the battle single-handedly, Renaud appears for the last time 
in the chronicle in a famous scene in Salah al-Din’s tent after the crusaders have been 
defeated. The account here is at odds with that in the Arab chronicles, and these differences 
are extremely telling. There are two main parts of the narrative in which the account in this 
chronicle is the diametric opposite of that which is reported in the Arab sources. The first of 
these is in the report of Renaud’s argument with Salah al-Dln over the cup of iced water. It 
has already been noted that the Arabic sources all report that Renaud took the cup without 
permission, and that Salah al-Dln did not want him to drink. The Eracles text, however, 
reports something quite different. It says that the king offered Renaud the cup but
‘Prince Renaud would not drink. When Saladin saw that he (the king) had handed the 
cup to Prince Renaud he was angered and said to him “Drink, for you will never drink 
again”. The prince answered that if it pleased God he would never drink or eat anything of 
his’.659
The implication from the chronicle from this is that Renaud is stubborn and proud, 
refusing to take the proffered drink from his enemy even though he would have been in need 
of it.
Renaud’s ultimate appearance in the account hits new heights of pride and obstinacy. 
Having refused the water, he is then asked by Salah al-Dln what the crusader would do if the 
tables were turned, and it was he who was Renaud’s prisoner. Renaud answers ‘So help me
659 Continuation, p. 48.
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God, I would cut off your head’.660 Enraged, because of the arrogance of this reply, Salah al- 
Dln tells Renaud he is arrogant, and then kills him.
Renaud’s attitude at his death could be regarded in one of a number of ways -  either he 
was being very stupid, or he was resigned to his fate, or he was trying to be killed, thus 
gaining martyrdom for himself. Whether the chronicler was trying to criticise Renaud or not 
is not clear, but it is certain that he is not trying to praise his actions and hold him up as a 
shining example of a martyr, in such terms as Peter of Blois described Renaud in the Passio 
Raginaldi,661 There are no words of praise, no reasons given for Renaud’s behaviour, and so 
the account of Renaud’s self-martyrdom in this chronicle must be seen as a way the 
previously destructive Renaud could have thought he could make amends for the damage he 
had done to Christendom. The response of the chronicler does make it seem that he regards 
Renaud as having carried out an act which is meaningless after the damage he had caused, 
although the fact that he did lose his life for the cause does engender some admiration, 
though only enough to produce no response from the writer. If the author had wanted to 
criticise Renaud, he would not have had any qualms about doing so.
The reason for this presentation was surely the relationship between the family of 
Ibelin, for whom the author of the original chronicle for this section, Emoul, was a squire, 
and Renaud. It has been established that the family of Ibelin was on the other side of the 
factionalism in Jerusalem from Renaud662, and their hope for power in the kingdom of 
Jerusalem had been dashed by the coronation of Guy and Sibylla as king and queen.663
660 Continuation, p. 48.
661 Peter of Blois, Passio Raginaldi, ed. R.B.C.Huygens, in Corpus Christianorum Continuatio M ed ieva list o\. 
194, Turnhout, Brepols, 2002, pp. 31 -  73.
662 M.R. Morgan, The Chmnicle o f  Emoul and the Continuations o f  William o f  Tyre, Oxford, 1973, p. 43. Also 
Continuation, p. 5.
663 The opposite side of the argument over this coronation is put forward by Roger of Howden, in both the 
Gesta Regis Henrici Secund,’ ed. W. Stubbs, Rolls Series, 4 Vols, London, 1868 -  71, Vol. II, pp. 315 -  6, and 
Chronica, ed. W. Stubbs, Rolls Series, 2 Vols, London, 1867, Vol. I, pp. 358 -  9, who both suggest that the 
nobility had agreed to let Sybilla be queen, and to let her choose her husband, expecting her to choose 
Raymond of Ti'ipoli, having previously divorced Guy of Lusignan. She, however, ignored their wishes and
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Renaud’s elevation had been at their expense, as it is certain that the Ibelins would have 
gained a position, had their candidate, the count of Tripoli, been crowned king as they 
believed he should have been. Thus, it is more than simply two opinions from differing sides 
of a fierce dispute. Instead, it is much more of a personal rivalry, and the bitterness that goes 
with it is reflected in the chronicle -  Renaud has not only treacherously wrested power from 
the liege-lords of Emoul, but his foolhardy decisions and actions lost the whole kingdom of 
Jerusalem.
The Image ofRenaud o f  Chdtillon in Peter ofB lois ’ ‘Passio Raginaldi’:
The Passio Raginaldi of Peter of Blois is one of the most extraordinary pieces of 
literature to result from the crusading experience. No other crusader, with the possible 
exception of St. Louis in the thirteenth century, had such a powerful tract dedicated to him. 
The contrast between the presentation of Renaud in this piece and his presentation 
elsewhere serves to heighten the effect further. What follows is a summary of the main ways 
in which Renaud is presentated by Peter ofBlois.
The Passio Raginaldi had but one purpose - to encourage the notables of Europe out of 
their apathy about the plight of the crusader states caused by the defeat at Hattm and the 
loss of Jerusalem. To achieve this, Peter used Renaud as the shining example of the perfect 
Christian warrior; how one should behave, how one should be, how one should meet one’s 
death; and what one’s reward would be. This view of Renaud is summed up by Peter's 
comments that the crusader was ‘cogitans, vigiliis, ieiuniis, disciplines, orationibus et
instead declared that she would take as her husband Guy, against which the nobility could do nothing. Renaud 
has no role whatever in the marriage, although this could have been because Roger was one of Richard I’s 
subjects, and so was on the side of the Guy faction in the kingdom, and he did not want to present anything 
that could damage their reputation. See J. Gillingham, ‘Love, Marriage and Politics in the Twelfth Century’, in 
Richard Coeur de Lion: Kingship, Chivalry and War in the Twelfth Century,; London, 1994, p. 245.
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elemosinis iugiter insistebat, et sicut differentios ceteris obtinebat milicie christiane 
titulos’.664 What more could a Christian soldier be than this - upright, disciplined, fighting 
for what is right? It was an example that all Christian soldiers should attempt to emulate. It 
was a challenge to those who would follow - who would, hopefully, recover Jerusalem - be 
like Renaud and you will be successful. The image Peter creates of Renaud is based around 
his desire to present the crusader as a model Christian, one who should be an inspiration to 
others.
Within this overall image of Renaud, there are a number of themes which combine to 
create the image. The most important of these is that Renaud’s life was one full of love for 
Christ - Peter writes that ‘pro Christi amore honesta possessionum paucitate contentus ea 
dumtaxat sibi retenuit’.665
However, love for Christ is shown by actions, not just by words666, and Peter 
highlights a number of ways in which Renaud's actions show a love of Christ. Right up until 
the end of his life, Renaud is shown as a caring Christian, as he tried to persuade his 
executioner that only belief in Christ can save him. Renaud knew that Salah al-Din is 
destined for the fires of Hell, and tried to help him avoid this.667 Not only was he obeying 
the commands of Christ to go to the ends of the earth to tell people about Him668, Renaud 
also showed a genuine concern for the welfare of his enemies, another Christ-like quality.669 
Furthermore, Renaud is also shown to be willing others on at death, telling them not to be
“ 4 Peter o f Blois, p. 45.
665 Peter of Blois, p. 45. Riley-Smith has shown that Peter o f Blois had already argued that crusading itself was 
one of the ultimate acts of love. J. Riley-Smith, 'Crusading as an Act of Love’, in H istory 65, 1980, pp. 177 -  
192.
666 Peter may have had in mind Chapter 2 of the Book of James, which links faith to deeds, clearly stating that 
a faith without deeds to back it up is dead.
667 Peter shows Renaud as saying: ‘Christus...neminem decepit, sed ille deceptus est, qui in eum non credit: 
ipsum adoro, ipsum confiteor, ipsius tibi nomen annuntio. Si in eum crederes, evadere posses supplicia 
dampnationis eterne, que tibi parata esse non dubites’ (‘Christ...deceives no-one, but he who does not believe 
in him is deceived: I adore him, I confess him, I proclaim his name to you. If you believe in him you can avoid 
the eternal punishment of hell, which is no doubt prepared for you’). Peter of Blois, p. 52
66s The Book of Matthew, Chapter 28.
669 Matthew Chp. 5, vv. 43-8.
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afraid but to embrace death.670 His actions in doing this demonstrate how Renaud's thoughts 
for his fellow-prisoners were not based on earthly needs, but instead were looking after their 
spiritual needs, as by carrying on unto death would guarantee all the rewards Peter 
describes.
The result of this love for Christ is that Renaud received something very precious - 
help from Christ himself. Peter uses Hebrews 2 v. 18 to highlight this671, demonstrating how 
Christ can help those who need help. He seems to be implying a two-way link between 
Renaud and Christ; Renaud loved Christ so wants to do His will, while Christ has the ability 
to help Renaud and does so because Renaud loved him. The relationship between Renaud 
and Christ in Peter's mind is neatly summed up by the comparison he makes of Renaud with 
the biblical Jonathan; he is Jonathan to Christ’s David. This is a remarkable comparison, as 
the friendship between David and Jonathan has been regarded as one of the greatest in the 
Bible, and the example of how a true friendship should be; comparing Renaud's relationship 
to Christ with that of Jonathan to David is astonishing. It has also been pointed out that the 
Biblical Jonathan renounced material possessions, only keeping arms and that which is 
necessary for survival672, thus presenting the way in which he had lived as a purely spiritual 
one.
However, Peter then goes even further than presenting Renaud as Christ's friend - he 
almost becomes a Christ figure himself. No doubt Peter was not attempting to present 
Renaud as Christ himself, but there are allusions to Renaud as defeating death much as 
Christ did, and the agents of death, the Muslims. The comparison between his death and 
Christ's are striking. Like Christ, Renaud's death was a blessing of sorts from God, as they
670 ‘Confidite...fratres, regnum enim glorie nobis parata est’ (Have confidence...brothers, for the kingdom of 
glory is prepared for us’). Peter o f Blois, p. 54.
671 ‘In eo autem in quo passus est ipse et temptatus, auxiliator et eis qui temptantur’; Peter of Blois, p. 60.
672 M. Markowski, ‘Peter of Blois and the Conception of the Third Crusade’, in The Horns ofH attin, ed. B. Z. 
Kedar, Jerusalem, 1992, p. 263.
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both became martyrs, giving up their lives for a greater cause. Because only those who are 
worthy enough to receive this blessing are allowed to become martyrs, the deaths of both 
Christ and Renaud were 'blessings in disguise’.673 Their martyrdom underlines that they were 
worthy of that honour. Furthermore, because Renaud was a martyr, he received great things 
because of his death, and the manner in which he lived his life. He has gained 'possessio 
glorie, regnum celi, corona inmarcescibilis et pax vite', that which was started by Christ and 
is the aim of every Christian.
Finally, like Christ, Renaud was loved by others, his friends, who were very much 
moved by his end.674 However, in the same way as Christ's friends' sorrow turned to joy, so 
will that of Renaud's mourners.675 He, like Christ, will be resurrected after a period of time, 
as 'non mors, sed dormitio est'.676 The comparison between Renaud's death and that of 
Christ is one of the main methods by which Peter of Blois creates the image of Renaud. His 
death is like Christ's, therefore Renaud himself is like Christ.
The image of Renaud of Chatillon in the Passio Raginaldi is unequivocal. There is no 
room for anything but the highest praise for the martyr. It presents Renaud and the 
circumstances surrounding his death in intensely spiritual terms. The reason for this is that 
in order to try to persuade the rulers of Western Europe to leave the comfort and familiarity 
of their homelands, he had to appeal to the part of their life the importance of which could 
not be denied. This had to be the spiritual side. They had to be presented with the idea that, 
if  they took the cross, they would benefit, whatever the outcome. If the crusade was
673 ‘Venerant [Renaud and the others] ad locum martyrii', (‘They went to the place of martyrs’). Peter o f Blois, 
p. 63.
674 ‘Mors principis multos excitavit ad lacrimas’, (‘The death of the Prince moved many to tears’). Peter of 
Blois, p. 61. Although in the Bible, the people watching Christ's death were not said to have been moved to 
tears, they did 'beat their breasts' with sorrow (Luke 23 v. 48), a clear allusion to grief.
675 ‘Gaudeamus ergo, ffatres, nam et ipse gaudet ac tripudiat, introductus in gaudium domini sui’, Peter of 
Blois, p. 62.
676 Peter of Blois, p. 62.
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successful, they would have delivered Jerusalem from the polluting influence of the 
Muslims; if they died in the attempt, as Renaud did, they would be a martyr, with all the 
blessed benefits that entailed, and which were described in his writings.
One important issue to resolve is why Peter of Blois chose to concentrate on Renaud 
as his picture of the perfection of Christian martyrdom. The answer is that, out of all the 
nobility of the crusader states who were captured after the Battle of Hattln, Renaud was the 
only one who was killed. He was not the only one of the crusaders who were executed - 
thousands of Templars and Hospitallers were as well. But of the famous, important nobility 
of Jerusalem, it was Renaud alone who was executed. Raymond of Tripoli ran away from the 
battle, King Guy was captured but then released, as were others including Humphrey of 




The aims of this thesis were twofold: to study the image of 'the other' within 
chronicles of the crusading period, in order to open up new perspectives on the history and 
historiography of the Crusades; and to encourage the adoption of a new methodology within 
crusader studies, that of using Arabic sources and Latin sources in combination.677
Beginning with the latter point, it should be clear from the reading of the thesis that 
this methodology has great value. The employment of Arabic and Latin sources equally has 
brought out aspects of the personalities which have not previously been fully appreciated by 
crusade historians, such as the place ofll-Ghazi's struggles against the crusaders within his 
wider battles against the Seljuks. Furthermore, it has also helped in assessing the sources 
themselves. There has been a tendency in the past for crusade historians to use Arabic 
sources only as reference points when they agree with the Latin sources they have been 
using. This thesis has helped to show that each Arabic source has its own preoccupations 
and raison d'etre, and by understanding these it is possible to posit different explanations for 
how and why events came to pass. For example, the description of Renaud as particularly 
evil must be seen in the context of the great threat he posed to Salah al-Dm, a threat no 
other crusader was in a position to pose, and that the Arabic writers wanted to portray Salah 
al-DJn as being a great warrior for Islam, defending it against its enemies.
Moving to the former point, throughout the corpus of material utilised in this thesis, 
the individuals examined are reviled by the chroniclers from what is usually termed their 
religious opponents. These chroniclers, operating in a framework of what ‘us’ was, which 
had been developed before the First Crusade ever reached the Holy Land, used primarily 
religious imagery in order to underline this point. This religious imagery was used because it
677 - See above, pp. 1 2 -3 .
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was a way in which all members of their own community would be able to understand the 
significance of what was being written. Thus, both 11-Ghazl and Renaud of Chatillon are 
referred to as being devilish, or evil, at the very basic level to which the writers lowered 
themselves at times. Using terms such as these would ensure that all who heard their 
accounts, whether peasant or ruler, would have understood that these men were anathema. 
However, the bases of these images which are portrayed come not from religious sentiment, 
but instead from political or personal reasons. It has been demonstrated that both Salah al- 
Dln and Richard the Lionheart were praised highly by writers from their religious 
opponents, who were able to appreciate them. Both 11-Ghazl and Renaud, on the other hand, 
were not.
Instead, the presentation ofll-Ghazl as evil is based mainly on Walter the Chancellor’s 
witness of the torture of prisoners. While normal practice at the time, Walter, essentially an 
administrator, was in shock at what he saw, and his hyperbolic criticisms ofll-G hazl are 
based on this. As Walter’s chronicle was one of the main sources for the period of the 
111 0s/500s and 1120s/51 Os, William of Tyre’s presentation ofll-G hazl would have used 
that of Walter the Chancellor, and so the image of a particularly evil man was perpetuated. 
For the Eastern Christians writers, the image ofll-Ghazl was also that of an evil man, as he 
subjected their co-religionists in his lands and attacked other lands.
But evil is not the only way in which 11-Ghazl is presented -  although it is the main 
view the chroniclers attempted to underline. He was also powerful politically -  which is 
something that none could deny -  and militarily. The writers had to accept his power in 
these areas, as it was the basis for his ability to carry out persecution and evil.
The same reason for why 11-Ghazl was demonised in the Latin sources also applies for 
why Renaud is demonised in the Arab sources -  it was because of the personal 
preoccupations of the authors. It is established that for the period of Salah al-Dln’s reign, all
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later chroniclers, including Ibn al-Athlr and Ibn al-‘Adim, relied on the very harsh testimony 
of Baha’ al-Dln and ‘Imad al-Dln -  hardly the most neutral of commentators. They, in turn, 
were extremely critical of Renaud because of how great a threat he was to their master, 
Salah al-Dln, while they also highlighted Renaud’s strength in order to show how strong 
Salah al-Dln was too. His attacks on caravans and into the Red Sea are highlighted as evil in 
order to demonstrate the need the Islamic world had for a strong leader like Salah al-Dln at 
the time, and his arrogance is presented as another reason why he had to be confronted by 
Salah al-Dln, as it seems, from the chronicles, that there was nothing that Renaud would not 
considering doing. Thus, Renaud’s image in the Arabic sources comes from the desire of 
Salah al-Dln’s inner circle to praise their own leader of the time, and to make all who 
opposed him evil, both inside and outside the Islamic community.
Yet the Arab writers were almost equally caustic about 11-Ghazl, though for much 
more individualistic reasons. Ibn al-‘Adim, who was worked for the Zengids, the family who 
took over much of the lands 11-Ghazl had ruled, openly criticises him, presumably because 
he had to justify the Zengid takeover. For Ibn al-Qalansl and Ibn al-Athlr, on the other hand, 
11-Ghazl is more a figure of ambiguity. While he was portrayed as a sometime champion of 
the jihad, fighting against the crusaders in his last few years, something which was very 
important to the writers, he also had many vices -  not the least of which was his drinking -  
and as such, he was does, overall, appear negatively. In the case of Ibn al-Athlr, the negative 
view of 11-Ghazl must be caused, at least in part, by his being, like Ibn al-‘Adim, in the 
service of the Zengids, while those from the -  much later -  non-Zengid historiographical 
traditions did not change the bias against 11-Ghazl of the pro-Zengid historians. Ibn al- 
Azraq, on the other hand, was in the employ of Artuqids, and so took every opportunity he 
could to praise 11-Ghazl as a great leader. Thus, when comparing the image of 11-Ghazl 
across time and religious divide -  when compared to the Christian view of him -  very few
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differences appear. While they all had their own reasons for presented Tl-Ghazi in a negative 
light, the negativity itself was remarkably consistent. Only Ibn al-Azraq, the author of the 
history of the Artuqids, presents him in a postive light. This, though, I would suggest, 
comes from the fact that the power of the Artuqid dynasty was severely restricted not long 
after 11-Ghazi’s death, and so, following this, the power of the Artuqids to create 
propaganda for themselves, against others, diminished. Political power dictated the sources 
we have for the period, and thus Zengid political strength must be taken into account when 
examining sources for the history of Il-Ghazi and northern Syria during this period.
In the same way as the Arab writers, each of the Latin chroniclers had their own way 
of viewing Renaud, caused by their own concerns in writing. The continuators of William of 
Tyre based their image of Renaud on the testimony of one man whose family was very 
hostile to Renaud, and so regarded him as an ‘other’, politically at least. Peter of Blois used 
Renaud as an ‘us’; a true Christian knight, in order to forward his own opinions over the 
condition of the crusader states. William of Tyre, on the other hand, seems to have been 
much more ambiguous, and his hostility towards Renaud while he was Prince of Antioch -  
being an ‘other’ because of his actions, was replaced by praise of his actions in Jerusalem 
after his imprisonment in Aleppo. In the same way as Il-Ghazi, Renaud’s image is fairly 
consistent across the Christian-Muslim divide, though not because the writers had the same 
preoccupations. Instead, their own political ideas coincided coincidentally, with the result 
that Renaud has been regarded as a troublemaker by crusade historians who have not taken 
into account the political considerations of the chroniclers. However, given the evidence 
presented about William of Tyre’s image of Renaud, I hope that this thesis will prove that 
he has been harshly treated and is in need of much more study.
The comparison of sources from their own religious communities, compared with 
those from the other side of the divide, highlights some interesting points. Firstly, it cannot
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be assumed that just because the chronicler and the figure they wrote about shared the same 
religious rite, does not mean that they can be yoked together as an ‘us’. Instead -  as can be 
most clearly seen in Ibn al-‘Adim’s account of Il-Ghazi and the Eracles text on Renaud, both 
of which heavily criticise their subject -  new ideas of ‘us’ and the ‘other’ are created, a 
dividing line caused by political disagreements within the religious community. A second, 
and related, point is that the writers from across the religious divide sometimes agreed with 
each other because they despised an individual. This means that through their writings they 
created a new ‘us’, one whose focus is based on mutual loathing for someone.
When comparing these ideas to how the Greeks wrote, it seems that the image of 
Renaud came about for much the same reason. The two Greek writers, Niketas Choniates 
and John Kinnamos, both had individual reasons for writing as they did -  Choniates wanted 
to highlight the power and majesty of his emperor, so presented Renaud as a hugely 
powerful ruler, yet one who still had to bow to the emperor, so awesome was the Greek 
ruler; while Kinnamos, too, tried to praise the emperor, albeit by showing Renaud as evil 
and hopeless as ruler of Antioch, as town which would have been much happier under the 
rule of the Byzantine emperor. Instead of viewing themselves as an ‘us’ with the Latin 
Renaud, they instead saw him as part of an ‘other’, because of the religio-political disputes 
of the time, and so painted an image of Renaud which was solely based on their desire to 
highlight the greatness of their ‘us’.
The assumption that this thesis began with was that during the Crusades, the idea of 
the evil ‘other’ was based merely along religious grounds. However, this is too simplistic. A 
religious divide certainly could, and indeed was, used by chroniclers to underline a position 
of despising someone from the other side of that divide. But there was a much deeper divide 
in the politics which could blur the ideas of what defined ‘us’ and what defined ‘the other’. 
What this thesis has shown is that the whole idea of what an evil ‘other’ is in the crusading
201
period is extremely complicated and is not based on religious boundaries. Instead, by basing 
their writings on their own preoccupations, the chroniclers would build new, fluid, inter­
religious constructions of identity, constructions which could change within a short space in 
the chronicles. The images of Renaud of Chatillon and Il-GhazI are thus based not on 
objective analysis, but upon being building blocks on which the ideas of the writers are both 
constructed, and upon which they depend.
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Glossary:
ghazi- A Muslim warrior, usually associated with fighting in the jihad
jih a d -  Literally meaning ‘struggle’, but more commonly applied to the Muslims’ physical 
struggle against non-Muslims.
1m iqta‘-  Someone who was given the right to tax an area in exchange for military service.
qadi- A religious judge.
shihna -  Military governor of a town.
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